


ASIA

LIBRARY  
ANNEX

2



Cornell University Library  
Ithaca, New York

CHARLES WILLIAM WASON  
COLLECTION  
CHINA AND THE CHINESE

THE GIFT OF  
CHARLES WILLIAM WASON  
CLASS OF 1876  
1918



The date shows when this volume was taken.

call and

Cornell University Library  
DS 548.N84

Tonkin, or, France in the Far East /



3 1924 023 040 581

ech

DATE DUE

DEC 19 1970			
GAYLORD			PRINTED IN U.S.A.



## Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in  
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in  
the United States on the use of the text.

TONKIN

Chas. A. Mason

9/19/14



# TONKIN

OR

## FRANCE IN THE FAR EAST

BY

C. B. NORMAN,

LATE CAPTAIN BENGAL STAFF CORPS AND 90TH LIGHT INFANTRY,

*Author of "Armenia and the Campaign of 1877."*

**With Maps.**

LONDON :

CHAPMAN & HALL, LIMITED,

11, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

1884.

G

C O R

Wason  
DS 548  
N 84

W2624

CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS,  
CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS.



## PREFACE.

---

WITHIN the last few months France has been deluged by a shower of books bearing on the Tonkin question. In none of these—and I think I have perused almost every scrap of writing that has appeared on the subject—have I discovered any symptom of astonishment, any expression of reprobation, at the course adopted by the Government of the Republic in its political or military policy. The French public and the French press seem to take it for granted that their Foreign Ministers should be guilty of duplicity, and their military commanders of cruelty. No stern rebuke has been meted out to M. Ferry for his garbled telegram relative to the disavowal by the Pekin Government of the Marquis Tseng, nor have Admiral Courbet or General Bouët been reprimanded for the wholesale execution of their prisoners. On the contrary, French writers applaud these excesses. “*Pas de quartier pour ces brigands qui ont assassiné*

*les nôtres! Quant aux mandarins qui nous ont trahis, il faut en faire une razzia complète et les fusiller sans pitié!*" Such is the language adopted by a nation which poses as the champion of civilisation and of Christendom.

The dispute between France and China concerns us in no small degree; eventually we must interfere either as a mediator or as an ally. For the preservation of the peace of the world and of that *entente cordiale* which now exists between Western and Eastern civilisation, it would be wiser that our interference should be immediate. When once the dogs of war are loose it will be hard to call them in, and our mediation then will not be so acceptable. All impartial observers are agreed as to the unjustifiable course France is pursuing, not only as regards Annam but also as regards Madagascar. Unless the European Powers speak plainly to France, the flames of war she is now kindling in Eastern waters will speedily be borne to the westward, and we shall be involved in a struggle which by judicious firmness at the present moment may well be averted.

The Republic is playing a braggart's game. She feels that her very existence is dependent on France being fed with glory, and her Ministers indulge in vain hopes that the grievous burden of taxation

will be forgotten in the glamour of a successful campaign. But war breeds war, and defeat is the twin to victory. Sedan was the corollary to Mexico ; will Son Tay be avenged in Paris ?

In the following pages I have endeavoured to recount the true history of the Tonkin question. I have quoted largely from official papers, and in order that I may not be accused of garbled translations I have given the actual text of all my authorities. Out of the mouths of her own Ministers France stands convicted of tyranny, greed, cruelty, and unscrupulousness ; and if I can bring this conviction home to anyone who now believes in the purity and disinterestedness of French Republican ideas, I shall rest satisfied.

C. B. NORMAN.



# CONTENTS.

---

## CHAPTER I.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION.—THE COLONIAL POLICY OF FRANCE . . .	1

Attempts of the French to ruin British Commerce—Decree of the French Directory in 1798—Expedition to Denmark—Berlin Decree—Present Feverish Activity of France evidently directed against England—A Frenchman's Opinion of France.

## CHAPTER II.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF TONKIN, ITS CUSTOMS AND UNSUITABILITY FOR COLONISATION . . . . .	16
---	----

Annam and China—Political Divisions of Annam—Geographical Description of Annam—Its Capital Hué—Tonkin—Its Rivers—Hanoi—Agricultural and Mineral Wealth—Government of Annam—The Mandarins—Its Army—Its Internal Administration—Commerce—Unsuitability for Colonisation—French Government forbids Colonisation.

## CHAPTER III.

EARLY RELATIONS OF FRANCE WITH ANNAM: 1787–1872 . . .	39
---	----

Early History of Annam ; Its Separation from China ; Its King expelled in 1785—Solicits Aid from France—A Missionary

Bishop's Views of the Value of Annam to France—Treaty between France and Annam, 1787—The Exile King regains his Kingdom with the help of the French—Persecution of the Missionaries by his Successors—French propagate the Gospel by means of Bombardments in 1847, 1856, and 1858, and finally wrest Southern Annam from the King—Treaty of 1862 between the French and Annamites—In 1868 French Annex more Territory—Reconnoitre Tonkin in 1872 with a View of Annexation, and there learn that Chinese Troops occupy the Principal Fortresses—Captain Senez saved by Chinese Commandant of Bac Ninh—Arrival of M. Dupuis' Expedition on the Red River.

CHAPTER IV.

THE EXPEDITION OF M. DUPUIS IN 1872 . . . . .	73
---	----

Monsieur Dupuis—His Land Journeys to Yunnan—Obtains the Authorisation of the Chinese to convey Arms to Yunnan by the Red River—Sails under the Chinese Flag—Opposition of the Authorities in Tonkin—Support afforded him by Captain Senez—Dupuis reaches Hanoi, and finally ascends the River to Yunnan—Prepares for a Second Journey—Adopts an aggressive attitude, and threatens the Annamite Authorities—Dupuis appeals to Saigon, the Mandarins to Hué—King Tu Duc forwards Complaint to French Governor at Saigon.

CHAPTER V.

TU DUC APPEALS TO SAIGON AGAINST DUPUIS. ADMIRAL DUPRÉ AND M. GARNIER . . . . .	92
--	----

The Dilemma of Admiral Dupré—Is forbidden by the Home Ministry to bring on a Rupture with Annam—Dupré's Letter to the French Ministry—Appoints Lieutenant Garnier

## CONTENTS.

xi

PAGE

as Envoy to Hanoi to settle Dispute—M. Henri Garnier—His Early Career—Qualifications for the Post somewhat vitiated by his Anti-English Bias—His Day-Dreams—Admiral Dupré's Letters to Viceroy of Canton and of Yunnan—His Threats to the Court of Hué—Garnier's Views on the Situation—His Letters on the Subject—His Unfinished Essay on Tonkin.

### CHAPTER VI.

CAPTURE OF THE DELTA OF THE RED RIVER BY M. GARNIER,

1873 . . . . . 118

M. Garnier leaves Saigon for Tonkin—Loses one of his Ships—His Letter to M. Dupuis—Reaches Hanoi by Dupuis' Aid—Bad Effect of this Unpolitic Step on the Mandarins of Hanoi—His Brusque Demands—Opposition of the Tonkin Authorities—Garnier's Injudicious Proclamation—Firm Attitude adopted by the Governor of Hanoi—Garnier's Second Proclamation—His Ultimatum—Storms and captures the Citadel—Fresh Proclamation—Expeditions to the various Forts on the Delta—Death of Garnier.

### CHAPTER VII.

PACIFIC NEGOTIATIONS OF M. PHILASTRE . . . . . 140

Disapproval of Garnier's Measures by Admiral Dupré—M. Philastre appointed Political Officer to Garnier's Force—Philastre's Letter to Garnier—Philastre visits Hué to ascertain the King's Real Wishes—Proceeds to the Red River and learns of Garnier's Death—Has previously determined to evacuate Tonkin—Issues Orders to this Effect—Ratification of the New Treaty—Extracts from it—The Treaty of Commerce.

## CHAPTER VIII.

	PAGE
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN PHILASTRE'S TREATY AND RIVIÈRE'S ACTION . . . . .	157

French Jealousy of England—France determines on the Annexation of Annam—The Treaty of 1874 an Infringement of that of Tientsin—The Duc Decazes counsels Prudence—Extracts from the Duke's Despatch—The Colonial Minister counsels a Protectorate, but the Duke says "*Plus tard*"—The Caution of the French Ambassador at Pekin—China refuses to open Yunnan to Commerce—Tu Duc continues to pay Tribute to China—France determines on enforcing a more clearly-defined Treaty on Annam—Tu Duc throws himself into the Arms of China—France consequently declares for War—The Marquis Tseng demands Explanations—Discourteous Treatment accorded to his Despatch—M. Le Myre de Vilers endeavours to avoid Hostilities—His Instructions to M. Rivière.

## CHAPTER IX.

RIVIÈRE'S EXPEDITION TO THE RED RIVER, 1882-83 . . .	186
--	-----

French Explorations in Tonkin—France seeks Pretexts to add the Country to her Colonies—The Rivière Expedition determined on—Text of Instructions given him—Pacific Measures insisted on—Rivière arrives at Hanoi—He at once adopts an aggressive attitude—Demands the Execution of a Fresh Treaty—The Mandarins refuse to treat with him—Rivière assaults and captures Hanoi—The Governor of Saigon disapproves of his Conduct, and orders Restitution of the Citadel, but the Ministry support Rivière—Attack on and capture of Nam Dinh—French hang their Prisoners—Attack on Hanoi by Annamites—French demonstrate towards Son Tay—Proclamation by the Black Flags, who again attack Hanoi, but are repulsed—Rivière's Final Sortie—He is slain—Defeat of the French.



## CHAPTER X.

	PAGE
OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO RIVIÈRE'S DEATH . . . .	219

French evacuate Coast Towns and strengthen Hanoi—General Bouët assumes Command in Tonkin, and adopts a Defensive Attitude—Annamite Assaults on Haiphong and Nam Dinh repulsed—Successful Sorties by Colonel Badens—Proclamation by the new French Civil Commissioner—Bouët undertakes a Sortie, is defeated on 19th May, 1883, and driven back in disorder on Hanoi—They obtain successes, however, in Lower Tonkin—An Ultimatum sent to Hué—Death of Tu Duc—Bombardment and Capture of Hué—Execution of Prisoners—Fresh Treaty concluded with the Young King—China formally protests and prepares for War—Bouët undertakes another Sortie on 2nd September and is again checked—Recall of General Bouët—Admiral Courbet assumes Command—Continues the cautious Policy of Bouët—Colonel Badens' Success at Ninh Binh—Son Tay captured on 14th December, 1883—Excesses committed by the French Troops—Quarter refused—Prisoners butchered.

## CHAPTER XI.

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND CHINA DURING 1882-83	246
--	-----

Fresh Remonstrances by the Marquis Tseng, met with Discourteous Reply on the part of the French Ministers—Venue of Negotiations changed to Peking—France declines to recognise Suzerainty of China over Annam—Copies of Letters from Tu Duc to the Emperor of China—M. Bourée, French Ambassador at Peking, counsels Moderation—His Views opposed by the Ministry, who demand Withdrawal of Chinese Troops from Tonkin and Recognition of French Protectorate over Annam—Tseng-li-Yamen refuse French Demands—Attitude of M. Challemel Lacour—His Opposition to M. Bourée, who plainly points out Danger of War—France pushes on her War Preparations, and whilst assuring the Marquis Tseng of her Pacific Intentions towards Annam attacks Hué—M. Ferry endeavours to throw Discredit on the Marquis Tseng—Fresh Reinforcements sent to Tonkin—General Millot named to the Chief Command.

## CHAPTER XII.

	PAGE
THE MILITARY FORCES OF FRANCE AND CHINA . . . . .	272

Present Condition of the French Army—Its Unsuitability for Colonial Warfare—Lord Clyde on Volunteering—Composition of French Battalions in Tonkin—The Chinese Army—The Army of Manchuria—The Army of the Centre—The Army of Turkestan—The Territorial Army—The Population of China—Characteristics of Chinese Soldiers—Tartar Horsemen—Lieutenant C. M. MacGregor—Chinese Gordon's Advice to China—The French Navy—Coal—French and Chinese Sailors—The Chinese Fleet—List of Vessels—The Armed Strength of China.

## CHAPTER XIII.

FRANCE AS A COLONIAL POWER . . . . .	295
--------------------------------------	-----

Failure of France to Retain her Colonies—Her fresh Attempts to induce Emigration to Algeria—Bureaucracy in her Colonies—French Views of introducing Civilisation—M. Waldeck Rousseau and M. de Grainville on extending the Colonial System of France—To massacre without pity all who oppose French Views of Civilisation—The French Soldier the Advance Guard of Civilisation!—Bombardment of Defenceless Villages a means of spreading French Civilisation—France outrages the Feelings of every European Nation—Her Hatred to England now extends to Germany—Her Power of injuring our Trade—Internal Expenditure and Official Corruption—Aggressive and Cruel Nature of the War in Tonkin—Difference between Algeria and the Punjab—Security of Life in British Colonies—Comparison between Moral and Physical Force as a Safeguard in Colonies—Connection between England and Annam—Real Danger to France when she loses Support of her Flotilla—Enormous Expenditure necessary for carrying on the War.

CONTENTS.

XV

CHAPTER XIV.

	PAGE
FRANCE AS A COMMERCIAL POWER . . . . .	329

Ignorance of Frenchmen on General Matters unconnected with their own Country—Les Droits et l'Honneur de la France—Jealousy of England, which must naturally benefit from all extension of the Colonial System of France—M. Thureau on French Commerce—M. Ferry and M. de Saint-Vallier on the Same Subject—Mercantile Navy of France—France fails to benefit commercially by her Colonies, which afford Employment to Officials and drain the Pecuniary Resources of the Mother Country—Tyranny of the Republic—Real Cause of French Decadence.

APPENDIX.

ANSWER OF PRINCE KONG TO TREATY OF 1874 . . . . .	341
---	-----



# TONKIN.

---

## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTION.—THE COLONIAL POLICY OF FRANCE.

THE greatness of England is so intimately bound up with the safety and development of her distant possessions, and the ramifications of her colonial system are so intricate and extensive, that any movement on the part of a European Power to extend its colonies is, politically as well as commercially, an affair not only of interest but of importance to all Englishmen. Politically, because even now in the event of war many of our colonies would be sources, if not of actual danger, at any rate of very grave anxiety; the establishment in their vicinity of military settlements belonging to another Power would necessitate the further dislocation of our forces, none too large for the efficient protection of the British Empire. Commercially, because the

52

annexation of fresh territories by European Powers means the divergence of trade to other markets; and though so long as the carrying power of the world is confided to the Union Jack, there is little danger of England suffering very materially in this respect, yet every new colony created by a rival means a certain loss of power to us.

When, therefore, we see a neighbour, enlarging her border by means savouring strongly of aggression, and when these aggressions tend to the absorption of small States hitherto friendly towards us, and to the establishment of military depôts and naval arsenals in positions threatening the safety of our main arteries of commerce; when these aggressions are openly spoken of as being undertaken for the express purpose of ruining English trade, it becomes a matter of some importance, not merely to our Cabinets but to our Chambers of Commerce, as to whether it is compatible with our national honour and our national security to look unconcernedly on the career of conquest France seems to have marked out in tropical countries.

Jealousy of England's commercial supremacy is a national trait in the French character. For close upon a century, every effort has been made by successive forms of Government in France, in times

of peace as well as in time of war, to damage English trade and to ruin English commerce; we are denounced as a nation of shopkeepers, but Frenchmen have shown themselves not more anxious to ruin the shop than to take the custom into their own hands.

The destruction of British commerce was the idea underlying the whole course of the wars of the Revolution and of the Empire. Antwerp as a French sea-port was to have caused the downfall of London as the metropolis of the world, and gallant were the efforts made to convert the Scheldt into the Thames of France. The Decree issued by the French Directory on the 18th January, 1798, was a malignant stroke towards the destruction of our trade. Not only were all English vessels with their crews lawful prize (the two nations being at war this was fair and just); but all vessels of *any* nationality found on the high seas with any English goods on board were also declared good and lawful prize; all neutral sailors found on English ships were to be sentenced to death, and all French harbours closed to vessels which had touched at any English port.

On Napoleon assuming the Consulate, he determined still further to prosecute designs against our commerce, which had not suffered as much as was

anticipated by the Decree of January, 1798. He was not long in persuading the Northern Powers to aid the fleets of France and Spain in chasing the English from the sea. The strength of the combined squadrons in the Baltic at that time amounted to 123 line-of-battle ships and 68 frigates. The energy of our Government in despatching Hyde Parker and Nelson to prevent the coalition of this armada, and the daring of our admirals—who, with 18 sail of the line and 4 frigates, did not hesitate to embark on a task where they were outnumbered six to one—crushed the maritime league, and for a time damped the ardour of our enemies. After the successful campaign of Jena, Napoleon once more felt himself strong enough to recommence his designs against us, and by the famous Berlin Decree of the 21st November, 1806, European harbours were closed to British ships, British sailors were treated as pirates, and British goods forbidden entry to the Continent. Again did our admirals, disdaining the odds against them, shatter the fleets which were destined to destroy our merchantmen; and the result has been that, for upwards of three-quarters of a century, the British flag has sailed unmolested over the world.

The feeling which prompted the ill-judged and futile decree of Directories, Consulates, and Empires



is still rife in the Republic of France, and we have abundant evidence in the public press and in the utterances of public men, that the feverish activity France is displaying in all quarters of the globe is not for the purpose of colonisation—for colonisation in Tonkin, on the Congo, or in Madagascar is impossible; not for the purpose of developing trade—for an increased trade with her small merchant fleet is out of the question; but for the express purpose of interfering with our trade by the introduction of her own prohibitive tariffs in these countries in time of peace, and to form bases of attack upon our merchantmen in time of war.

So long as her rivalry is fair and above-board, so long as her commerce is developed by peaceful means, England and Englishmen would welcome the regeneration of France and the reappearance of her flag in distant waters; but when diplomacy is carried on by means of duplicity aided by threats, when treaties of commerce are signed to the accompaniment of bombardments, and valuable provinces filched by armed mercantile expeditions, it is impossible to avoid the feeling that the fact of France becoming a neighbour in Asia is not a guarantee for peace. Her colonial enterprises of the last century and her exploits in the East were one

and all directed against the power of England; her recent expeditions are being undertaken evidently with the same view. Mauritius was occupied to enable French cruisers to prey on our East Indiamen. Louis XVI. volunteered armed aid to Annam, in order to cut off Calcutta from Canton.

The policy of France in the nineteenth century is framed on the principles which guided her in the eighteenth. The possession of Madagascar would give France a secure base from which to threaten our colonies in Africa, or to make descents on those islands in the possession of which we were confirmed by the Congress of Vienna; but a French occupation of Tonkin is a far more serious matter, and one to the importance of which England does not seem fully alive.

The northernmost province of the Kingdom of Annam, lying conterminous to the southern frontier of China, Tonkin is in itself one of the richest and most valuable districts in the great Indo-Chinese peninsula; watered by a magnificent stream which is navigable for some hundreds of miles, it forms one of the principal outlets for the wealth of South-Western China, and consequently has been jealously guarded both by the Government of the

Celestial Empire and by that of her vassal Annam. Merely as a means towards securing this valuable trade, the possession of Tonkin is much to be desired, but there are other advantages which render it no less desirable. The southern slopes of the mountains which form its northern boundary are clothed with forests, similar to those which constitute so much of the wealth of Burmah; the districts in the vicinity of the many rivers are among the richest rice-producing lands of the world; tea is also found among its exports; and what makes it of more value to the French, of more danger to us, coal, in apparently inexhaustible quantities and of excellent quality, exists in more than one locality within a reasonable distance of the sea.

It must not be forgotten that by the Treaty of Frankfort of 1871 the large coal-fields of Western France were, with some unimportant exceptions, wrested from her. French railways and French vessels are now to a very great extent dependent on this country for fuel, and the distant naval stations of France are entirely so. In the event of a European war, the magnificent ironclads of the Republic would be paralysed for want of coal, and her distant colonies would fall an easy prey to the nation which possesses supplies of fuel in the

East. But though England has rich coal-fields in India, her railways and steamships still depend on the mother-country for their supplies; and should a war break out which placed France and England on opposite sides, the endeavours to destroy our commerce which failed in the early days of the nineteenth century would now be put in force with double vigour. French cruisers supplied with coal from the mines of Tonkin would lie in the fairway of our China trade, Burmah and Calcutta would be effectually blockaded, and the safety of our Eastern possessions gravely compromised.

French papers have not hesitated to point out that in a naval war between France and England, despite our apparent advantages, we should inevitably be the loser. The truth of this assertion cannot be combated. England possesses in round numbers, on the books of the *Bureau Veritas*, 18,000 sailing ships and 4700 steamers, with an aggregate tonnage of upwards of 11,000,000; France owns 2490 ships, of which 458 are steamers, their aggregate tonnage amounting to 1,000,000. The protection of our merchant fleets would be a matter of impossibility, and one French *Alabama* in Eastern waters, with the friendly harbours of Tonkin in which to run for refit and supply, might cripple our Eastern trade. True,

our merchant skippers in olden days never hesitated to engage French ships of war, and more often than not were victorious—to wit, the gallant action which has given a succession of *Glattons* to our navy. There would be a poor chance for a French cruiser when opposed to a well-found and well-armed Peninsular and Oriental steamer; but just as the old East Indiamen were shunned, and weaker craft singled out for attack in the wars of the Consulate and the Empire, so in a future campaign would our smaller steamers fall the more ready prey. If the possession of the coal-fields of the Red River is debarred to France, and she permitted to remain in undisputed possession of her present colonies of Cochin-China, we may look with equanimity on her efforts to harm us in the East.

The whole history of the French in Annam is indissolubly bound up with the history of their efforts to destroy our Eastern supremacy. The memorandum of Bishop Pigneau de Béhaine of 1787, the letters of Garnier and Admiral Dupré in 1873, those of Rivière ten years later, and the journals of the present day, all breathe the same spirit. When the worthy bishop a hundred years ago persuaded his sovereign to put King Gia Long on the throne of Annam, in dwelling on the advantages a footing in that country would

give France, he wrote : “ On suppose que le moyen le plus sûr de combattre les Anglais dans l’Inde est de ruiner ou d’affaiblir leur commerce.” In 1873 the enthusiast Garnier, who lost his life in endeavouring to force a commercial treaty on the mandarins of Hanoi, wrote : “ J’y veux un arsenal français et le commencement d’une voie ferrée reliant le fleuve du Tonkin à Yunnan, les Anglais ne se relèveront pas de celle-là.”

The *Soleil*, in its issue of the 1st December, 1883, when discussing the Tonkin question went still further. It called to the memories of the readers the glorious projects of Duplex, the visions of a French empire in the East, and the loss of those stations in Egypt, the Mediterranean, and the Red Sea, which once barred England’s road to India :

“ Avant de songer à avoir un grand empire dans l’Extrême-Orient, la France aurait dû s’assurer des stations dans la Méditerranée et dans la mer Rouge et veiller à l’indépendance du canal de Suez.—H. DE KEROHANT.”

Those who have studied the temper of the French people or the language of the French press during the last few years, have noticed a very marked change in their bearing towards the English. There seems to be a general feeling abroad in France,

that the next war in which she is engaged will be one against us; and the strengthening of her fleets, and completion of harbours of refuge in the Channel, are openly stated to be precautionary measures of defence. The Madagascar incident met with the warmest approval of the country; journals of all shades loudly applauded the conduct of Admiral Pierre, and denounced the Ministry which sanctioned the compensation to the missionary; some even going so far as to assert that, as the indemnity to Consul Pritchard had never been paid, so would it be advisable to neglect to recoup Mr. Shaw. M. Waddington, with that spirit of patriotism which so well became him, boldly announced at the Mansion House that France was a peace-loving nation; but history goes far to disprove his words, even if the recent action of the Republic in Asia and Africa did not belie them. The Comte de Gasparini wrote in 1881:

“ La guerre nous amuse; fils des anciens Gaulois, qui ne connaissaient d'autre plaisir que de se battre, qui brûlaient le Capitole et laissaient leur nom à la Galatie. Nous avons besoin de remuer beaucoup.

“ Nous sommes passés à l'état d'enfants terribles. On nous redoute comme une sorte de danger public. Que fera la France, que prépare-t-elle,

qui attaquera-t-elle, que va-t-elle convoiter? Il n'y a pas un quart d'heure de tranquillité pour qui que ce soit. Tantôt c'est la guerre, et l'Europe arme à l'outrance, se demandant chaque matin si la France ne va pas donner le signal. Tantôt c'est la révolution, et l'Europe, troublée, se demande si l'anarchie ne va pas commencer chez nous, pour l'envahir après. Quand un de nos Gouvernements a duré une quinzaine d'années, on sait que ses jours sont comptés, que le feu va éclater dans Paris, et que l'incendie s'étendra partout. J'ai entendu des gens graves proposer sérieusement que l'Europe fatiguée mît une bonne fois la France en régie pour en finir avec ces périls incessants.

“La France révolutionnaire inquiète encore plus que la France guerrière. Non-seulement la France subit la révolution, mais elle la pratique en grand; le peuple entier y met la main, et, sous prétexte de liberté, volontiers elle en secouerait les torches aux quatre coins de l'horizon. Ne nous y trompons pas, le voisinage des volcans ne plaît à personne.”

In fact, war seems the only means French Governments can devise to turn the attention of the populace from the grievances they suffer at home. A successful campaign may enable a Ministry to impose an additional tax, or to prop up its tottering



foundations. A little glory has ever been a panacea for all French ills, but France forgets that its glories have never been lasting. It is difficult to see in what direction fresh imposts could be levied, even if a successful campaign strengthened the hands of the present Government. The taxation of the country appears to have reached its furthest limits; each year shows an ever-increasing deficit, and yet the colonial policy France is now pursuing necessitates large expenditure, shows no return, and promises to involve the country in a war which can only bring a modicum of glory, and may involve her in financial ruin. The last war, which the Parisians fondly imagined would be a military promenade to Berlin, added £350,000,000 to the National Debt of France, and since 1875 upwards of £40,000,000 has been spent in replacing material lost in that campaign. The credits demanded by the Chamber for the prosecution of the Tonkin Expedition in 1878 show either that the Executive altogether underrates the gravity of the task before it, or that it dares not appeal to the country for sufficient money to conduct the war on a scale commensurate with its importance. Already the strength of the forces in the field, or under orders for service, exceed those we sent either to Abyssinia in 1868 or to South Africa in 1879,

yet the Ministry imagine that the operations will be brought to a successful termination for something under a couple of millions sterling. The deadlock which exists in Tonkin is solely due to the fact that France commenced the struggle with inefficient means and with commanders ignorant of Oriental tactics. Garnier, in 1873, with 180 seamen and marines, fancied he could conquer and hold the Delta. Rivière, with a force of 230 men (according to M. Le Myre de Villers' letter to M. Ferry of the 2nd December, 1883), seized Hanoi, and thus applied the match to a conflagration which Admiral Courbet, with close on 10,000 troops and a strong flotilla, dares not attempt to cope with.

The difficulties which now beset France are not of recent creation ; for close on a hundred years she has had relations with the Kingdom of Annam, and a history of these relations redounds to the credit of neither party. Crass superstition and barbaric pride on the one side have been pitted against Western arrogance and the unscrupulous use of civilised force on the other. The result has been that the Kingdom of Annam, shorn of its southern provinces by the expedition of 1862, now finds her northern districts in the grasp of the invader. The king may well liken himself to the earthen pot between two iron vessels.

The following chapters recount the story of the French dealings in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. I lay claim to the advancement of no original views, but after a careful perusal of very many French works on the subject, and close study of all published official documents and recent periodical literature, I cannot avoid arriving at the conclusion which many thousands of Frenchmen of all shades of political opinions have arrived at—viz., that the history of the French in Tonkin is but a record of crimes. It is a record of these crimes that I now publish, with a view of calling public attention in England to the colonial policy of France, and to show what the real end and aim of that colonial policy is.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE GEOGRAPHY OF TONKIN, ITS CUSTOMS AND UNSUITABILITY FOR COLONISATION.

THAT great peninsula lying to the east of Hindostan, and known to us by the name of Further India, to the French by that of *Indo-Chine*, was, up to the commencement of the fifteenth century, an integral portion of the Celestial Empire. One by one the various tribes threw off the Chinese yoke, and grouped themselves in the three separate kingdoms of Burmah, Siam, and Annam, but though the bonds between China and its distant provinces were loosened, they were by no means cast off; it was to their mutual benefit that connection between them should still continue, and though the sovereigns of the new kingdoms are virtually independent, they forward from time to time tribute to Peking, and monarchs on ascending the throne demand recognition of their rights.

The Kingdom of Annam forms the eastern fringe of this great peninsula, and Tonkin, as its name implies, is the northern portion of the realm. Prior to the campaign of 1862, when the lower provinces were conquered and annexed by the French, the Kingdom of Annam consisted of thirty-one provinces, these forming three distinct groups, which for convenience may here be divided.

*The First or Southern Division*, sometimes styled Lower Cochin-China, consisted of the provinces of Saigon, Bien Hoa, Mytho, Kulong, Chandoc, and Ha-tien. Of these, the three first were annexed by France under the terms of the Treaty of 1862, which the king was compelled to sign after the bombardment and capture of Saigon. The three latter provinces were occupied and annexed some years later, but main force only sanctioned their appropriation until the very loosely-worded Treaty of 1874 confirmed them to France.

*The Second or Central Division*, now known as *Annam*. This comprises the twelve narrow coast-line provinces of Binh Thuan, Khan Hoa, Phu Yen, Bin Dinh, Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, Quang Due, Quang Tai, Quang Binh, Ha-Tinh, Ngean, and Tan Hoa. Until 1883, these remained in undisputed possession of the king; but in August of that year, the

bombardment and occupation of Hué as a means of opening the Red River to trade jeopardised even their claim to independence, the Government of the French Republic assuming a protectorate over the whole kingdom by virtue of a paragraph in the Treaty of 1874, the text of which is given on page 148.

*The Third or Northern Division* is known as Tonkin ; it consists of the thirteen provinces of Cao Ban, Langson, Thai Nguyen, Tuyen Quang, Quangyen, Hung Hoa, Bac Ninh, Son Tay, Hanoi, Haid Zuong, Hung Yen, Nam Dinh, and Ninh Binh ; in other words, Tonkin comprises all those provinces which are watered by the Red River and its tributaries. Not only is its protectorate claimed by the French, but it would seem as if they intended to occupy it as permanently as they have done the southern group of Annamite provinces.

Including Lower Cochin-China, which of course may now be considered a French possession, the Kingdom of Annam embraces in round numbers about 115,000 square miles. It comprises a narrow band of territory running parallel to the sea, some twenty-five or thirty miles in depth, until the mouth of the Red River is reached, where the province of Tonkin assumes the shape of a V. The coast-line commences

from the French frontier, runs to the north-east for a distance of about 200 miles to Cape Padaran, it then tends due north to the fifteenth parallel of latitude, when it bears north-west as far as the town of Vinh; it now tends off to the north-east and keeps this direction until the Chinese frontier is reached, the total sea-board being a little more than a thousand miles. A chain of mountains runs parallel to the coast at a distance seldom exceeding forty miles, bearing away to the north-west after passing the province of Tan Hoa, thus forming the water-shed of the southern tributaries of the Red River.

The coast of the southernmost province of Annam, viz. Binh Thuan, is cut up into a number of shallow bays, none of which are of value as affording harbours of refuge for shipping. The capital of this province was fortified towards the end of the last century by Colonel Ollivier, a French officer who accompanied the mission of M. Pigneau de Béhaine to Annam in 1788.

Just to the north of Cape Padaran, the frontier-line of the province of Khan Hoa is reached; this, with Phu Yen and Binh Dinh, form the easternmost districts of the country. The coast-line is deeply indented by a number of bays, offering excellent harbours. The most important of these is

Qui Non, in the province of Bin Dinh, one of the ports opened to commerce by the Treaty of 1874. The length of this bay is about five miles, with a breadth of about two, and a mean depth of twenty-six feet. The port is the residence of a French consul, who has an escort of a hundred men. These three provinces are, for the most part, level, well watered, and richly cultivated; rice and silk forming the principal exports. Off the province of Quang Nam lies the island of Culao Cham, with an excellent roadstead sheltered from all northerly breezes. The next most important point met with on the coast is the Bay of Tourane. Sheltered to the north by the peninsula of the same name, it is protected by two forts which were bombarded in 1859, prior to the French temporary occupation of the promontory—an occupation which lasted eight months, and which cost the Empire, it is said, over a thousand men, whose bones now bleach on the sands of this fever-stricken coast. The bay is about nine miles in extreme length and seven in breadth, with a depth, at low water, of sixteen feet.

North of Tourane we meet Cape Choumaie, and beyond that again the promontory of Thuan Ane, below which the Truong Tien, or river of Hué, runs into the sea; Hué, the capital, is situated



at a distance of about fifteen miles from the coast. The entrance to the river is protected naturally by a sandy bar, which only admits of the passage of vessels drawing under twelve feet. Larger ships are forced to lie in the harbour of Thuan An. The course of the Truong Tien from Hué to the sea is studded on either bank with forts, and here and there, under fire of the forts, obstructions have been raised to render the approach to the capital more difficult.

Hué, on the left bank of the Truong Tien, contains, it is said, 100,000 inhabitants. It is surrounded by a masonry wall and ditch; the ramparts are in the form of a square, with sides of about 2000 yards; they are constructed of brick and have a relief of thirty-four feet, the ditch being fifteen feet deep and capable of being flooded at pleasure. An inner enceinte gives cover to the garrison; whilst a third work, or citadel, is the royal residence. The fortress was constructed on its present lines by French officers at the end of the last century, and, possessing as it does excellent flank defences, was in those days a very formidable work; the great range of modern firearms has, however, diminished its value, for some hills about 1500 yards to the south-east completely command the city, and so render it from a military point of view of little

importance, whilst the formidable bar at the mouth of the Truong Tien prevents it ever obtaining a position as a commercial port.

Tonkin—which, as we said before, comprises the thirteen northern provinces of the Kingdom of Annam—is bounded on the west by the north-eastern districts of Siam and Burmah, on the north by the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Quang Si, and on the east by the sea. It lies between the 18th and 22nd degrees of north latitude and the 104th and 106th of east longitude, and contains a superficial area of about 70,000 square miles, with an estimated population of 12,000,000.

The northern and western frontiers of the country are formed by lofty mountain ranges, clothed with magnificent forests of teak and other valuable wood. From these ranges spring innumerable rivers, which traverse the central plains in every direction, rendering them marvellously fertile. In addition to these natural means of irrigation, the Tonkinois have constructed a vast network of canals connecting the streams, thus enabling them to flood the rice-fields which cover these fertile plains; and though the agricultural wealth of their country is enhanced, and the means of water communication in flat-bottomed boats of slight draught rendered facile,

the general health of the inhabitants is sapped by fever, and land routes are practically unknown. These minor streams, whether from the mountains on the Siamese or the Chinese border, all find their way to the Red River, adding their mite to that gigantic volume of water on which the French hope to find a ready access to the southern provinces of China. On entering the low-lying alluvial lands in the east of Tonkin the Red River opens out into four great branches, each of which has its own outlet; all are navigable to the point they leave the parent stream, but the most frequented channel is that known as the Cua Thai Binh; even this, though a noble-looking river, is not navigable for boats of any size, owing to the silting up of its mouth, and the neglect of the Annamite Government to improve the entrance by dredging.

The two principal tributaries of the Red River are the Giango Ho and the Tsin Ho. The former, rising on the frontier of Siam, flows into the main stream below Huang Ho; it is navigable to Pho Yen, a considerable town some 80 miles up the river. At this point navigation is impeded by a dangerous rapid, which, it is said, could easily be removed. The country in the neighbourhood of the Giango Ho is amongst the most fertile in Tonkin.

The Tsin Ho, or Claire River of the French, is formed of two branches, the westernmost rising near Yunnan, the easterly one in the Chinese province of Quang Si. As far as Doanghong, their point of junction, the Tsin Ho is navigable; both tributaries traverse mountainous regions, which are little cultivated, but which are supposed to contain much mineral wealth; as far north as Doanghong the country is devoted to rice cultivation.

Parallel to the Red River runs another large stream, known as the Thai Binh; it also discharges itself into the sea by several branches, which fertilise the rice-growing districts to the north of the embouchures of the Red River. Many lateral canals connect these main streams, the most important being the Canal of the Rapids, which runs from Hanoi to Bin Ninh. Owing to the immense deposits of alluvial matter at the mouth of the Red River, the main communication between Hanoi and the sea is by means of the Thai Binh and the lateral canals which connect the two.

The capital of Tonkin is Hanoi; it is, indeed, little inferior in any way to Hué, the chief town of the kingdom. Before the northern province fell under the sway of the kings of Annam, Hanoi was the capital of a kingdom; and though, since the absorption of

Tonkin by Annam, it has become merely the capital of a province, it still remains one of the largest and most important cities in the country. Its population is estimated at 100,000 souls, a large number of whom are employed in the manufacture of silks. The principal university of the kingdom, which is said to boast of upwards of 3000 pupils, is also situated at Hanoi. The town is one of many which were fortified by French officers at the commencement of the century, and though its defences are of little worth in the present day, when Colonel Ollivier surrounded it with Vauban's bastion trace it may well have been considered one of the strongest towns in Further India. The geographical situation of Hanoi assures it a great future, if only that future is entrusted to enlightened and liberal minds. The Red River is at all times navigable to this point, even in the dry season by vessels drawing six, and, in the wet season, by those drawing eight and a half feet of water, and for a further distance of 150 miles by flat-bottomed craft drawing three and a half feet. The Red River connects the rich province of Yunnan, in the south of China, by a short navigable route, with the sea, and if opened up to commerce, must naturally result in attracting trade and civilisation to provinces where both are practically unknown.

The climate of Tonkin is extremely unhealthy ; the excess of irrigation renders it damp and feverish, and this added to the extreme heat proves most trying to Europeans. In the rainy season, which lasts from May to August, epidemics are often rife ; and the small French garrisons which from 1870 have occupied some of the principal towns, have had a death-rate as high as twelve per cent.

The natural products are rice, which forms the principal export and the staple food of the country, the sweet potato, cotton, cinnamon, castor-oil berries, sugar-cane, indigo, and mulberries. All these are largely exported, as also are tea, the betel and areca nut, but in lesser quantities. The forests are magnificent, and consist of teak, satinwood, walnut, and other scented trees much valued by the Buddhists for their temples. Of the mineral wealth little is really known, though great expectations have been raised on this point. It is certain that tin and copper mines exist in the mountains through which the Tsin Ho flows, and it is rumoured that gold and silver abound also in the same regions.

Coal has been discovered in more than one quarter, and the experiments made with it prove it to be of a description well suited for steam purposes. As some beds of this invaluable adjunct

to maritime warfare have been found near the sea, the French in this discovery alone will derive a recompense far above that which all the precious metals in the land can give them. They will be placed beyond the necessity of depending on the precarious supply from the mines of Great Britain, which in the event of war could, by an enterprising power, be wholly forbidden to them. To France, situated as she is, the coal-fields of Tonkin are a prize worth striving for.

The inhabitants of Tonkin are for the most part slight and below the middle height, resembling the Chinese in their features though of darker complexion; their figures are more lithe and elegant, in this respect they are more like the Malays. They are possessed of much intelligence, and in diplomacy are more than a match for their Western conquerors; though in the field, their ignorance of modern tactics and the fact that they do not possess arms of precision render their defeat, when opposed to equal numbers of well-armed and well-led troops, a matter of certainty. They are by no means destitute of courage, and, though defeated and driven out of positions, will return to the charge the next day with equal determination and *sang-froid*. Being entirely destitute of artillery, the Tonkino s

deserve much credit for the way in which, armed mainly with bows and arrows, they have never hesitated to face the heavy cannon of the French gunboats or the repeating rifles of the French blue-jackets. Although followers of Buddha, the Tonkinois are not very bigoted in their religion. Women amongst them occupy a very inferior place, and polygamy is rife, especially in the northern districts. The houses of the poorer and middle classes are generally built of wood; the majority are thatched, but some few are seen with roofs neatly covered with tiles. It is rare to see a solitary house; they are generally grouped together, surrounded by bamboo hedges, which not only serve as a protection from the effects of the deadly tornadoes which devastate the country, but also as a very effective obstacle against the advance of human foes.

The Government of Annam is that of an absolute monarchy, the king having practically unlimited power; but, as in the case of all despotic sovereigns, the power is often wielded by less scrupulous persons, who, having gained an ascendancy over the sovereign, rule in his stead; and, as in the case of countries not so remote from our shores, this despotic power is often wielded through the instrumentality of some female favourite. Nominally



the king is assisted by a secret council consisting of six ministers :

The Minister of Religion (Le bo thuong then).

The Minister of Finance (Ho bo thuong then).

The Minister of War (Bin bo thuong then).

The Minister of Justice (Hin bo thuong then).

The Minister of the Interior (Thai bo thuong then).

The Minister of Public Works (Cong bo thuong then).

These ministers are almost invariably selected from amongst the mandarins, though occasionally some ignoble favourite has filled one of the chief offices of state.

The king corresponds directly with none of his ministers ; he lives entirely surrounded by his wives and concubines, who rival in number those of King Solomon. When once a woman is admitted to this charmed circle she abandons all direct communication with the outer world, but being surrounded by a crowd of servants, who act as intermediaries, she finds no difficulty in carrying on clandestine correspondence, and doubtless clandestine interviews. The position of these women is as humiliating and degrading as that of the favourites of a Turkish Sultan. In matters of State business, the king never grants an audience to his ministers. All questions are submitted to him in writing, and answered by some female amanuensis who has learnt the Chinese

characters. The woman who possesses a smattering of education occupies an important position in the royal seraglio—a position Annamite ladies are not slow to turn to account. On certain rare occasions of State ceremonial, such as the arrival of a foreign ambassador, or the despatch of the triennial tribute-bearing embassy to China, the Council of Six are admitted to the royal presence, and then receive the royal commands on the question immediately at issue, but no other business is ever touched upon. It will thus readily be seen that though nominally an absolute monarch, the king possesses but little real power, and that if the secret council were in league against him, he might easily be kept in ignorance of all matters connected with the government of his kingdom.

The Mandarins form two distinct classes.

First, the Civilian class (Quan Van). These are selected from amongst the graduates of universities who have passed the most satisfactory literary examinations. To these are confided all the administrative posts, and occasionally they are entrusted with the direction of military affairs.

The second or Military class (Quan Vo) are chosen from amongst the most distinguished soldiers, who have not only acquired a reputation for profes-

sional ability, but who have also passed a university test. In fact, Annam, like China, is the home of competitive examinations.

Mandarins, whether of the civil or military profession, are divided into nine great classes, each class containing members of both the army or civil service.

First Degree.....First Class.....Lord Chief Justice. Commander-in-Chief.

Second Class...Chief Justices. Marshals of the Army. Commander of the Fleet.

Second Degree...First Class.....Presidents of the Chief Courts. Governors-General of Provinces. Generals in the Army. Admirals. Military Governor of Hué.

Second Class...Vice-Presidents of the Chief Courts. Local Governors of Provinces. Rear-Admirals of the Fleet.

Third Degree.....First Class.....Civil Governor of Hué. Colonels of Regiments. Commandant of Provincial Militia. Chief of Provincial Courts of Justice.

Second Class...Ministerial Secretaries. Lieutenant-Governors of Hué. Lieutenant-Colonels of Regiments.

Fourth Degree...First Class.....Provincial Judges. Under-Secretaries to Ministers.

Second Class...King's Chaplains.

Fifth Degree.....First Class.....Provincial Directors of Studies.

Second Class...Commissioners of Districts.

Mandarins of the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth degrees include all officials in the Judicial,

Administrative, and Educational Departments, and all officers of the Army and Navy; these latter are under the command of an official of the First Degree, styled the Grand Marshal; he is personally charged with the defence of the citadel of Hué, and is always in immediate attendance on the sovereign.

The army, an organisation for which exists on paper, consists nominally of eighty battalions of 500 men each. There is also a provincial militia (*linh keu*), the men of which can only be called upon for the defence of their own districts. It is generally supposed that, in an invasion of the country, the most determined resistance would be met with when facing the *linh keu*. As regards drill, discipline, and armament, the Annam forces are on a par with other Eastern nations who have not adopted Western ideas. Their navy consists of five wooden gunboats, presented by the French in 1874, and now again in the custody of their original owners.

Nominally, every male of the age of twenty-one years is liable to military service; but, as a rule, the annual contingents do not exceed seven per cent. of those inscribed on the rolls of the village elders. The period of service is fixed at ten years, but men are permitted to prolong their service indefinitely;

desertions are rare, as villages are held responsible for any loss incurred, and not only are compelled to furnish a substitute but not unfrequently are mulcted of a very considerable sum, should the colonel of the regiment be an influential man at Court.

The internal administration of the country is far in advance of its military administration. Each of the twenty-five provinces is ruled over by a governor-general or *Tong Doc*, who has under him a certain number of lieutenant-governors (*Tuan Phu*), according to the size and importance of the province. These officials are in charge of departments, which are again subdivided into districts and sub-districts, the latter comprising in rural parts a group of several villages. Every male inhabitant at the age of twenty-one years, provided he is either possessed of a certain amount of property, or in pursuit of a profession, is entitled to a vote in the election of the village elders, who in their turn nominate certain of their own members as representatives in the administrative council of the sub-district. This council is presided over by an unpaid official: though elected by his confrères, he must be approved of by the lieutenant-governors of the district. He possesses the seals of authority, and, though he has no judicial power, is a very important personage both within

and without the borders of his government. These sub-district councils are self-governing, and have well-defined powers of very considerable extent; any act of theirs can be vetoed by the lieutenant-governor, but it rarely happens that this prerogative is exercised. They are responsible for the execution and repair of all public works: roads, canals, and bridges are under the care of one committee; a second is entrusted with the management of the police; a third with financial arrangements, levying taxes not only for their own but also for Government purposes; a fourth supervises public education; a fifth regulates all commercial and agricultural disputes; in fact, the internal administration of the kingdom is carried on almost in its entirety by these little parliaments.

The roll of electors is annually revised by the village elders, and submitted by them to the district council, who arrange local and imperial taxation, the draughts for military service, and other such-like duties. The chief imperial imposts consist of a land and a poll tax, but a considerable revenue is also derived from the concession of fishery and mining rights, licenses for ocean-going and river craft, which all come under the supervision of the district councils. The customs dues on exports and imports are collected by imperial officials having no connection

with the local governments. Every male inscribed on the roll of electors has to furnish to the State annually forty-eight days' labour; by this means public roads, bridges, and buildings are maintained in excellent condition. The land-tax is a variable quantity. The Council of State of Hué forward annually to the Governors of provinces a statement of the amount each is requested to furnish, and he in turn submits a demand to the district council, who again furnish requisitions to the village elders. The tax is accepted partly in money, partly in kind as regards land under rice cultivation, but all other lands are compelled to pay in specie.

As regards the commerce of the country, accurate statistics are unattainable; but it is anticipated by the French that the opening of the Red River will immediately produce a trade of from one to three millions sterling a year, but as these calculations are based on hypothesis, not on any ascertained data, they must be received with caution. It is, however, an open question whether France would greatly benefit by the trade, for in the year 1881, of the 253 European vessels which found their way to the port of Haiphong on the Red River, only eleven carried the tricolour. Until the steam mercantile fleet of France is very largely increased, it is

improbable that she will be able to compete with England and Germany in Eastern waters; thus even for commercial purposes, it is doubtful whether France will benefit directly or indirectly by the possession of Annam. For colonisation, the country is valueless; even were the French possessed with the qualities necessary to make good settlers, the climate would absolutely forbid any attempt in this direction being successful. For two-and-twenty years the Tricolour has waved over the walls of Saigon, yet the non-official French community in the whole of Cochin-China at the last census was, according to M. P. Delafosse, less than 700 souls, and these for the most part were merchants, shopkeepers, ship-chandlers, and clerks. Of colonists, as we understand the term, there were none. Even in Algeria, where the climate is more healthy and equable, colonists are rare, the few settlers being men who hope to make sufficient money by trade to enable them to live in comfort and to die in peace in their own native village. A Frenchman rarely cuts himself adrift from his native commune; indeed the present laws forbid his doing so. I know of a case where a man, thinking he could better himself as a small contractor in Algeria, was arrested in Marseilles and sent back



under police supervision to his village, because he had not completed the twenty years' military service demanded of him by his country. Similar instances are not rare. Not long since one of the firemen on a St. Malo steamer was sentenced to a month's imprisonment and a lengthened police supervision for proceeding on a voyage to South America in search of employment when his term of conscription was approaching. On his return from Pernambuco, he was arrested at Havre and condemned without power of appeal. I have known several cases of skilled workmen who have expressed a wish to proceed to Canada or America, where skilled labour is at a premium—not with the object of becoming settlers, for no Frenchman thinks of that, but of amassing a competence more rapidly than is possible in France—but the knowledge of their certain arrest and imprisonment at the port of embarkation has deterred them from putting their designs into execution.

The statement that the present feverish policy of France is dictated with a view of providing homes for her surplus population is absurd. In the first place, these new homes are being provided in climates deadly to the European constitution ; in the second place, the French Government render penal

all attempts at colonisation by men under forty. With a home policy which forbids emigration, and a foreign policy equally subversive of justice, if not destitute of honour, France is nursing discontent within and engendering distrust without her frontier.

### CHAPTER III.

EARLY RELATIONS OF FRANCE WITH ANNAM : 1787-1872.

THE early history of Annam is involved in some obscurity ; there is, however, abundant evidence that until the year 1427 it was an outlying province of the Chinese Empire, when, availing themselves of the distance from the Imperial armies, the people rose in rebellion, massacred the Chinese forces, and proclaimed one Le Loi ruler of the newly founded kingdom. The Celestial Empire is not one which really acquiesces in the loss of territory, nor does it readily forgive the assumption of independence on the part of distant provinces. Armies were accordingly despatched toward the revolted districts, and, after years of undecided warfare, both parties were glad to arrive at a peaceable solution of the difficult question raging between them. Annam was to retain its independence, but its Kings were to pay triennial tribute to the Emperor, and all

new sovereigns were required to demand recognition of these rights by the Court of Peking on ascending the throne. Little by little the Kings of Annam, descendants of the Le Loi who had succeeded in gaining independence for the country, increased their territories, but they still remained tributaries of China, and each sovereign still paid homage to the Emperor. Early in the sixteenth century, the dynasty of Lé was nearly overthrown by a rebellion which for years ravaged the kingdom, and when this was quelled, the grateful sovereign bestowed on the successful general (one Nguyen Dzo) who had restored peace, the title of Chua or hereditary viceroy of the country. On Nguyen Dzo's death, his eldest son succeeded him in the office of Chua; his younger son, an able general and skilful diplomat, being appointed governor of the newly conquered provinces of Chiampa, which formed the southernmost possession of the kingdom. At the commencement of the seventeenth century, the governors of Chiampa asserted their independence, and though recognising the nominal supremacy of the Lé dynasty, refused to acknowledge subservience to the Chuas. During the whole of the seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth century, the northern and southern portions of Annam formed virtually distinct kingdoms; the one ruled over by repre-

sentatives of the Lé, the other by the Nguyen family. The enervating influence of the viceregents over the Kings of Annam had long been felt, and for many years all real power had passed into the hands of the detested Chuas. Towards the end of the eighteenth century a formidable insurrection arose in the northern provinces of Tonkin; it was fostered and fed by the mountaineers of Southern China, and, sweeping all before them, the rebels demanded the execution of the viceregent and the annulment of his commission. The rebel leader now became virtual ruler of Annam, though for two years Chien Tong, the last of the Lé's, reigned as a puppet monarch by his side, when, finding his position insupportable, he fled to China and vainly sought the armed assistance of the Emperor. All-powerful now in Northern Annam, the ex-rebel, now king, turned his attention to the rich southern provinces, which for more than a century had claimed their independence; aided by the hardy mountaineers of <sup>Tayson</sup> ~~Taeping~~, to whose prowess he virtually owed his kingdom, the attempt to reconquer this valuable district was completely successful; the king, <sup>Hoang-anh</sup> Gia Long, was driven from his throne and, barely escaping with his life, took refuge with the Court of Siam. The Emperor of Siam was by no means inclined to run the risk of a collision with the

all-powerful usurper in Annam, and though willing to afford hospitality to Gia Long, declined to aid him in regaining his kingdom. Bangkok in those days was the site of an important mission station, and the Jesuits, who have ever looked on themselves as political agents as well as preachers of the Gospel, saw in the arrival of the destitute king an opportunity for increasing French influence in the East. Gia Long readily consented to his eldest son, Canh Dzue, accompanying the Catholic bishop to Paris, with a view of soliciting the aid of the French King towards the expulsion of his foes. Thus, in 1787, French interference was first solicited in Annam by an exile king; to quote the words of Francis Garnier, used a century later, little did Gia Long realise that he was introducing a wolf into his fold. Louis XVI. received the prince with much *empressement*, but, before embarking on such a distant enterprise, demanded full particulars of the country and the probable value of such interference from the clerical ambassador.

In submitting to Louis a project for supporting the claims of the fugitive King of Lower Annam, Bishop Pigneaux de Béhaine, the chief of the Jesuit mission at Bangkok, advanced the following arguments, which, though broached in 1787, are still considered by a large section of our neighbours applicable in 1883.

“The balance of political power in India appears at the present moment to be largely in favour of the English, and one may be justified in looking upon it as a matter of no little difficulty to restore the equilibrium. In my opinion the establishment of a French colony in Cochin-China will be the surest and most efficacious means to the end. In fact, if the productions of the country and the situation of its ports are taken into consideration, it will easily be seen that the greatest advantages, both in peace and in war, will be derived from its occupation.

“*First Advantage.* The most certain way of damaging the English in India is to ruin or at any rate to weaken her commerce. In time of peace, being situated nearer to China, we should undoubtedly absorb much of her trade; the voyage being shorter and the expense of transit cheaper than to India, Chinese merchants would naturally prefer the French ports in Cochin-China to the more distant ones of Calcutta and Madras.

“*Second Advantage.* In time of war it would be still more easy to stop all commerce between China and any hostile nations; the situation of our harbours would enable us to forbid the entry or departure of any vessel from Chinese ports.

“*Third Advantage.* The harbours of Cochin-China

afford excellent refuges in which our merchant vessels could refit, and the forests would permit us to construct new ships on the spot.

“*Fourth Advantage.* In Cochin-China we should find all necessaries of life for the revictualling of our squadrons in the extreme East, and for the supply of our distant colonies.

“*Fifth Advantage.* From such a coign of vantage it would be easy to interfere with the designs which the English evidently have of extending their frontier more to the East.

“Other advantages also present themselves, more important in the future though perhaps not so pressing in the present, and these are the immense benefits to be derived from the natural wealth of the country, and from establishing a commercial highway into Central China, which shall open to us the riches of that unknown country.”

The young monarch was not slow in realising the advantages to be gained by a prosecution of the scheme thus unfolded by the Bishop, and a treaty was entered into, in virtue of which France found herself virtually the protector of Annam.



TERMS OF A TREATY SIGNED AT VERSAILLES ON THE 20TH NOVEMBER, 1787, BY THE COMTE DE VERGENNES AND THE COMTE DE MONTMORIN, ON BEHALF OF LOUIS XVI. OF FRANCE, AND BY THE PRINCE CANH DZUE ON BEHALF OF HIS FATHER, THE KING GIA LONG OF COCHIN-CHINA.

“1. Il y aura une alliance offensive et défensive entre les deux rois de France et de Cochin-Chine ; ils devront se prêter mutuellement secours et assistance contre tous les ennemis de l’un ou de l’autre des parties contractantes.

“2. En conséquence, il sera équipé et mis sous les ordres du Roi de Cochin-Chine, un escadre de vingt bâtiments de guerre français de telle force que les demandes pour son service feront juger convenable.

“3. Cinq régiments européens et deux régiments de troupes coloniales du pays seront embarqués sans délai pour la Cochin-Chine.

“4. S. M. Louis XVI. s’engage à fournir, dans quelques mois, la somme d’un million de dollars, dont 500,000 en espèces, le reste en salpêtre, canons, mousquets, et autres armements militaires.

“5. Du moment que les troupes françaises seront entrées sur la territoire de Cochin-Chine, elles et leurs généraux recevront les ordres du Roi de Cochin-Chine.

“De l’autre part :

“1. Le Roi de Cochin-Chine s’engage à fournir, aussitôt que la tranquillité sera rétablie dans ses

états, et sur la simple réquisition de l'ambassadeur du Roi de France, tout ce qui sera nécessaire en équipements, agrès et provisions, pour mettre en mer, sans aucun délai, quatorze vaisseaux de ligne, et pour la parfaite exécution de cet article, il sera envoyé d'Europe un corps d'officiers et de sous-officiers de marine qui formeront un établissement permanent en Cochin-Chine.

“ 2. S. M. Louis XVI. aura des consuls résidents dans toutes les parties de la Côte de Cochin-Chine, partout où elle le jugera convenable. Ces consuls seront autorisés à construire ou faire construire des vaisseaux, frégates, et autre bâtiments, sans qu'ils puissent être troublés sous aucun prétexte par le Gouvernement de Cochin-Chine.

“ 3. L'ambassadeur de S. M. Louis XVI. à la cour de Cochin-Chine aura le droit de faire du bois pour la construction des vaisseaux, frégates, et autre bâtiments dans toutes les forêts où il en trouvera de convenable.

“ 4. Le Roi de Cochin-Chine et son Conseil d'Etat cèderont à perpétuité à Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne, ses héritiers et ses successeurs, le port et le territoire de Han San (Baie de Tourane et la péninsule) et les îles adjacentes de Fai-far au midi et de Hai-Wen au nord et de Poulo Condore au Sud.

“ 5. Le Roi de Cochin-Chine s’engage à fournir les hommes et les matériaux nécessaires pour la construction des forts, ponts, grandes routes, fontaines, etc., qui seront jugés nécessaires pour la sûreté et défense des cessions faites à son fidèle allié, le Roi de France.

“ 6. Au cas où les naturels du pays en quelque temps que ce soit, répugneraient à rester sur le territoire cédé, ils auront la liberté d’en sortir ; la valeur des propriétés qu’ils y laisseront leur sera remboursée ; la jurisprudence tant civile que criminelle ne sera pas changée ; toutes les opinions religieuses seront libres ; les taxes seront perçues par les Français, suivant les usages du pays ; et les collecteurs seront nommés d’un commun accord, par l’ambassadeur de France et le Roi de Cochin-Chine ; mais le Roi ne réclamera aucune part de ces taxes, qui appartiendront en propre à Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne pour subvenir aux frais que l’entretien exigera.

“ 7. Dans le cas où Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne se déterminerait à faire la guerre dans quelque partie de l’Inde, il sera permis au commandant en chef des troupes de France, de faire une levée de 14,000 hommes qu’il fera exercer de la même manière qu’en France, et qu’on formera à la discipline française.

“8. Dans le cas où quelques puissances attaqueraient les Français sur le territoire de Cochin-Chine, le Roi de Cochin-Chine fournira au moins 60,000 hommes de troupes de terre qu’il habillera, et entretiendra à ses frais.”

Unfortunately for the projects of the militant bishop, times were troublous in France. The king, though desirous of extending his conquests abroad, was compelled to turn his attention to the consolidation of his power at home, and before His Most Christian Majesty could dispatch the promised aid to the East, he himself was involved in the meshes of a revolution, and, less fortunate than his new ally, who had found refuge and safety with a neighbouring sovereign, Louis XVI. fell a victim in those dark days

“When France got drunk with blood to vomit crime.”

But though deprived of the assistance of regular troops, Pigneau de Béhaine succeeded in inducing a number of soldiers of fortune to accompany him on his return to the East, and, being well provided with funds, he was enabled, through the assistance of Count Montmorin, to purchase arms, freight ships, and finally to land in Cochin-China in 1789, at the head of a well-armed and fairly-disciplined force.

As was usual in those days, the Eastern hordes went down like grass before the Western troops, and ere Pigneau's death in 1799, Gia Long had recovered his lost kingdom. He was not ungrateful to the French officers to whom he owed his restoration; he gave them munificent presents, entrusted them with the reorganisation of his army and with the construction of fortifications, and finally, by their aid, in the year 1804 reconquered the province of Tonkin, which had become separated from the crown of Annam during a preceding revolution. Little did the early pioneers of French civilisation in Annam dream that the many forts with which they studded the country, forts built on Vauban's earlier principles, should, ere the close of the century, thunder forth defiance to their country's flag, and that the best blood of France would be spilt in wresting these carefully-constructed works from the successor of Gia Long.

So long as Gia Long felt the necessity of the services of the French officers, to whom, indeed, he owed his restoration, they enjoyed the most perfect freedom, and the Catholic missionaries, who for now more than two centuries had been settled in Cochin-China, pursued their career with fervour, success, and uninterrupted; but in 1820 Gia Long

died, having named as his successor, in pursuance of his undoubted right, his younger son, Minh Mang, to the exclusion of the children of his eldest son, Prince Canh Dzue, who, in 1787, had been his envoy to France. It does not often happen in Oriental countries that the crown passes peaceably from successor to successor, and Annam has proved itself no exception to the general rule. The friends and adherents of Canh Dzue rose in rebellion, not only in Cochin-China and Annam, but also in Tonkin. King Minh Mang with difficulty suppressed these various revolts, and chose to consider that they had been the work of Canh Dzue's foreign friends the French. The missionaries were treated with uncompromising rigour, and many were suspected of meeting a violent death through royal instigation.

In 1833 his hatred towards the French showed itself more openly than in secret persecution of the missionaries. He, by a royal edict, forbade them coming into the country, and those who refused to withdraw were put to death. Missionaries of the Holy Society of Jesus have never been wanting in courage; they have ever looked upon a martyr's death as their highest glory, and even those who differ from them in religion must have been struck

by the different mode of life pursued by Catholic and Protestant missionaries. Too many of the gentlemen sent out by our societies seem to adopt the sacred calling of missionary as a profession; too few remember the instruction given to the first pioneers of the Gospel, "Take nothing for your journey, neither staves nor scrip, neither bread, neither money;" and in India certainly, in the hot season, more missionaries are found revelling in the cool breezes of Murree than in the fever-stricken plains of Peshawur, more in the sanatorium of Sheikh Budeen than in the deserts of the Derajat. The Jesuit missionaries in Cochin-China braved the fever of the Delta as well as the sword of the king. In 1833 M. Francis Gagelm was strangled; in 1834 M. Odorico was beheaded, and in the following year M. Marchand was torn to pieces, having been previously tortured with hot irons; for three years we can trace no cruelties, but in 1838, as if to atone for the clemency of the preceding years, six missionaries were beheaded and one strangled, and in 1839 a solitary execution took place.

In 1840 Minh Mang died, being succeeded by his eldest son, Thien Tri, who at once commenced the same system of persecution that his father had for so many years carried on. In 1841 and 1842, three

missionaries were killed and several others thrown into prison ; but the sufferings of his fellow-countrymen had reached the ears of an officer commanding a French ship of war in Eastern waters, and in January, 1843, a frigate anchored off Tourane, and demanded the release of the captive missionaries. There were men still living in Hué who were old enough to remember that Gia Long, Thien Tri's grandfather, owed his kingdom to French intervention, and these now warned the king of the folly of refusing a demand which he was not strong enough to resist. The missionaries were released, and conducted by their weeping converts to the French vessel. Baulked of his prey on this occasion, the Oriental monarch was not one to allow further opportunities for satiating his love of blood to escape him, and no sooner had the white flag of France sunk below the horizon than Thien Tri recommenced his persecutions. The French admiral in Chinese waters, however, had orders to visit the ports of Cochin-China and to insist on the missionaries being treated with justice ; and in 1847 Admiral Lapierre, hearing of the continued persecutions of Thien Tri, appeared before Tourane with two frigates, and demanded free liberty, not only for the missionaries to prosecute their calling, but for the converts to follow their new



faith unmolested. But the royal palace at Hué is some distance from the port of Tourane, and the French force was altogether too small to attempt a march upon the capital. The admiral, indeed, had no means at hand to compel the king to accede to his demands. Thien Tri was not inclined to submit, except at the sword's point; in fact, wholly miscalculating the strength of his opponents, he made a feeble attempt to destroy the squadron of five ships, and when that had failed and the fortifications of Tourane had been dismantled by the French artillery, he ordered the mandarin in command to be beheaded. No sooner had the squadron sailed away, unable, owing to weakness, to compel any compliance with their demands, than Thien Tri recommenced his persecutions; these continued until his death, which occurred in 1848. He was succeeded by his younger son, Tu Duc, who was named heir to the exclusion of his elder brother, Nu-phong.

Tu Duc was not permitted to commence his reign without a violent attempt on the part of his brother to wrest the kingdom from him. For three years the struggle lasted, and when, in 1851, the rebellion had been put down and the new king's power consolidated, he found time to turn his attention to the punishment of the missionaries. Sending for the

bishops of the Jesuits and of the Dominican order, he commanded them to abstain from all attempts to spread their religion, and threatened them with death in case of refusal; indeed, his speech may well be likened to Rehoboam's: "My father did lade you with a heavy yoke, and I will add to your yoke. My father also chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions."

Firmly convinced, from the result of Admiral Lapierre's mission, that he had nothing to fear in Hué from French resentment, he commenced a war of extermination against the Christians; large sums were offered for the heads of European priests, lesser sums for Christian converts. This cruelty, however, soon came to the ears of the French Government, and in 1856 the Imperial minister in Siam despatched a vessel of war, the *Catinat*, to impress upon Tu Duc the necessity of shaping his conduct on lines somewhat different to his father's. On reaching Tourane, the captain handed his letter to the mandarin, with a request that it should be forwarded to Hué. The Annamite officer not only absolutely declined to comply with the request, but manned his guns and refused all communication between the ship and the shore.

The commandant promptly opened fire on the

fort, landed as strong a party of marines and blue-jackets as his crew would permit, spiked the guns, destroyed the powder, and threatened to blow up the fort unless his letter was immediately despatched to the king. The application of force is potent in shaping Oriental diplomacy, and the mandarin now readily agreed to have the letter conveyed to Hué.

Owing to heavy weather and other more pressing duties, the commander of the *Catinat* was unable to remain on the coast to ascertain if the minister's letter had the effect of ameliorating the treatment of the missionaries; but he warned the mandarin that a large French force would shortly arrive, which would compel Tu Duc to listen to its demands.

Before the close of 1856 one more attempt was made by the French minister at Bangkok to open negotiations with Tu Duc; but he, in the meantime, had received orders from China to resist the barbarians to the uttermost, and though he made a pretence of treating, it was evident, both from the rank of the officer sent to confer with the captain of the *Capricieuse* and from the bearing that official displayed towards the French officer, that there was no real intention of submitting to M. de Montigny's demands.

No sooner had the French frigate left Tourane than Tu Duc redoubled his persecutions. He felt that he risked nothing by such conduct. France might be able to sink a junk or two, or to bombard a fort; but he remained safe in the interior of his kingdom, and was free to vent his rage on the many Christians scattered throughout his dominions. Between 1851 and 1858 ten French missionaries were beheaded, and though their fate must excite pity and their noble heroism admiration, yet in dying for their faith they were but obeying the Master who sent them forth; and it certainly seems scarcely consonant with the tenets of the Christian faith, that it should be promulgated by means of gunboats and bayonets. The French, however, look upon it that Christianity was introduced, not to bring peace into the world, but a sword; and on the 31st August, 1858, an expedition, despatched by the Emperor Napoleon with a view of enforcing freedom of religion throughout Annam, cast anchor off Tourane. An ultimatum despatched to Hué was unanswered. A cannonade was opened on the forts, which made no reply, and on the landing party reaching the works, they found the gates open and the places deserted. Owing to deficient means of transport, it was impossible to

march at once on Hué, and, with the opening of the rainy season, all hope of seizing the capital that year vanished. The small force was decimated by sickness and worn out by fatigue; they were never actually engaged; the enemy were masters in the art of false alarms, and, fearing attack, the commander had judged it advisable to surround his camp with defensive works, which necessitated much labour and told heavily on the enfeebled constitution of his men.

In February, 1859, Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, feeling that the prolonged inactivity was not only hurtful to his men, who were fast losing their *morale*, but was also having the effect of fortifying Tu· Duc in his opposition, determined to embark his troops and attack Saigon, an important port in the South of Annam, and now the capital of French Cochin-China. On the 9th of February the admiral reached Cape St. Jacques, and then learnt that the town was some miles up a river difficult of navigation and well defended with powerful forts. On the 10th the squadron cleared for action and steamed up the river, silencing and destroying the works as they passed; on the 17th five vessels found themselves in front of Saigon, which, after a bombardment of some hours, was reduced to ruins and forced to surrender.

The booty was considerable ; over 400 cannon—most of them, however, old and unserviceable—6000 rifles of modern manufacture, 160,000 lbs. of gunpowder, 500,000 dollars in specie, and large quantities of provisions fell into the hands of the French. Their losses, however, were considerable, amounting to over 200 killed and wounded. But, as at Tourane, no sooner had they landed and occupied the town than the enemy commenced a series of the most harassing night attacks; these were invariably repulsed, but generally with some loss. The capture and occupation of such an important post as Saigon was a severe blow to Tu Duc, who at first appeared willing to treat, but the terms demanded by Admiral Rigault de Genouilly were too onerous to be accepted without a further struggle; the demands were thus formulated:

1. Liberty of religion throughout Annam.
2. All ports to be open to European commerce.
3. Saigon to be ceded to France.
4. Recognition by Annam of the ancient rights of France over Tourane.

These terms were indignantly rejected, and the king's troops once more assumed a defensive attitude. An attack on the Annamite entrenchments, though successful, cost the French 24 killed and 70 wounded. The terrible heat of the summer and approach of

the rainy season rendered further active operations impossible, so the French were compelled to rest satisfied with their first successes, and to strengthen themselves as much as possible in Saigon.

The outbreak of the war in China in 1860 necessitated the reduction of the French force at Saigon, upwards of a thousand men being withdrawn to strengthen the Anglo-French expeditionary force. Whilst thus weakened, the little garrison was exposed to constant attacks, and was never able to assume the offensive. On the signature of the Treaty of Peking, Admiral Charnier appeared before Saigon with strong reinforcements, and in February, 1861, drove the Annamites out of their entrenchments at Kihoa, then moving south to Mitho, captured that province, and in the month of May occupied Bien Hoa. Tu Duc was able to offer but a very slight opposition to the French arms in the South. A pretender to the throne, in the person of a French Catholic convert, had suddenly appeared in Tonkin, giving himself out to be the only representative of the Lé dynasty; although opposed by Tu Duc's best generals, Le Phung was very successful, and captured the town of Haid Zuong on the Red River. Wishing to mass all his troops to destroy this pretender, or perhaps feeling that further opposition to the French was really bootless, Tu Duc sent

ambassadors to Saigon, and on the 5th June, 1862, a second treaty of peace was signed between France and Annam.

“*TRAITÉ DU 5 JUIN, 1862, CONCLU À SAIGON, ENTRE LA FRANCE ET L'ESPAGNE D'UNE PART ET L'ANNAM DE L'AUTRE.\**”

“Article 1. Il y aura dorénavant paix perpétuelle entre l'Empereur des Français et la Reine d'Espagne d'une part et le Roi d'Annam de l'autre : l'amitié sera complète et également perpétuelle entre les sujets des trois nations en quelque lieu qu'ils se trouvent.

“Article 2. Les sujets des deux nations de France et d'Espagne pourront exercer le culte chrétien dans le royaume d'Annam, et les sujets de ce royaume, sans distinction, qui désireront embrasser et suivre la religion chrétienne le pourront librement et sans contrainte ; mais on ne forcera pas à se faire chrétiens ceux qui n'en auront pas le désir.

“Article 3. Les trois provinces complètes de Bien Hoa, de Gia Dinh et de Mytho, ainsi que l'île de Poulo Condore, sont cédées entièrement par ce traité en toute souveraineté à Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français.

“En outre les commerçants français pourront librement commercer et circuler sur des bâtiments

\* This treaty was signed by Rear-Admiral Bouard for France, Colonel Palança Guttierrez for Spain, and Phau Than Giang and Lam Gien Thiép, Minister of War, for Annam.



quels qu'ils soient dans le grand fleuve de Cambodge, et dans tous les bras de ce fleuve ; il en sera de même pour les bâtiments de guerre français envoyés en surveillance dans ce même fleuve ou dans ses affluents.

“Article 4. La paix étant faite, si une nation étrangère voulait, soit en usant de provocation, soit par un traité, se faire donner une partie du territoire annamite, le Roi d'Annam préviendra par un envoyé l'Empereur des Français afin de lui soumettre le cas qui se présente, en laissant à l'Empereur pleine liberté de venir en aide ou non au royaume d'Annam ; mais si dans le dit traité avec la nation étrangère il est question de cession de territoire, cette cession ne pourra être sanctionnée qu'avec le consentement de l'Empereur des Français.

“Article 5. Les sujets de l'empire de France et du royaume d'Espagne pourront librement commercer dans les trois ports de Tourane, de Balat et de Quang-au.

“Les sujets annamites pourront également librement commercer dans les ports de France et d'Espagne, en se conformant toutefois à la règle des droits établis.

“Si un pays étranger fait du commerce avec le royaume d'Annam, les sujets de ce pays étranger

ne pourront pas jouir d'une protection plus grande que ceux de France ou d'Espagne ; et si ce dit pays étranger obtient un avantage dans le royaume d'Annam, ce ne pourra jamais être un avantage plus considérable que ceux accordés à la France ou à l'Espagne.

“ Article 6. La paix étant faite, s'il y a à traiter quelque affaire importante, les trois souverains pourront envoyer des représentants pour traiter ces affaires dans une des trois capitales.

“ Si sans affaire importante, l'un des trois souverains désiret envoyer des félicitations aux autres, il pourra également envoyer un représentant.

“ Le bâtiment de l'envoyé français ou espagnol mouillera dans le port de Tourane et l'envoyé ira de là à Hué par terre, où il sera reçu par le Roi d'Annam.

“ Article 7. La paix étant faite, l'inimitié disparaît entièrement, c'est pourquoi l'Empereur des Français accorde une amnistie générale aux sujets, soit militaires soit civils, du royaume d'Annam compromis dans la guerre, et leurs propriétés sequestrées leurs seront rendues. Le Roi d'Annam accorde également une amnistie générale à ceux de ses sujets que se sont soumis à l'autorité française, et son amnistie s'étend sur eux et sur leur familles.

“ Article 8. Le Roi d’Annam devra donner comme indemnité une somme de quatre millions de dollars, qui seront remis au représentant de l’Empereur des Français à Saïgon. Cet argent a pour but d’indemniser les dépenses de guerre de la France.

“ Article 9. Si quelque brigand, pirate ou fauteur de troubles annamites commet quelque brigandage ou désordre sur le territoire français, ou si quelque sujet européen coupable de quelque délit s’enfuit sur le territoire annamite, aussitôt que l’autorité française en aura donné connaissance à l’autorité annamite, celle-ci devra faire ses efforts pour s’emparer du coupable afin de le livrer à l’autorité française.

“ Article 10. Les habitants des trois provinces de Vinh-luong, Nugian et Ha-tien pourront librement commercer dans les trois provinces françaises en se soumettant aux droits en vigueur ; mais les convois de troupes, d’armes, de munitions, ou de vivres entre les trois susdites provinces et la Cochin-Chine devront se faire exclusivement par mer.

“ Cependant l’Empereur des Français accorde pour l’entrée de ces convois dans le Cambodge la passe de Mytho dite Cua-tien, à la condition toutefois que les autorités annamites en préviendront à l’avance le représentant de l’Empereur, qui leur fera délivrer un laissez passer. Si cette formalité était négligée

et qu'un convoi pareil entrât sans un permis, le dit convoi et ce qui le compose seront de bonne prise et les objets seront détruits.

“Article 11. La citadelle de Vinh-luong sera gardée jusqu'à nouvel ordre par les troupes françaises, sans empêcher pourtant en aucune sorte l'action des mandarins annamites. Elle sera rendue au Roi d'Annam aussitôt qu'il aura fait cesser la rébellion qui existe aujourd'hui par ses ordres dans les provinces de Gid-Dinh et de Dinh-Tuong, et lorsque les chefs de ces rébellions seront partis et le pays tranquille et soumis comme il convient à un pays en paix.

“Article 12. Ce traité étant conclu entre les trois nations et les ministres plénipotentiaires des dites trois nations l'ayant signé et revêtu de leurs sceaux, ils en rendront compte chacun à leur souverain, et à partir d'aujourd'hui, jour de la signature dans l'intervalle d'un an, les trois souverains ayant examiné et ratifié le dit traité, l'échange des ratifications aura lieu dans la capitale de l'Annam, en foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs susnommés ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs cachets.”

Tu Duc, however, did not show much more consideration for Christians than formerly, treaty rights notwithstanding; and though all persecution ceased,

missionaries were forbidden to build churches or schools, or to preach religion in open places; converts, also, were excluded from public appointments. In fact, the King concluded peace more with the object of massing his men to put down Le Phung's rebellion than from any real fear of the French; and when fortune favoured him in the north, and Tonkin became peaceful, he was shrewdly suspected of stirring up his southern provinces against their new neighbours. Although Tu Duc's complicity was never proved, nor a shadow of evidence advanced in support of it, the French Government accused him of originating the disturbances; and to put an end to the annoyance of having to retain a force on the frontier, Admiral Grandier, in 1867, occupied the provinces of Vinh-luong, Chan-Doc, and Han-Tien. Naturally, this action exasperated Tu Duc, who again appealed to his suzerain, the Emperor of China, for assistance to drive the barbarians beyond the sea. China, however, was occupied with a rebellion in her own western states, and could spare no help to her vassal; and as Tu Duc himself was suffering from incursions of rebel Chinese in Northern Tonkin, he was perforce compelled to accept this fresh loss of territory without being able to retaliate on the French.

No sooner was Le Phung's rebellion thoroughly subdued, than Tu Duc found himself face to face with fresh complications. Strong bodies of Taepings, forced over the Chinese frontier by the victorious armies of the Celestial Empire, took refuge in the mountainous regions lying to the north of Tonkin. Pouring down the tributary valleys of the Red River, they ravaged the whole country, and driving out the Annamite troops, established themselves firmly throughout the district extending from Langson to Son Tay, and for some time threatened Hanoi itself. Tu Duc's armies met with no success against these new foes, and he once more turned to the Celestial Empire for help, and now help was accorded him. The Black Flags, or Taeping rebels, were split up into two parties, some being driven up the river towards Laokai, where they were hemmed in by the imperialist troops in Yunnan and the Yellow Flags, or the contingent despatched by the Governor of Canton. A second section of Black Flags spread eastwards, and interfered considerably with the commerce of the Red River between Hai Dzuong and the sea, joining themselves to the Chinese pirates, who for centuries had made the navigation of the open sea between the Bay of Alung and Canton so perilous.

As the persecution of missionaries had been put

forward as the pretext for French interference in Southern Annam, so was piracy advanced as a reason for the introduction of a force into Tu Duc's northern provinces. In 1868 Admiral Graudier, when annexing Vinh-luong, Chan-Doc, and Han-Tien, had strongly urged the necessity of a joint Franco-Annamite expedition to suppress piracy, and on this being courteously declined, threatened to undertake the mission without Tu Duc's aid. The outbreak of the war of 1870 interfered with this design; but no sooner were the boulevards of Paris cleared of the pirates of the Commune, than the French commander in Cochin-China was instructed to act against those of Tonkin.

In January, 1872, Captain Senez, of the frigate *Bourayne*, appeared before Tourane as the bearer of a letter to Tu Duc; and then sailing northwards, he visited all the most important Christian settlements on the coast, reconnoitred and surveyed the various mouths of the Red River, and on his return to Saigon submitted a plan for the more effectual suppression of the armed bands and flotillas which ravaged the Bay of Tonkin. The approach of the hot season prevented further steps being then taken; but in October, Senez again appeared before Tourane, this time armed with a letter announcing the intention of visiting Tonkin, and demanding the

assistance of two Court officials to assist him in suppressing the piracy. On the voyage to the mouth of the Red River, Senez destroyed several junks, which being armed were assumed to be pirates, though the owners vainly protested that their armaments were for purposes of defence, not offence. However, Senez's instructions were to destroy piratical junks; and as, according to French law, an accused person is guilty until he proves himself innocent, so these junks, being unable to produce satisfactory proof of their peaceable intentions beyond mere verbal assurances, were sent to the bottom. Anchoring at Cat Ba, off the mouth of the Thai Binh branch of the Red River, Senez found there a Chinese envoy, who, in obedience to orders from Peking, had visited Tonkin for the same purpose as the French *mandataire*; in fact, China had assumed, in virtue of an application from Tu Duc, a sort of protectorate over the whole eastern sea-board of Tonkin. This was by no means what Senez wanted, and, declining to enter into any negotiations with the Chinese mandarin, the French commander steamed up the river and anchored off Haiphong. Here he was received with cold civility by the Annamite authorities, who lodged formal objections to the appearance of the French flag in Tonkin waters. At Haiphong, as at Cua Cam, Senez



found Chinese mandarins working side by side with their confrères of Annam in the regulation of the river commerce. Leaving the *Bourayne* at Haiphong, Captain Senez proceeded in his steam launch to Kemo, the head-quarters of the Spanish Mission in Tonkin, and finally reached Hanoi on the 6th November. Here, as at Haiphong, the governor entered a formal protest against Senez's appearance—“Votre voyage ne m'a nullement été annoncé, vous êtes venu en dehors des conditions du traité. Vos canots n'ont pas le droit de pénétrer dans ce fleuve”—and declined to receive any visit from the French officer. Senez's reply was curt, and sufficiently explicit to open the eyes of the Government of Tu Duc to the real purport of the visit. “J'y suis et je ne souffrirai pas la moindre inconvenance à mon égard.” In spite, however, of M. Senez's threat to attack the citadel with his boat's crew of fifteen men, the governor held firm, and the French officer was compelled to leave the town without gaining the required interview. On his return voyage to Haiphong, M. Senez passed by Bac Ninh, which he found occupied by Chinese troops, some 300 of them being quartered in the citadel. These men formed part of the force sent by the Peking Government to repel the Taeping incursions, and it was

mainly due to their supervision that Chinese commerce passed comparatively unmolested on this branch of the Red River. The irritation of the Chinese soldiery at the sight of the small armed party of French seamen was very great, and it needed all the firmness of their officers to prevent an *émeute*. The governor declared himself powerless unless M. Senez would consent to enter the citadel—a citadel which, seventy years previously, had been constructed by French emigrants, and which, now ten years later, has defied French armies. In reporting on the defences of these places, M. Senez says: “ Cette citadelle, bâtie comme toutes les autres, est une assez vaste quadrilatère à bastions, n’ayant sur les murailles que quelques vieux blocs de fonte oxydés en guise de canons. Comme forteresse elle n’a aucune valeur, étant complètement dominée par plusieurs collines distant de huit à quinze cents mètres. Ces collines, à peu très douces, sont entièrement dépourvues de végétation ; y faire monter de l’artillerie serait aussi facile que de la traîner sur une grande route.”

Whilst the French commander and his small escort were immured in the citadel of Bac Ninh, and whilst the Chinese officers and Annamite mandarins were

endeavouring to calm the soldiery, news reached the Governor of the arrival of a small French flotilla at the mouth of the Red River. Fearing that this might betoken a force which should undertake the relief of Senez, the officials of Bac Ninh deemed it expedient to facilitate the departure of the French officer; and thus, to the appearance of what was in reality a mercantile expedition, the captain of the French frigate owed his safety. Escaping from his humiliating confinement, Senez dropped rapidly down stream, and on the 16th November, after passing Hai Dzuong, reached Quang Yen, where he rejoined the *Bourayne*, and at once opened negotiations for the free passage of M. Dupuis up the Red River.

Although the visit of the *Bourayne* was ostensibly to suppress piracy, there is no doubt that it was more intimately connected than French authorities would have us believe with the opening of the Red River to commerce; and Senez, it is now perfectly well known, had instructions to remain on the spot until the arrival of a M. Dupuis, who was armed with credentials from the Governor of Canton to the Governor of Yunnan, and who was, at the moment of Senez's departure from Saigon, fitting out at that port an expedition, half mercantile,

half filibustering, with which he meant to force French trade down the throats of the people of Tonkin, much in the same way as Admiral Lapierre had supported the missionaries by the bombshells of his squadron.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE EXPEDITION OF M. DUPUIS IN 1872.

AMONGST the many foreigners attracted to Shanghai during the Anglo-French expedition of 1860 was M. Dupuis, a Frenchman who combined the calling of a merchant with the profession of an adventurer. The prospect of commerce being extended by a new treaty between China and the Western Powers, opened out to this gentleman vistas of untold wealth to be extracted from those far-off provinces where no barbarian foot had trod. The first years of his residence were spent in acquiring a knowledge of the language, so that when in 1868, on the arrival of M. Garnier in Hankow after the adventurous overland journey from Cochin-China through Yunnan, it was rumoured that cargoes of arms would be acceptable to the Celestial troops engaged in crushing the Mohammedan rebellion in Western China, the

adventurous Frenchman felt an opening had arrived. To transport arms by land from China to Yunnan was out of the question ; but Garnier had established beyond a doubt that the Red River of Tonkin had its source on the southern slopes of the mountains of Yunnan, and that it was navigable for some distance beyond Hanoi. The jealousy of the Annamite authorities forbade any hope of a Frenchman, or indeed any foreigner, being permitted practically to test this question by an ascent from the sea. Dupuis therefore determined to place the matter beyond doubt by a descent from Yunnan. In the summer of 1868 a first attempt was made ; but the insurgents had too strong a hold on Yunnan to enable Dupuis to carry out his project. Two years later, however, he received a hint that a second attempt might be more successful ; and after a journey, the vicissitudes of which are graphically and not too modestly described in an entertaining work entitled “*L’Ouverture du Fleuve Rouge*,”\* he crossed over the mountain range which separates Yunnan from Annam, struck the Red River at Manghao on the twenty-third parallel of latitude, and, working down the stream

\* “*L’Ouverture du Fleuve Rouge au Commerce et les Evénements du Tonkin, 1872-73.*” Par T. Dupuis. Challamel éditeur, 5, Rue Jacob, Paris.

to Baoha (Touen Hia in Chinese), about 100 miles to the south-west, satisfied himself that at least 200 miles of the country between Hanoi and Yunnan could be traversed in boats of light draught. The journey also was of value in enabling him to visit districts rich in precious metals. The existence of these deposits was well known; but the secret of their locality had been strictly guarded with that jealousy with which a Chinaman naturally surrounds the resources of his own land. Fortified by this valuable information, Dupuis retraced his steps to Yunnan, there entered into contracts with the governor for the delivery of cargoes of modern weapons, and, armed with letters to the Chinese authorities at Hankow and Canton, he returned to Shanghai. His own resources were not sufficient to enable him to carry out his proposed expedition unaided, and he had at this time, most undoubtedly, visions of support from his own Government.

In order the more thoroughly to carry out his views, Dupuis proceeded to France, and endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to obtain an official recognition of his mission. The country had only just been evacuated by the German army; the onerous terms of the Treaty of Frankfort necessitated the most rigid economy; and the Ministry were far from wishing to

indulge in exploits which might plunge them into difficulties, even with such an insignificant foe as Annam. But though deprived of official support, Dupuis succeeded in gaining the co-operation of some wealthy speculators. He also received the sanction of the Minister of War for the purchase of the war material promised to the Marshal of Yunnan; and finally, through some influential friends, obtained the authorisation of the Minister of Marine to his proceeding to Hué in a French ship of war, thinking that the Tricolour would be a sort of moral support to his petition, and that the King of Annam would be more likely, under such circumstances, to afford his assistance to the expedition. On reaching Saigon, the Governor of Cochin-China advised Dupuis to rely merely on the passports of the Canton authorities, and to sail under the Chinese flag. By the Treaty of 1862, the Red River was closed to French vessels; and the Governor of Saigon deemed it unlikely that Tu Duc would view Dupuis' scheme with favour, but rather look on it as the thin end of a wedge which, when driven home by the French Government, would end in placing the commerce of the country in the hands of foreigners, and in eventually transferring to the French the northern provinces of Annam.

Dupuis therefore proceeded to Hong Kong and



commenced the organisation of his expedition. That he anticipated some resistance is certain, for he busied himself more particularly in the selection of his *personnel*, which consisted of nearly 200 men of all nations, whom he drilled and armed with chassepôts and revolvers. The Red River was open to Chinese vessels, and for many years the principal towns on its banks had been occupied by Chinese troops. Dupuis therefore knew that so long as he sailed under the Yellow flag, and conformed to the instructions and acted within the permission of the Governor of Canton, he had nothing to fear from the authorities of Tonkin. He knew, however, their jealous disposition—knew that trade of any sort when conducted by a foreigner, more especially by a thrice-hated Frenchman, would be rigidly forbidden, and that when he had carried out his original mission he would receive no aid from Annam, no support from China. His eyes were rivetted on the gold mines of Sing-Lai, and he was determined to be the pioneer by which the wealth of Cathay should be transferred to the boulevards of Paris. If the Court of Annam forbade legitimate trade, Dupuis, who had thoroughly gauged the strength of the opposition he might expect to meet, was prepared to carry on his

business illegitimately; in fact, it is impossible to blink our eyes to the fact that this first introduction of the French flag to Tonkin waters was not far short of a piratical expedition, and that whilst the Ministry in Paris declined to aid it officially, the colonial authorities at Saigon, in obedience to instructions from the Minister of the Colonies, assisted Dupuis with advice, encouragement, and moral support. Whilst Dupuis was organising his expedition, Captain Senez was paving the way for its success by reconnoitring the various streams of the Red River between the sea and Hanoi, in order to lessen the difficulties which it was anticipated would be met with during the first part of the journey. Two main trade routes ran from Hanoi to the sea; the one by the Bodé River, passing Nam Dinh; the other and better known one by the Thai Binh, passing Haiphong, Hai Dzuong, the mission station of Kemo, and then skirting the walls of Bac Ninh, joining the main stream by a canal named "The Rapids." The first route was throughout in Annamite, the latter in Chinese hands; and it was deemed advisable for Senez to explore the last-named route thoroughly, as Dupuis sailed under Chinese colours.

We have seen in the preceding chapter, that Senez

was shut up in Bac Ninh when he heard of Dupuis, arrival at the embouchure of the Red River. During his passage from Cat Ba to Hanoi he had never alluded to the real purport of his mission, and he owed his liberation from the citadel of Bac Ninh to the fact that the Governor believed Dupuis' flotilla to be a French squadron, on whose help Senez was relying. On the 16th November the *Bourayne*, the command of which had been resumed by Senez, arrived off Quang Yen, and Dupuis anchored his small fleet under the guns of the French corvette. The Governor of the province, whose chief duties in concert with his Chinese colleagues were the suppression of piracy, received M. Senez with studied courtesy, but regretted that, as Dupuis had no authority from the Government of Peking, but was only furnished with papers from the Viceroy of Yunnan and Canton, he would be unable to accord him any aid. Such a step as permitting the ascent of the Red River by an armed flotilla could only be granted by the King himself or his suzerain, the Emperor of China; and until such authority arrived, he himself was powerless in the matter. Oriental-like, he fully acquiesced with his Western guests in the immense advantage that must necessarily accrue to the country from the flow of European commerce;

but—he was but a servant, bound to obey orders, and he had no alternative in the matter. The Governor further pointed out that Dupuis was furnished with no authorisation from the French Government, and he feared that, in the absence of such recommendation, King Tu Duc would not be inclined to look favourably on his enterprise. He should be happy to submit the case to his sovereign, but unless he was able to assure His Majesty that M. Dupuis had the support of the President of the Republic, he was not very sanguine as to the success of his application.

M. Senez, who was in possession apparently of ample instructions, at once furnished the Governor with the following letter :

“À MONSIEUR L'INSPECTEUR-GÉNÉRAL DÉLÉGUÉ DU ROI AUX ARMÉES  
DU NORD.

“Cua Cam, le 19 Nov., 1872.

“MONSIEUR L'INSPECTEUR-GÉNÉRAL,

“Monsieur Dupuis, qui vient d'arriver dans le Cua Cam avec deux vapeurs, une jonque et une chaloupe à vapeur, se réclame de moi et me prie de l'assister auprès de votre Excellence, afin d'obtenir du Gouvernement d'Annam l'autorisation de traverser son territoire, fleuves, rivières et canaux, pour se rendre au Yunnan, dans le but d'y nouer des relations

commerciales, et d'ouvrir ainsi une voie nouvelle qui ne peut qu'être avantageuse aux intérêts de ce pays, comme au progrès de la civilisation.

“ Dans ces conditions, je déclare à votre Excellence que je suis autorisé par le Gouverneur de Saïgon à lui dire que le Gouvernement français verrait, avec la plus grande satisfaction, celui de l'Annam accorder à M. Dupuis l'autorisation de se rendre au Yunnan en passant par son territoire, afin d'y nouer et d'y établir des relations commerciales nouvelles.

“ Je suis, avec un profond respect, Monsieur l'Inspecteur-Général,

“ Votre très obéissant serviteur,

“ Le capitaine de frégate, commandant le *Bourayne*,

“ E. SENEZ.”

Furnished with this letter, the Governor of Quang Yen promised that he would endeavour to procure from Hué the necessary authorisation, but at the same time he pointed out to Captain Senez that, as Dupuis had ventured thus far in defiance of treaty rights, he feared that there was little hope of the permission being accorded.

In the meantime, Dupuis' little flotilla lay off Quang Yen, the Annamite authorities furnishing it with fresh provisions and water with the same

facility and courtesy they extended to the French frigate; and, finally, the Governor permitted Dupuis to make excursions in the neighbourhood with his steam-launch. The enterprising merchant was thus enabled to ascertain the best route to Hanoi, and to verify Captain Senez' survey of the Delta. Furnished with this information, he felt that, even should Tu Duc refuse the required leave, he was to a certain extent independent of local pilots, and was prepared, should the necessity arise, to force his way to Manghao, in virtue of his Chinese passports; knowing that the Annam forts dared not, and the Chinese forts would not, fire on the Yellow flag under which he now-proposed to sail.

This determination of M. Dupuis was somewhat bluntly put before the Governor of Quang Yen by Captain Senez :

“Mieux que nul autre votre Gouvernement sait quel prix coûtent des bateaux tels que ceux de M. Dupuis, comment donc pourrait-il supposer qu'un homme qui a tant dépensé en vue de la réalisation d'une idée va l'abandonner sans une vive résistance ? En refusant cette autorisation, le roi commettrait une de ces fautes dont il est impossible de prévoir les conséquences. Dès lors la nationalité de M. Dupuis disparaîtrait devant ce refus, qui en sa personne

frapperait un des plus hardis propagateurs du commerce et de l'industrie. Le Gouvernement de Hué doit enfin se bien persuader que sa persistance à s'isoler du monde civilisé ne peut durer plus longtemps. Le redoutable problème du progrès vient de se poser devant lui, et il appartient aux hommes intelligents comme vous, de l'éclairer et de le guider dans cette voie, s'ils ne veulent pas le voir périr. C'est aujourd'hui M. Dupuis, demain ce sera un autre, qui tous et toujours au nom du progrès et de la civilisation viendront vous demander la liberté de circuler et de commercer. Croyez-le bien, toute résistance est vaine. Forts, canons, barrages sont désormais impuissants à résister au courant envahisseur de la civilisation qui se dirige vers l'Annam."

Even this piece of rude reasoning was not sufficient to procure the required authorisation. Kings of Annam are irresponsible monarchs, and the Governor, fearing for his head, absolutely declined to permit Dupuis to ascend the Red River without Tu Duc's special sanction. As there appeared no probability of the sanction arriving, Senez unwillingly turned his back on his countryman, not, however, without giving him strong hints that it would be unadvisable to incur further delay, and that he might count on

assistance from Saigon should anything more serious than a dead-lock arrive. This was all that Dupuis was really anxious about; no sooner had the masts of the *Bourayne* disappeared from view, than, getting up his own steam, Dupuis pushed up the river with his small flotilla. The guns it carried, and the groups of well-armed men on the decks, added to the suggestive paragraph in Senez's despatch that the French merchant would oppose force to force, were any attempt made to stop him, induced the mandarins to let him enter the river unmolested, and on the 22nd of December he reached Hanoi. Here the Annamite authorities, without showing active opposition, took all the means in their power, by declining to furnish the flotilla with supplies, to compel M. Dupuis to retrace his steps. The arrival of the flotilla was naturally reported to the commandant of the Chinese forces in the neighbourhood, and shortly after reaching Hanoi, Dupuis received a visit from Colonel Tsai, who was in charge of the Celestial troops at Bac Ninh. Through the intervention of this officer, who learnt that Dupuis' mission was to carry supplies of arms and munitions of war to Yunnan, some Chinese merchants in Hanoi, braving the dangers of Annamite resentment, undertook to furnish the French adventurer with junks of



light draught, which were capable of ascending to Manghao, and also with supplies for his crews. Thus relieved of all fears for the success of his enterprise, Dupuis transferred his cargo to the new vessels, and taking with him fifty of his own men, including ten Europeans, and two rifled cannon, started on the 18th of January on the third and final stage of his adventurous voyage. The steamers, under the command of M. Millot, with 150 men, were left moored off Hanoi. French money proved more potent than mandarin commands, and, though thwarted at every step, Dupuis overcame all obstacles, dispersing armed opposition by the accuracy of his fire, and at last on the 4th of March, after a most exciting voyage, reached Manghao, the highest navigable point on the Red River, and within a few days' land journey of Yunnan.

Although the Governor of Yunnan had succeeded in quelling the rebellion without the aid of chasseurpôts, he was none the less cordial in the welcome he accorded the daring merchant, whose account of the obstacles thrust in his way by the Annamite authorities roused the ire of the marshal; and in order that M. Dupuis' further voyages might be free from the annoyances which retarded his first one, letters from the Marshal of Yunnan and from the Viceroy of Canton were given

him, and he was also provided with a personal escort of 150 Chinese soldiers under the command of a mandarin. These men were clothed in the regulation uniform of orange with black facings, and had embroidered on their tunics the words, "*Soldat de la garde du Maréchal du Yunnan.*" Instructions were also sent to General Fang, who commanded the Chinese garrison at Son Tay, to afford all the assistance in his power, should Dupuis call upon him for aid.

On the 30th April, loading his junks with copper and tin, the produce of local mines, many of which he personally visited, Dupuis commenced his return journey, and a week later, owing to the rapidity of the current, reached Hanoi; he there found the authorities more hostile than ever; the merchants who, during his absence, had supplied the vessels with food had been seized and imprisoned. The first act of M. Dupuis was to demand their release, threatening, in the event of a refusal, to seize them even in the citadel itself. The Governor replied that he was acting in compliance with orders received from Hué, whereupon Dupuis landed his little force, now amounting to 350 men, and with two field-pieces advanced against the citadel, whilst his gunboats moved up stream to open fire on it from the east. This determined attitude

cowed the Annamite general, who sent the imprisoned merchants to the river-bank.

M. Dupuis now determined to occupy a position on shore. His men were cooped and confined on the gunboats, and there were many reasons why he considered he would be safer with a portion of his force in some strong commanding post, within easy reach of his vessels. The search for provisions could be more easily carried out, more efficient protection afforded to the merchants who ventured to aid him, and he better able to act vigorously against hostile attempts. His quarrel was with the Annamite officials, not with the people, who were far from slow in perceiving the advantages of an increased trade; and though it is difficult to realise how official support was ever extended to a man who carried out his mercantile ventures with such a high hand, it is impossible to withhold admiration for his pluck and daring. Early in May, Dupuis, now in the position of a general in a conquered country, issued the following proclamation :

“ AU PEUPLE TONKINOIS.

“ J’annonce que l’affaire des prisonniers n’est pas assez grave pour me décider à agir par la force contre les mandarins, et que j’espère que ceux-ci

finiront par comprendre leur propre intérêt, en me laissant librement circuler sur leur territoire pour le compte des autorités du Yunnan et dans l'intérêt des populations du Tonkin. Je recommande au peuple de s'occuper paisiblement de ses travaux et de ne point s'inquiéter de ce que les mandarins peuvent dire de nous. Nous ne lui voulons aucun mal, nous sommes des amis."

For some few weeks matters remained quiet, but the enterprising merchant was only seeking some means for commencing another profitable voyage, and the mandarins were not disposed to interfere so long as his vessels did not engage in commerce.

As in all Eastern countries, Annam derives a great part of her revenue from the customs on salt. At the frontier stations of each province transit dues are levied, varying from five to ten per cent. on the value of the cargo; and even with these exorbitant charges, which vie with our own iniquitous imposts in India, large fortunes are cleared by salt merchants. Dupuis, strong in his own strength and further fortified by the letters from the Governors of Yunnan and Canton, determined to send a flotilla of junks laden with salt to Manghao, and to send it free of all dues. Any interference with the salt

trade would have been jealously viewed by the mandarins, but to carry on contraband trade, defying their traditional customs, was an act they were not prepared to allow to pass unnoticed. The mandarins, therefore, massed a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Hanoi, and, as Dupuis' junks endeavoured to ascend the stream, opened a heavy fire on them and compelled them to descend, seeking the shelter of the gunboats. Dupuis retaliated by threatening to destroy all Annamite junks which came within reach of his guns. This was tantamount to open war. On the one hand the mandarins of Annam, acting within the orders of their own king; on the other hand an irresponsible trader, acting in virtue of his breechloaders and rifled guns.

The Governor of Hanoi now commenced to act with vigour. The following proclamation was issued: "Les mandarins du Yunnan ont donné à un Français mission de transporter un matériel de guerre, mais cela ne l'autorise pas à faire un commerce de sel; ceux qui en vendront, ou qui fourniront barques ou bateliers, seront punis comme conspirateurs contre l'état, et leurs familles exterminées jusqu'à la racine;" and an urgent request transmitted to Hué, demanding instructions as to the course to be followed with regard

to the intruder. Sheltered under the Chinese flag, bearer of letters of recommendation from the Viceroy of Yunnan and Canton, Dupuis was a power against whom the Governor of Hanoi feared to act precipitately. The conduct of the Frenchman appeared to the mandarins that of a madman, but there was method, too, in his madness. Tu Duc referred the matter to Peking, and Dupuis' later actions were disavowed. China, jealous of her own trade, was willing, in order to relieve her hard-pressed armies, to permit a barbarian to transport arms by a highway hitherto sealed; but she was by no means prepared to open up the interior of Tonkin to European commerce. The Annam Government now saw its course clear; a mandarin of high rank, who had distinguished himself in the defence of Cochin-China, was despatched to Hanoi with orders to drive Dupuis out of the country. The position of the French merchant was now a perilous one; he was disavowed by China, under whose flag he was sailing, and he had no official papers proving his French nationality. From all sides, large bodies of armed men were converged on Hanoi, barriers were constructed above and below stream to cut off the retreat of the squadron, and it was clear that only audacity could save the French. Dupuis, whose courage throughout the conflict never

flinched, was equal to the emergency ; he ran up the Tricolour, and despatched his second in command to Saigon for the assistance of the French admiral. Nguyen-tri-phuong, the new Governor of Hanoi, a cousin of the King of Annam, had seen the power of that flag, and before venturing to incur its displeasure, thought it would be advisable to resort to negotiations ; he accordingly advised the Court of the new departure Dupuis had taken, suggested a reference to the Governor of Saigon, and contented himself with adopting a purely defensive attitude towards the French flotilla.

The King, anxious to avoid further complications with the Republic, adopted the views of the Viceroy of Tonkin, and ordering him to abstain from all acts of aggression towards M. Dupuis, unless forced to act in self-defence, despatched an embassy to Saigon, demanding the assistance of the French admiral in compelling M. Dupuis to withdraw ; urging that the presence of vessels in the Red River under the Tricolour was a distinct infringement of treaty rights.

## CHAPTER V.

TU DUC APPEALS TO SAIGON AGAINST DUPUIS.

ADMIRAL DUPRÉ AND M. GARNIER.

THE position of M. Dupuis at Hanoi necessitated the prompt intervention of the French admiral in Eastern waters. The first voyage of that enterprising merchant had been conducted, as we have seen, with the express sanction of the Viceroy of Canton, and for the express purpose of conveying munitions of war by the most expeditious route to the Chinese forces in Yunnan. M. Dupuis had on that occasion availed himself of the shelter of the Chinese flag, and had thus tacitly admitted the claim of Chinese sovereignty over the waters of the Red River; but the refusal of the authorities of Canton to grant him permission to carry on a contraband trade in salt was in itself sufficient justification (as M. Dupuis himself had appealed to Canton) of the conduct of the Hanoi



officials in refusing a right of way to his flotilla in the second attempt to ascend towards Yunnan. Availing himself of his status as a French citizen, the Tricolour, as we explained in the last chapter, was hoisted over the flotilla, and mutual complaints were made by both parties to Saigon.

The admiral found himself in an awkward dilemma. The terms of the treaty entered into in June, 1862, between Tu Duc as Emperor of Cochin-China and the French Government, expressly restricted European commerce to the three ports of Tourane, Balat, and Quang-au. It was, therefore, impossible for the French commander to offer any justification for the presence of a French flotilla in the Red River. On the other hand, M. Dupuis' first appearance had been due to the authorisation of the Chinese Government, and the authorities at Hanoi had grudgingly acquiesced in it. Admiral Dupré felt that the dash and enterprise of one of his countrymen had opened up to France a grand commercial undertaking, and he was nothing loth to support such designs, although the views of the Ministry of the Duke of Broglie were plainly set forth in a despatch dated 17th July, 1873, which contained the following words :

“ Sous aucun prétexte, pour quelque raison que ce soit n'engagez la France au Tonkin.”

The admiral, however, found it impossible to allow matters to remain in the present *impasse*. On the one hand, the Annamite authorities were requesting him to demand the recall of the French merchant; threatening, in the event of the non-intervention of the French Government, to expel M. Dupuis forcibly. On the other hand, M. Dupuis was preferring the most preposterous claims against the Government of Hué, for damages incurred by the refusal of the Hanoi mandarins to permit him to trade with Yunnan. It became necessary to act with vigour, the more so as the Court of Hué were suspected of having applied for advice, if not assistance, to Hong-Kong. Admiral Dupré accordingly offered to despatch a gunboat to Hanoi to inquire into the Annamite claims. Tu Duc, however, objected to this course, urging, “Comme les relations avec la Chine sont amicales, l’emploi de la force n’aurait-il pas un inconvénient?”

In reply to this letter, Admiral Dupré reproached the King with having solicited English intervention :

“Cette démarche change profondément la situation. Je ne puis attendre pour agir au Tonkin les résultats de vos pourparlers avec d’autres, je ne saurais souffrir que des étrangers se mêlent d’une

affaire qui ne regarde que vous et nous. J'envoie donc un officier. Si cet officier est directement ou indirectement entravé dans l'exécution de sa mission par le fait des autorités annamites, je serai forcé de rendre votre Gouvernement responsable, et il faudra renoncer à mon grand regret à l'espoir d'une amitié prochaine."

To this document, the Government of Tu Duc, anxious to avoid war, replied that the admiral was at liberty to send a French officer to Hanoi to inquire into the disputes between M. Dupuis and the local authorities, and to arrange for the withdrawal of the flotilla now anchored at that town. On receipt of this permission, Admiral Dupré forwarded a despatch to Paris, stating that French intervention in the Dupuis affair had been solicited by Annam, and the Ministry accordingly yielded.

It may be of interest, having regard to the manner in which the Chinese have been accused of duplicity throughout the Tonkin affair, to give extracts of Admiral Dupré's letter to the French Government during this crisis.

“SAIGON, 28 *Juillet*, 1873.

“La question vient de faire un pas nouveau et décisif par suite de l'expédition tentée par MM. Dupuis

et Millot. Vous n'ignorez pas que le Gouvernement annamite s'est adressé à moi à deux reprises différentes pour me demander de décider par mon intervention, M. Dupuis à se retirer du Tonkin. Sa présence dans le pays est, en effet, contraire aux stipulations du Traité de Juin, 1862.

“Ignorant d'ailleurs à cette époque la duplicité dont les mandarins avaient fait preuve dans tous leurs rapports avec M. Dupuis, j'ai adressé à celui-ci une invitation d'abandonner un point où il n'a pas le droit de résider. Que va-t-il en résulter ? Fort de mon assentiment le Gouvernement annamite aura-t-il le courage et la puissance de forcer M. Dupuis à déguerpir ? Ou suivant des habitudes commandées par sa faiblesse, temporisera-t-il encore et aura-t-il de nouveau recours à mon intervention ?

“Dans la première hypothèse je ferai savoir à la Cour de Hué que j'ai reçu de nos deux nationaux des rapports, en complète contradiction avec la relation des faits qu'elle m'a présentés, qu'en l'absence de tous rapports diplomatiques écrits ou réguliers, auxquels elle se refuse obstinément, je n'ai d'autre moyen de m'éclairer que celui d'une enquête faite sur les lieux.

“Dans la seconde hypothèse, au contraire, je représenterai que M. Dupuis ayant résisté à mon

invitation, je ne puis l'y contraindre que par l'envoi au Tonkin d'une force capable de faire respecter ma décision."

Here we have the French admiral owning that the presence of the French ships in the Red River was in violation of the terms of the treaty between France and Annam, yet on the same day a telegraphic message is despatched to Paris, of which the following is an extract :

"Le Tonkin est ouvert de fait par le succès de l'entreprise Dupuis. Effet immense dans commerce anglais, allemand, américain ; nécessité absolue d'occuper Tonkin avant la double invasion dont ce pays est menacé par les Européens et par les Chinois, et assurer à cette route unique."

It was this despatch which called forth permission to despatch a force to Hanoi to settle the Dupuis dispute, and on receipt of the anxiously expected response, the admiral wrote to M. Francis Garnier, at Shanghai :

"MON CHER GARNIER,

"J'ai à vous parler d'affaires importantes, et je vous prie de venir le plus tôt que vous pourrez."

No better selection could have been made for the arduous task in one sense, no worse in another. Garnier was a man well versed in Oriental character, well skilled in Eastern languages and ways ; but, hot-headed by nature, he was little inclined to study their diplomatic finesse, and too ready, as the sequel shows, to resort to force.

Born at St. Étienne in 1839, he passed the Naval School, and entered the service as a first-class aspirant just prior to the Anglo-French expedition to China, and was appointed to a ship under orders for that station. He distinguished himself on the outward voyage by saving a cavalry officer who had fallen overboard on a dark squally night, and for his gallantry he was nominated *enseigne de vaisseau*. After the close of the China war, Garnier was present in the expedition to Kihoa, and, being in a vessel on the Cochin-China station, was, after the capture of Saigon, nominated to a civil post in the newly acquired French colony. In this position, his notice was attracted by the wealth of the southern provinces of China, and in 1864 he published a brochure, "La Cochin-Chine Française en 1864," in which, calling attention to the efforts made by English travellers to penetrate these unknown regions, and thus draw their wealth to our dependencies in Burmah, he pointed out

how much more happily France was situated for this purpose, and endeavoured to organise mercantile expeditions to exploit Yunnan and other districts. In 1866, M. Chasseloup-Laubat, recognising the worth of the young officer, attached him to an expedition under the command of M. de Lagrée. Quitting Saigon in June, the party proceeded to Angkor in Siam, and then ascending the Mekong River to the province of Laos, crossed over the mountains into Yunnan in October, 1876. Four navigable rivers rise from the watershed they then traversed: the Irawaddy of Burma, the Saluen—which flows into the Gulf of Martaban—the Red River of Tonkin, and the Blue River of Canton. The fatigues of this journey told upon its chief, who died in Yunnan; when young Garnier assumed the command, and under his leadership it reached Shanghai in June, 1868, after an eventful voyage of discovery of just two years. Our Royal Geographical Society honoured M. Garnier with its gold medal, as also did that of Antwerp.

In 1870, Garnier, with the naval brigade which performed such excellent service, was present at the defence of Paris; and in 1872 he once more left France, determined to carry out more thoroughly the views adopted when in Cochin-China. “Il y a là un secret à pénétrer; ces intermédiaires chinois, qui

prélèvent de si gros bénéfices sur le transport du thé, de la soie, font naturellement mystère de la provenance, pour garder le monopole des relations avec le producteur inconnu. C'est un mystère que protège jusqu'au présent les difficultés des routes ; mais que l'euro péen surmonte cette difficulté, qu'il parvienne plus avant dans les terres, voyez-vous la révolution économique dont se ressent tout notre vieux monde ? Le thé, la soie, à moitié prix ! Aussi les principaux commerçants de Shanghai sont-ils vivement préoccupés de la navigation du fleuve Bleu. C'est déjà un grand progrès que d'avoir établi un service de bateaux à vapeur jusqu'à Hankow ; mais ce n'est pas assez loin. Pourrait-on pousser au-delà ? C'est à voir. Les anglais—toujours les anglais—ont fait les voyages d'étude pour reconnaître les obstacles, et vérifier, s'il n'y aurait pas moyen d'amener la vapeur jusqu'à Chongkin, qui est le grand marché du Se-chuen. Ce marché est avide de cotonnades. Il y aurait donc—si l'on pouvait ouvrir de ce côté un accès moins lent, moins dispendieux, qu'avec les jonques chinoises—une source féconde d'échanges."

Arriving at Shanghai, impressed with these views, some months were passed in excursions up to and beyond Hankow, in collecting information about the country beyond, and in endeavouring to interest the



French Government and the Shanghai merchants in his enterprise. But recent events in Europe had caused the Ministry of the Republic to look askance on projects of colonial extension, and Garnier found but little response to his enthusiastic views. It was, therefore, with a feeling of delight that he received Admiral Dupré's short letter in July, 1873. He was acquainted with M. Dupuis, cognisant of the state of affairs of Tonkin, and, finding that all hopes of the exploration of the Blue River were fruitless, he gladly turned his mind to that other stream whose source he had descried when entering Yunnan.

Garnier had already written both to the Governor of Cochin-China and to Paris, offering to proceed on a politico-scientific mission in order to counter-balance the effect caused by Mr. T. T. Cooper in his expedition between Burmah and China; and on receipt of Admiral Dupré's letter, his first impression was that his destination was Yunnan, and in writing to a friend he said :

“ Je serai résident français au Yunnan avec ou sans coadjuteur. J'y veux un arsenal français et le commencement d'une voie ferrée reliant le fleuve du Tonkin à Yunnan. Les Anglais ne se relèveront pas de celle-là.”

It was not until he reached Saigon that Garnier learnt the true nature of his mission, and then he threw himself heart and soul into the views of the admiral, which were, the expulsion of the Chinese from the valley of the Red River, and the annexation of Tonkin by France. The first step was to procure the withdrawal by peaceable means of the Chinese troops, who were already occupying Bac Ninh and Son Tay; and with a view towards this end, the French admiral addressed a letter, the text of which ran as follows, to the Governors of Canton and Yunnan :

LETTER FROM REAR-ADMIRAL DUPRÉ TO THE VICEROY OF CANTON,

“ SAIGON, 1er *Septembre*, 1873.

“ À SON EXCELLENCE LE VICEROI DES DEUX KOUANG.

“ C'est avec une vive satisfaction et une profonde reconnaissance que j'ai appris les dispositions amicales de votre Excellence pour un sujet français, le sieur Dupuis, qui est au service du Gouvernement du Yunnan. Mon devoir est de remercier votre Excellence pour la généreuse protection qu'elle lui a accordée et en même temps pour l'aide que les soldats du Kouang Si ont donné à un pays ami et voisin, l'Annam, pour la répression des rebelles. Les intérêts de la France sont, en effet, intimement liés

à ceux de l'Annam, et qui tend la main à l'un mérite la reconnaissance de l'autre.

“ J’ai accueilli aussi avec une grande joie cette nouvelle qu’un français avait trouvé une route avantageuse pour pénétrer dans le Yunnan, et avait créé ainsi de nouvelles relations d’amitié et de commerce entre la France et l’empire du Ciel. Mais il n’est pas juste que je laisse à votre Excellence tout le fardeau de la protection des intérêts du commerce dans une région, le Tonkin, aussi voisine de Saïgon. L’amitié se prouve par des services réciproques, et à une main tendue une autre main doit répondre. J’ai donc résolu de m’entendre avec la Cour de Hué pour rétablir la paix dans ses provinces et pour établir sur un pied satisfaisant les relations commerciales entre le Tonkin et le Yunnan. Dans ces conditions, comment la présence de soldats chinois dans l’Annam continuerait-elle à être nécessaire ? Les routes sont longues et difficiles, le pays malsain, les dépenses pour entretenir les troupes considérables. Le cœur de votre Excellence ne peut pas ne pas souffrir de cet état de choses. Je lui offre donc de retirer ses troupes ainsi que celles qui pourraient encore venir du Yunnan, de leur épargner ainsi un exil pénible, un voyage fatigant et dangereux. Je me fais fort, d’accord avec le Gou-

vernement annamite, de protéger d'une façon efficace le commerce, les intérêts chinois qui sont aussi les intérêts français. De la sorte, il n'y aura pas de confusion possible et une amitié sincère continuera de régner entre les deux royaumes.

“Je recevrai avec reconnaissance toutes les communications que votre Excellence pourrait avoir à me faire au sujet des réclamations ou des besoins des sujets chinois qui font le commerce en Annam, et je saisis avec empressement cette occasion de renouveler à votre Excellence l'assurance de mon amitié et du bon souvenir que je garde de ma visite à Canton il y a trente mois.

“Le Contre-Amiral gouverneur et  
Commandant en chef,

“C.-Am. J. DUPRÉ.”

LETTER FROM REAR-ADMIRAL DUPRÉ TO THE VICEROY OF YUNNAN.

“Cochin-Chine Française.

Cabinet du Gouverneur commandant en chef.

“SAÏGON, le 1er Septembre, 1873.

“À SON EXCELLENCE LE VICEROI DE YUNNAN.

“J'ai appris avec la joie la plus vive le succès de votre Excellence sur les Mahométans rebelles, et je lui en adresse mes félicitations les plus sincères. Elle sait déjà sans doute tout l'intérêt

que je porte à la belle province qu'elle gouverne. C'est avec mon assentiment que le commandant de navire Ngan,\* qui a déjà visité le Yunnan, il y a cinq ans, comme envoyé du Gouvernement français, lui avait offert son concours pour la prise de Ta-ly, et j'étais disposé à aider votre Excellence de toutes mes forces pour atteindre un but si désirable.

“Aujourd'hui c'est avec une grande satisfaction que je vois des relations commerciales fructueuses sur le point de s'établir entre le Yunnan et l'empire d'Annam, dont une partie appartient à la France ; j'ai appris que des difficultés s'étaient élevées entre le sieur Dupuis, français au service de votre Excellence, et le Gouvernement annamite, et je vais immédiatement travailler à les aplanir.

“Il est inutile que votre Excellence se préoccupe d'une question qu'il est de mon devoir de résoudre, ni qu'elle envoie des troupes pour soutenir M. Dupuis. J'envoie au Tonkin le même officier Ngan pour faire rendre justice à vos envoyés et en même temps pour rechercher les moyens d'établir sur le pied le plus équitable un commerce qui doit être si avantageux aux peuples dont le Gouvernement nous est confié.

“Je prie votre Excellence d'avoir égard à ce

\* The Chinese name given to M. Garnier.

que lui communiquera cet officier. Je la prie de m'informer de tous ses desirs. Je suis prêt à m'entendre avec elle tant pour les choses de commerce que pour les choses de guerre, si des gens pervers suscitaient encore dans le Yunnan de nouvelles rebellions.

“Que votre Excellence agrée l'assurance de ma haute considération.

“Contre-Amiral J. DUPRÉ.”

At the same time a despatch was forwarded to Hué by Admiral Dupré :

“Je ne vois d'autre moyen de répondre convenablement au désir de votre Excellence que d'envoyer un officier, accompagné de plusieurs hommes, à Hanoi, pour signifier à M. Dupuis l'ordre de se retirer, et pour le faire exécuter de force s'il refuse d'obéir de bonne grace.”

Whilst officially restricting the object of the mission to the task of settling the dispute between M. Dupuis and the authorities at Hanoi, there is no doubt that both Admiral Dupré and M. Garnier intended it to act on a much wider scope. In a letter despatched from Shanghai three weeks before his departure from Saigon, Garnier writes, after describing M. Dupuis' position at Hanoi :

“Cet état de choses est plein de dangers. D'un côté l'impuissance où se trouvent les autorités annamites de forcer à la retraite une poignée d'Européens et de soldats chinois, peut encourager d'autres aventuriers à aller s'établir dans un pays aux dépens duquel il est si facile de vivre.

“De l'autre, les autorités du Yunnan disposant d'un effectif militaire considérable et bien armé, que la répression de la rébellion mahométane laisse sans emploi, peuvent être tentées de prolonger et de rendre définitive l'occupation du cours du Song Coi, qui leur assure des avantages commerciaux d'autant plus considérables que dans la situation prise par M. Dupuis. Il ne peut être question d'acquitter au Gouvernement annamite les droits de douane qui lui sont dûs.

“Dans le premier cas, *une intervention anglaise deviendra imminente.* L'expédition Dupuis est partie de Hong-Kong ; les aventuriers qui l'imiteraient en partiraient aussi et seraient anglais pour la plupart, au besoin le gouvernement de cette colonie en susciterait s'il était nécessaire. La Cour de Hué, ayant déjà adressé des plaintes à Sir Kennedy, Gouverneur du Hong-Kong, celui-ci qui a des instructions dans ce sens, interviendra dès qu'il aura le plus léger prétexte pour le faire.

“ Dans le second cas, le Tonkin devient chinois ; l'influence anglaise fait ouvrir le port de Hanoi, y place un commissaire de douanes anglais, et c'est Hong-Kong qui bénéficie des avantages commerciaux que nous devons nous efforcer d'assurer à Saïgon. Vous savez que le chef des douanes chinoises et anglaises est un anglais, M. Hart.

“ La première pensée de l'amiral avait été de profiter de cet état de choses pour s'emparer du pays par un hardi coup-de-main. Je n'ai pas eu de peine à lui démontrer les inconvénients, les dangers même de cette tentative. Les troupes du Yunnan sont armées de fusils à tir rapide et comptant des instructeurs européens ; un conflit avec elles serait à craindre. *Diplomatiquement nous serions dans notre tort et un échec serait d'autant plus grave.* Enfin nous achèverions par une lutte la ruine de ce malheureux pays, qui de longtemps ne pourrait nous offrir une compensation aux sacrifices que nous aurions faits.

“ Notre politique doit donc consister à dénouer peu à peu tous les fils de cette situation trop tendue ; agir auprès du Gouvernement de Pékin pour obtenir la retraite des troupes chinoises déjà envoyées ou sur le point de l'être dans le Tonkin ; garantir la libre circulation du fleuve que le Gouvernement



annamite ne peut plus aujourd'hui s'obstiner à fermer, *faire comprendre à la Cour de Hué qu'elle perd le Tonkin si elle n'accepte pas cette clause.* Enfin pour donner satisfaction à ses plaintes contre M. Dupuis, et enlever tout prétexte à une intervention officieuse ou officielle d'une autre puissance, envoyer à Hanoi un officier chargé de faire une enquête et de régulariser la situation de M. Dupuis.

“ L'amiral a adopté cette manière de voir, et j'ai accepté la mission délicate d'aller au Tonkin chercher à apaiser les conflits élevés entre M. Dupuis et le Viceroi du Yunnan d'un côté, et les mandarins annamites de l'autre ; étudier les dispositions des populations et m'en servir au besoin comme d'une arme pour vaincre les dernières résistances des lettres \* annamites ; négocier avec eux et les autorités des Yunnan un tarif douanier donnant satisfaction à toutes les parties ; essayer enfin d'obtenir pour notre industrie et nos nationaux l'exploitation des mines du Yunnan qu'un décret impérial vient de rouvrir, et auxquelles les Anglais voudraient de leur côté obtenir un accès exclusif. Ceux-ci ne restent pas inactifs ; ils ont créé une agence politique et commerciale à Bamo, à quelques journées des frontières du Yunnan ; les journaux de l'Inde réclament à grands cris la création

\* Mandarins.

d'un consulat anglais à Talifou; enfin M. Wade, Ministre d'Angleterre à Pékin, pousse évidemment à la conquête du Tonkin par le Yunnan."

Whilst privately announcing his views to friends in France, M. Garnier was no less open in his declarations to the French Minister in Peking, to the course most advisable to take in order to prevent Tonkin and the rich provinces in its neighbourhood falling into the hands or under the protection of the English.

HONG KONG, 8 *Septembre*, 1873.

"Les traités conclus avec la Cour de Hué défendent à nos nationaux de résider à l'intérieur de l'empire d'Annam. J'ai dû, devant les réclamations du Gouvernement annamite, rappeler M. Dupuis à l'exécution de cet article. Il s'y est refusé en se réclamant des autorités du Yunnan, dont il a arboré le pavillon. Les quelques soldats chinois qui lui ont été envoyés doivent être renforcés au mois d'Octobre, cet état de choses n'est pas sans danger. L'impuissance où se sont trouvées les autorités annamites à forcer à la retraite une poignée d'européens peut encourager d'autres aventuriers. L'Empereur Tu Duc est aujourd'hui en présence de difficultés tellement graves que nous pouvons raisonnablement espérer lui faire accepter un protectorat. Mais la

conquête de ce pays par les chinois n'aurait d'autre résultat que de faire bénéficier la colonie anglaise de Hong-Kong des avantages commerciaux que nous devons nous efforcer d'assurer à Saïgon."

The following private letters are equally explicit :

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM M. GARNIER.

"SHANGHAI, 9th August, 1873.

"I wish to see a French garrison in Tonkin and a railway connecting Yunnan with the Red River: The English will never get over that! I feel that if I am supported, Indo-China is French."

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM M. GARNIER.

"19th August, 1873.

"The last mails from India announce the nomination of Mr. T. T. Cooper as political agent at Bhamo, with authority to establish a Consulate at Tali-foo. They openly say that it is necessary to cut the grass under our feet, and to demand the intervention of the English Legation of Peking in order to interest the Viceroy of Yunnan in favour of Mr. Cooper."

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM M. GARNIER.

"SHANGHAI, 8th September, 1873.

"The English are endeavouring to persuade China to advance to the conquest of Tonkin, and propose that she should employ for this purpose the soldiers in Yunnan, whom the suppression of the rebellion has left without employ. With Tonkin in the hands of China, the English will have at their disposal a sea-port far superior to Hainen. I have explained to Admiral Dupré that with the disappearance of Annamite power in Tonkin, our influence in this country (China) will be at an end; but that in compelling the Court of Hué to respect our rights, we place ourselves in an impregnable position, diplomatically speaking. It would be easy enough to conquer the country, but most difficult to administer it, and we have not the necessary *personnel* to undertake the feat. I have, therefore, advised the admiral to negotiate with Peking to demand the retreat of the Chinese troops; with Yunnan to guarantee the opening of the new route and to discuss the customs dues; and with the Court of Hué to point out the dangers in so obstinately keeping the river closed to commerce, and the advantages it will derive from freely opening it,

placing the administration of the customs under French control, analogous to that lately introduced in China."

Animated with these views, and furnished with confidential instructions which have never yet been divulged, but which, it is well known, placed the affair of M. Dupuis in a position subordinate to that of the commercial treaty, M. Garnier quitted Shanghai for Saigon on the 27th September, 1873, and on the 8th of the following month, the expedition, escorted by two men-of-war, sailed for the mouth of the Red River.

The following translation of a memorandum drawn up by Garnier perhaps more clearly explains his views on the question than any recapitulations of the facts connected with his sad fate, and is well worth perusal as being but the ideas now expressed by thousands of Frenchmen with regard to the Indo-Chinese question :

"For many years Great Britain has been endeavouring to establish direct commercial relations between her Indian possessions and the Celestial Empire. A continental route, which would join the Eastern watersheds of the Chinese Seas with the basin of the Irawaddy or of the Ganges, would naturally possess great advantages over the sea route, which obliges vessels to coast the long Indo-Chinese

peninsula and pass through the dangerous Straits of Malacca.

“When the art of navigation was in its infancy, and only timid coasting voyages ventured on, land routes were preferred, whatever their difficulties and perils. From a very early period, China possessed extensive commercial relations with India, Persia, and even Europe. The security, rapidity, and cheapness of sea transport have in a great measure diverted this trade from land to sea routes. But the English conquests in Southern Asia singularly facilitate the re-establishment of these ancient roads; the mineral and agricultural wealth of Western China is in pressing need of outlets for its expansion; the inhabitants themselves eagerly seek the introduction of European merchandise. These land routes, therefore, being shorter, will naturally secure enormous traffic.

“The conquest of Saigon by France, by establishing in Indo-China a rival influence to that of England, and by stimulating explorations and researches on our part towards the same end, encourages our ancient rivals to make still further efforts to secure possession of the land routes to China; and our ancient rivals are to-day our masters in matters of colonisation and commerce. But whilst this great commercial question excites the most profound interest in

England, it attracts but little attention in France. Politically speaking, it is of course a matter of the greatest importance for England to extend her frontiers until they are conterminous with those of China, and to occupy in the south the same position towards the Celestial Empire that Russia occupies in the north. Measures have already been adopted by the English to arrive at this result. A political agency has been created at Bhamo, the Mohammedan rebellion in Western China has been secretly encouraged, and, should success attend the rising, the newly-formed province will be placed under the protection of England politically and commercially; and in the event of a dissolution of the Celestial Empire, or of its diminution by loss of territory, Yunnan would at once come under English influence, Chinese markets would be hermetically sealed to commerce from Tonkin, and all our efforts in that direction be condemned to failure.

“This is already looked upon as a *fait accompli* in England. Maps have recently been published in London, and reproduced in Germany, in which Yunnan is shown as an independent kingdom separated from China, and styled ‘The Kingdom of Panthay.’ It is tinted in the same tint as the British possessions in Burmah. This, I presume, is

merely to habituate the Government of Peking to the thought that the province of Yunnan will eventually be severed from her, and to advance, on the part of England, an *à priori* claim to these distant regions.

“Recent events, however, have falsified these pretensions and damped these hopes of the English Government.

“A French merchant, M. Dupuis, happened to be at Hankow when the French mission of M. Garnier arrived from Yunnan. He learnt from them of the precarious position of the Chinese troops in that province, of their pressing need for arms and munition of war, and of the immense advantages to be gained by conveying these supplies up the Red River of Tonkin. Brave, adventurous, and persevering, M. Dupuis possessed in a pre-eminent degree the qualities necessary for the performance of this task; his knowledge, too, of the Chinese language was of further assistance. He at once proceeded to Yunnan, placed himself in communication with the governor of the province, visited him in his camp, and by a most daring journey over the mountains which separate Yunnan from Tonkin, satisfied himself of the feasibility of his plan. Dupuis then organised his expedition, purchased arms, ammunition, and other warlike stores, and obtained the



promise of the French Government that a vessel of war should be sent to the mouth of the Red River to demand the good services of the Annamite authorities in affording assistance to his expedition. The corvette *Bourayne*, Captain Senez, preceded M. Dupuis to the mouth of the Red River; the commandant visited Hanoi and other towns of the littoral, and cordially recommended the merchant adventurer to the good offices of the mandarin. As a French subject and as an agent of the Chinese viceroy, M. Dupuis had a double claim on the Annamite Government, as it was a debtor to France for the war indemnity of 1863, and is a tributary State of China.

“At the same time that M. Dupuis arrived at Tonkin, Mr. J. J. Cooper, a well-known English traveller, arrived at Rangoon, accredited as political agent to Bhamo, and furnished with instructions to sustain by all the means at his disposal the Mohammedan rebellion in Yunnan.”

The above extract, besides being of value as the opinion of an enthusiast in the cause of French colonisation, is of mournful interest—it is but a fragment, the completion of which was for ever frustrated by the fatal result of the gallant sortie on the 21st December, 1873, when Garnier sacrificed himself for “la vieille France.”

## CHAPTER VI.

CAPTURE OF THE DELTA OF THE RED RIVER BY  
M. GARNIER, 1873.

ON the 10th of October, 1873, M. Garnier announced to his friend M. Gautier his departure :

“ Je pars demain pour le Tonkin à la tête d’une petite force, deux cannières et de l’infanterie, et pleins pouvoirs. Rien, je vous prie, dans les journaux de ce départ.”

In order to understand the dash and gallantry of this brave man, it will be advisable to dwell on the composition of his command, amounting on the whole to less than 200 men. Two small gunboats, the *Arc* and *Espingole*, with crews respectively of fifty-one and twenty-one men, were to be towed to the mouth of the Red River by the corvettes *D’Estrées* and *Decrès*, where a detachment of sixty men of the infantry of the marine were to join them, as well as some twenty gunners to man one

piece of  $5\frac{1}{2}$ " and four of  $1\frac{1}{2}$ " calibre. With this petty force did Garnier contemplate the subjugation of Tonkin. Failure with such means at his disposal was no disgrace; indeed, the early successes that crowned his undertaking are amongst the most marvellous achievements ever experienced by civilised over uncivilised foes, and stamp him as one of the bravest and most cool-headed men of a profession which has never shown itself wanting in heroes.

Unfortunately, a heavy gale experienced during the short voyage from Saigon to the mouth of the Red River swamped the little craft, the *Arc*, and on Garnier's arrival at Tourane on the 15th of October, he feared an abrupt termination to his mission; he, however, only waited there long enough to send messengers to Hué, to demand the presence of the ambassadors who were to accompany him to Tonkin, determining to push on in native craft to Hanoi. In reporting his arrival at Tourane to the Government of Annam, and stating the points of discussion, it does not appear that M. Garnier made any mention of the original cause of his mission—namely, the dispute between M. Dupuis and the Hanoi mandarins (thus early did he show his real intentions); on the contrary, he writes to the Foreign Minister at Hué:

“ Ces questions en litige étaient énumérées dans la lettre de l’amiral et les griefs contre Annam sont récapitulés. 1. Démarche de Hué auprès du gouvernement étranger de Hong-Kong. 2. Mauvais traitements infligés aux chrétiens. 3. Impossibilité de laisser fermée à la navigation la seule voie mettant facilement les provinces de la Chine en communication avec la mer. En conséquence, la Cour de Hue est bien prévenue que M. Garnier a l’ordre de rester à Hanoi jusqu’à ce que l’affaire de la navigation du Song Coi soit réglée.”

On the 20th of October, in announcing the arrival of the ambassadors at Tourane—whence two were to accompany him to Hanoi, the third proceeding direct overland—Garnier writes to a friend in Paris :

“ Il faut que les affaires soient dans un bien mauvais état au Tonkin, pour que le Gouvernement annamite se prête d’aussi bonne grâce à *l’introduction du loup dans la bergerie.*”

No clearer illustration is needed than Garnier’s own words of the duplicity which has attended the French dealings with Annam from the earliest days until now.

Immediately on arrival of the Ambassadors from Hué, the little expedition proceeded to Hai Dzuong,

whence Garnier transmitted the following characteristic letter to the merchant at Hanoi :

“ 24 Octobre, 1873.

“ MON CHER MONSIEUR DUPUIS,

“ Je suis arrivé, vous le savez peut-être, par le *D'Estrées*, avec la mission officielle de faire une enquête sur vos réclamations contre le Gouvernement annamite, et sur les plaintes de celui-ci à votre endroit. Ma mission ne se borne pas là. L'amiral désire mettre un terme à la situation équivoque du commerce étranger au Tonkin. Je compte beaucoup sur votre expérience du pays pour m'éclairer sur la meilleure solution de ce difficile problème. Il est bon cependant ; et vous comprendrez aisément pourquoi que nos relations n'aient, au début, qu'un caractère officiel. À un certain point de vue, je suis un juge qui ne doit paraître se laisser prévenir par aucun des deux partis.

“ Mais je puis au moins vous prémunir contre les bruits exagérés que les annamites ne manqueront pas de faire courir sur les motifs de ma venue, et vous affirmer de la façon la plus positive que l'amiral n'entend abandonner aucun des intérêts commerciaux engagés. Il vous a donné d'ailleurs des preuves non

équivoques de la vive sympathie qu'il porte à votre entreprise.

“Je serai sous très peu de jours à Hanoi, où nous pourrons causer ensemble de la situation politique du pays et de ses nécessités momentanées. J'ai tenu à vous faire parvenir ces quelques lignes par une voie autre que la voie annamite.”

Here again we have the French Envoy openly assuring M. Dupuis of the fact that, in this dispute with the Annamites, he might count on his support. In fact, the complications brought on by the conduct of the French merchant were taken advantage of by Admirals Dupré and Garnier for their own aggrandisement; and it is impossible to acquit the French Government of being a participator in one of the most disgraceful political acts which has ever stained European diplomacy in the far East. Seldom has duplicity been more completely unmasked, seldom has it been more severely punished.

Having thus assured M. Dupuis of his moral support, it was evident that M. Garnier might, in his turn, count on the material aid of that gentleman's well-found expedition; so, determining not to wait for the *Espingole*, the Envoy, now without any steamer, transferred the crew and equipment of the *Arc* to junks, and proceeded slowly up stream. Fortunately,

on the 3rd of November, M. Dupuis, who at Hanoi had heard of the misfortune which had happened to the expedition, steamed down the river, and, taking the junks in tow, soon shortened the distance between Hai Dzuong and Hanoi, at which place Garnier arrived on the 5th of November.

It was, no doubt, extremely galling to the mandarins to witness the arrival of the Envoy in such company. They had requested the French Government to despatch an officer to Hanoi in order to cause the withdrawal of an enterprising French merchant, who was endeavouring to ride roughshod over their laws and customs, and now they saw the Ambassador reach Hanoi in one of M. Dupuis' own steamers. It is scarcely to be wondered at that the only troops which accorded a reception to the embassy were the Chinese levies in M. Dupuis' employ, and though Garnier, in describing his arrival, says, "*Ces Annamites furent décidément des maladroits,*" it is quite open to the impartial historian to comment on the lack of taste displayed by the French Envoy. The indiscretion committed in accepting a passage in M. Dupuis' steamer was equalled if not surpassed by M. Garnier's conduct in proceeding to the Governor's house immediately on landing, and demanding "*un endroit pour mes troupes où ils*

fussent à l'abri d'une surprise, et une installation digne de mon rang ;" and in announcing the object of his mission he merely stated that it was " pour poser les bases d'un traité qui devait se conclure entre la France et la Cour du Hué, afin d'ouvrir à la navigation commerciale le fleuve du Tonkin." The Governor professed himself quite unable to treat on such a subject—which was, he averred, one to be dealt with at Hué, not at Hanoi—but he was prepared to discuss the question of M. Dupuis' attitude, which, according to his instructions, was the sole aim and object of M. Garnier's mission ; and though declining to admit the French troops to the citadel, he courteously placed at the Envoy's disposal an entrenched camp about half a mile to the south of the town.

In the evening of the 5th of November the escort then took possession of the camp, and M. Garnier, in a further fit of indiscretion, placarded the walls of the city with a document which he had already prepared in Saigon :

“ AU PEUPLE TONKINOIS.

“ Le représentant du noble royaume de France fait savoir à tous les habitants que les mandarins du noble royaume d'Annam étant venus à Saïgon demander assistance, l'amiral nous a envoyés au



Tonkin pour voir comment les choses s'y passaient. De plus ici, au Tonkin les côtes sont désolées par de nombreux pirates qui font beaucoup de ravages ; nous avons l'intention de pourchasser ces bandits afin que les habitants de ces lieux puissent en paix vaquer à leurs affaires. Populations du Tonkin, il faut bien vous convaincre d'une chose. C'est que les mandarins et soldats français sont unis comme frères avec les mandarins et soldats annamites. En conséquence, nous désirons procurer au Tonkin la facilité de faire le commerce et par là lui apporter la richesse et la paix. Telles sont nos intentions ; nous vous les faisons connaître à tous, mandarins, soldats et populations du Tonkin."

Such a document was not calculated to remove the bad impression which Garnier's injudicious conduct had already caused. The Governor—a proud old mandarin, who had held a high command in the unfortunate campaign against the French, and bore on his body the scars of wounds received in honourable warfare—was not well pleased at being thus bearded in his den by a young naval lieutenant, and was not slow in showing his resentment, and he declined altogether to discuss any question relating to commerce without explicit instructions from Hué.

The special Ambassadors sent by Tu Duc were equally firm as the Governor in denying any power to discuss the opening of the Red River, and M. Garnier, on his part, showed himself determined not to open the question relating to M. Dupuis' conduct until after the settlement of what he was pleased to term a Treaty of Commerce. The Annamite Ambassadors, on the 9th of November, forwarded to M. Garnier a strongly worded document, which plainly showed the course they meant to adopt :

“Pour discuter les articles d'une convention commerciale il faut absolument que le traité de paix soit fait ; c'est alors seulement qu'on en pourra parler. Il faut de plus que notre Gouvernement détruise jusque dans ses racines la piraterie sur terre et sur mer. Ce n'est certainement pas un fonctionnaire subalterne n'ayant qu'une courte mission temporaire qui peut régler tout cela. Si le noble envoyé, parce qu'il a été chargé de venir au Tonkin donner un ordre aux bateaux Dupuis, argue de cela pour s'occuper d'autre chose, telle que la discussion relative à l'ouverture des routes commerciales, alors les étrangers qui verront ces faits penseront et diront qu'il agit comme Dupuis.”

This despatch was followed up by an order posted on the city walls, in the form of a proclamation

forbidding any merchant to enter into communication with M. Garnier, whose only mission was "pour juger et chasser M. Dupuis, il n'avait pas à s'immiscer dans les affaires du pays; et qu'enfin si quelqu'un croyait avoir le droit de formuler des réclamations, c'était à lui, gouverneur, qu'elles devaient uniquement s'adresser."

This bold speaking was little suited to the character of Garnier, who immediately proceeded to the citadel, and demanded the withdrawal of the offensive despatch and the destruction of the offensive proclamations. The Governor declined to do either the one thing or the other, whereupon the Envoy, in an intemperate mood, issued the following counter proclamation on the 15th November :

"AU PEUPLE TONKINOIS.

"Le gouverneur de cette ville vient de faire une proclamation au peuple qui dénature ma mission. Je l'ai invité à la rétirer, mais j'apprends qu'il ne l'a pas encore fait.

"J'ai été envoyé ici par l'amiral gouverneur de la Cochinchine française pour examiner les différends survenus entre M. Dupuis et les autorités annamites, et tâcher si faire se peut de les aplanir, mais nullement pour expulser M. Dupuis; ni venu, comme le dit la

proclamation du gouverneur, sur l'ordre et la demande de la Cour de Hué pour chasser le même Dupuis et partir avec lui. Ma mission a un autre but, dont le principal est de protéger le commerce en ouvrant le pays et son fleuve à toutes les nations, sous la protection de la France."

The arrival of the gunboats *Espingole* and *Scorpion* further strengthened M. Garnier's force. He now formally warned the Governor of Hanoi that, in the event of his refusal to accept the terms of the Commercial Treaty which was submitted to him, force would be used to fulfil its adoption. This ultimatum was accompanied by a draft treaty containing five clauses, of which the following are the heads :

"1. The Red River (Hongkiang in Chinese, Song Coi in Annamite) is open to ships of commerce from the 15th November, 1873.

"2. It will be exclusively retained for the navigation of French and Chinese vessels.

"3. The customs dues are fixed at three per cent. of the value of the goods.

"4. For vessels coming from Saigon, the customs dues shall be one and a half per cent.

"5. For vessels coming from the Chinese pro-

vince of Yunnan, the customs dues shall be likewise reduced to one and a half per cent."

It was on the 15th November that the Treaty was submitted to the mandarin Governor, who, together with the Ambassadors, declared their inability to discuss any subject but that concerning M. Dupuis; and on the 19th M. Garnier forwarded his final ultimatum, announcing his intention of storming the citadel, making a prisoner of the Governor, and placing the delta of the Red River under French administration, should his terms be not accepted by nightfall. Unfortunately, the exact terms of this curt document are not known; if a copy ever reached Paris, the Government of the Republic have wisely taken steps to prevent its publication; but M. Garnier, in a letter to his brother on the eve of the storming of the citadel, sufficiently explains matters.

"HANOI, 19 *Novembre*, 1873.

"Après avoir essayé tous les moyens pour décider les autorités annamites à ouvrir le pays au commerce, et répugnant à employer la force, j'ai pris un terme moyen, celui de gouverner à côté d'eux et de proclamer le pays ouvert. Le *D'Estrées* est parti, apportant la notification du nouveau régime commercial du Tonkin aux différents consuls de

la côte. Je n'entre pas dans plus de détails à cet égard : tu verras dans les journaux très probablement les mesures très simples que j'ai adoptées. La prise sous la protection de la France des résidents étrangers, les autorités annamites ont laissé faire, mais elles sont préparées à la lutte. Le maréchal a envoyé demander à Hué la permission de me combattre ou de se retirer. Hué m'a écrit deux lettres insolentes pour me dire que je me mêlais de ce qui ne me regardait pas, et qu'il allait en appeler aux pays voisins (Hong-Kong). Je n'ai pas bronché, mais devant des menaces directes d'attaque j'ai posé un ultimatum : le désarmement de la citadelle ; l'ordre à envoyer par le maréchal à tous les gouverneurs de province de se conformer à mes arrêtés ; enfin la permission pour M. Dupuis de rentrer librement au Yunnan. J'attends la réponse avant six heures du soir. Si elle ne vient pas, j'attaquerai la citadelle au point du jour. J'ai fait assez d'efforts pour éviter l'effusion du sang."

“ 10 heures du soir.

“ ‘Alea jacta est,’ ce qui veut dire que les ordres sont donnés. J'attaque demain, au point du jour, 7,000 hommes derrière des murs, avec 180 hommes.

“ 20 Novembre, 10 heures du matin.

“ *All right!* La citadelle a été enlevée avec ensemble. Pas un blessé. La surprise a été complète, et réussie au-delà de mes prévisions; le feu de la rade surtout a abruti ces pauvres gens, qui n'avaient pas encore vu de projectiles explosibles. C'est une opération modèle.”

It was indeed a marvellous exploit. At daybreak the small assaulting columns moved off, and took shelter under the many low walls which surround the city. They were assisted by a detachment of ninety Chinese troops, drawn from the escort which had been placed at the disposal of M. Dupuis by the Governor of Yunnan. At 6 a.m. the two gunboats *Scorpion* and *Espingole* opened a heavy fire on the eastern face of the citadel, the shells bursting inside causing some loss and still more confusion. At the same time a detachment of infantry of the marine, with a 4-centimètre boat-gun, worked round to the south-western gate, opening fire in that quarter. By half-past seven the fire of the garrison was sufficiently got under to enable the little column to push forward to the assault, which they did with the dash and *élan* characteristic of their nation. Impressed by the

determined attitude of the French, the Annamites, unaccustomed to artillery fire and hitherto ignorant of the terrible effect of shells, took to flight; and soon the rice-fields to the north of the citadel were covered with fugitives, amongst whom the long-range cannon of the gunboats worked still further havoc. At eight the French colours were hoisted on the citadel, which, together with the town, was entirely deserted, and the utmost quiet reigned. Garnier's plans had been carefully thought out, and had not failed in one particular. His first act was to placard the city with the following proclamation :

“ AU PEUPLE TONKINOIS.

“ 20 *Novembre*, 1873.

“ L'envoyé du noble royaume de France, le grand mandarin Garnier, fait savoir à tous les habitants que venu au Tonkin par ordre de l'amiral pour ouvrir une voie du commerce, il n'avait nullement l'intention de s'emparer du pays ; mais que les mandarins d'Hanoi ayant tendu des embûches, il n'a pu tolérer leur conduite et a dû s'emparer de ces mandarins perfides. Mais que le peuple reste en paix à s'occuper de ses travaux, il n'a rien à craindre pour ses coutumes, ni pour ses biens. Maintenant que



les gens capables de gouverner le peuple viennent nous offrir leur services. Nous laisserons en place tous les mandarins qui feront leur soumission. Pour ceux qui se retirent, nous les remplaceront par des hommes prudents et sachant prendre les intérêts du peuple; puis nous recommanderons au roi et aux mandarins de traiter le peuple comme un père traite ses enfants.”

The capture of Hanoi was but a preliminary step to the conquest of the delta of the Red River, and it was necessary to take energetic measures to prevent communication being cut off, and to complete the subjugation of the whole country from Hanoi to the sea. On the 23rd of November, the *Espingole*, with a small party of marines in addition to her own complement, steamed southwards, under the command of M. Balny, and on the same day arrived before Hungyen, one of the largest towns in the province. Warned by the fall of the capital, the Governor declared his submission, without making even a show of resistance, in the following terms :

“Reconnaissant que les Français veulent rester bons amis des provinces qui se conformeront aux traités de commerce, je declare que je suis prêt à

m'y conformer. Les douanes sont détruites, et le barrage, à la démolition duquel je mettrai un plus grand nombre d'ouvriers, va disparaître promptement. Les impôts ne seront plus payés désormais entre les mains des autorités annamites mais au commandant français à Hanoi."

Having assured himself that the dam which was being constructed across the river to cut off the French gunboats had been destroyed, M. Balny steamed on to Phuly, which gave in its submission on the 26th of November. In obedience to his original instructions, Balny now steamed down to the open sea, then up the Cua Tai Binh; and on the 4th of December, after a skirmish of some hours, in which the small French detachment showed an excess of hardihood, the fort of Hai Dzuong was captured.

Garnier had been without news of the *Espingole* during her voyage from Phuly to Hai Dzuong, and learning that the Governor of Nam Dinh was erecting dams to cut off the French flotilla from the sea, and was endeavouring to raise the whole country against the invaders, the Envoy, leaving a small garrison in Hanoi, proceeded in the *Scorpion* down the Red River, and, on arriving at Ninh Binh, to

his surprise found the French flag flying. It had been seized in the most gallant manner by a youngster of the name of Hautefeuille, who had been despatched with an order in a steam-cutter, directing M. Balny to attack the fort. Not finding the *Espingole* at Phuly, Hautefeuille conceived the idea of executing the mission himself; and though his crew only consisted of ten men, of whom two were Annamites, he opened fire with his one-and-a-half-inch gun on the fort, and then, disembarking with six men, marched up to the gate and demanded its surrender.

There now remained only the fort of Nam Dinh in Annamite hands. This was attacked by the *Scorpion*, under Garnier, on the 11th, and captured after a short resistance, in which the French suffered their first casualties. Thus, within five weeks of the arrival of the French Envoy in Hanoi, the whole Delta of the river had been seized, by a series of exploits as brave and dashing as any which have ever characterised naval warfare, but which call to mind the piratical excursions of the sixteenth rather than commercial or diplomatic missions of the nineteenth century.

Although the whole Delta of the Red River was in his hands, Garnier found that it was easier to

capture than to guard it. It was necessary to place small garrisons in all the principal forts which maintained communication between Hanoi and the sea, and these garrisons materially weakened the small force at his disposal—a force in its entirety far too small for the protection of the capital. Already, during his absence from Hanoi, disturbances had arisen, and it was abundantly evident that the mandarins were about to make a determined effort to oust the French from their new conquests. Strong Annamite forces appeared at Phu Hoai and Son Tay. At the latter place they had the moral support of a Chinese garrison, and an attempt made to dislodge the enemy from the former village was repulsed. This check was the turning-point in the campaign. On all sides, bands of armed men appeared. Hanoi was threatened in such numbers that Garnier returned in all haste with the *Scorpion* to his head-quarters, and detached the *Espingole* to the mouth of the river, in the hope of finding there some French ship of war from which reinforcements might be drawn.

A slight glimmer of peace appeared on the horizon. Tu Duc, fearing the entire loss of the province, despatched fresh powers to the Ambassadors already at Hanoi, directing them to conclude the Commercial Treaty, and at the same time, with much dignity,

expressed his regret that the French Envoy, "pour parvenir à ses fins, se fût cru obligé de conquérir le pays et de chasser les mandarins du roi. Vous avez dépassé les instructions de l'amiral gouverneur de Saïgon. Au moins auriez-vous dû nous remettre les trésors et les approvisionnements que vous avez trouvés dans la citadelle de Hanoi."

M. Garnier's answer to this missive was not of a nature to accelerate matters. He disclaimed all warlike intentions, and affirmed that "toujours il s'était tenu dans la limite de ses instructions; s'il s'était emparé de la citadel de Hanoi, c'était pour mettre un terme aux manœuvres hostiles des mandarins; s'il avait chassé les mandarins, c'est qu'ils n'avaient pas voulu accepter le nouveau régime commercial;" and though the Ambassadors still remained in the citadel, endeavouring to conclude some arrangement with the French Envoy, it was evident that the feeling of the people in the neighbouring province was averse to any concession to the French.

On the 21st of December the storm burst; swarms of Chinese, Black Flags, and Annamites appeared on the Son Tay road, and the little garrison, all too weak to defend such an extended rampart, bravely manned the western walls of the citadel. The fire of the guns

and chassépôts checked the enemy's advance, and, in a fatal moment of indiscretion, Garnier ordered M. Balny to issue from one gate and press back the assailants in front, whilst he attacked them in the flank. This manœuvre at first appeared successful; step by step the Chinese masses retired before the weak French detachments, but slowly and surely were the Europeans being lured to destruction; the swampy nature of the soil soon forbade the further advance of the guns, and the effects of the rifles were minimised directly the enemy took refuge behind the walls of the outlying villages. It was whilst endeavouring to clear one of these that Garnier, ever foremost in the fight, received his death-wound; and Balny, who was advancing about half a mile to the north, fell almost simultaneously. Deprived of their leaders, the French fell into confusion and were driven back on the citadel in disorder; the fire of the heavy guns from its bastion checked the further advance of the Chinese, who, contented with the heads of two French officers as trophies, returned to Son Tay in triumph.

Despite this unfortunate interruption, the Annamite Ambassadors, who throughout the day's operations had been detained as hostages in the citadel, professed themselves willing to continue

the negotiations on the basis of the power conferred on them by the King; but the terms demanded by M. Esnierz, Garnier's second in command, were of such a nature as to preclude all hope of a satisfactory settlement. They were based entirely on the lines of the Treaty proposed by his predecessor on the 15th November, and, finding it useless to continue the discussion, the Ambassadors declined to proceed until further instructions had reached both contracting parties. The negotiations were accordingly suspended; but the Ambassadors were detained as hostages in the citadel, a proceeding by no means calculated to appease the Annamite King.

## CHAPTER VII.

### PACIFIC NEGOTIATIONS OF M. PHILASTRE.

ANXIOUS as Admiral Dupré undoubtedly was to open up the Red River to commerce, he was by no means satisfied with the very drastic measures adopted by Garnier to this end. The seizure of the citadel of Hanoi was an act of war which might—nay, in all probability would—be disavowed by the French Government; and the admiral thought it advisable to take all the means in his power to render nugatory the exasperating effects of Garnier's conduct. Receiving the report of the outbreak of hostilities on the 4th December, the admiral at once determined to despatch an officer to Hanoi, who should be the bearer of specific instructions to the hot-headed Envoy—directing him to abstain from all further acts of aggression—and who should be in his person the medium of negotiations between the



French and Annamite Governments; as Garnier had of course ceased to be a *persona grata* from the moment that he so ostentatiously accepted Dupuis' friendship.

The officer selected was a M. Philastre, one of that numerous class known in India as "military politicals." He was a man rich in experience of the Oriental character, retaining sufficient of his early training to render him alive to the strategical value of the new country, but so thoroughly imbued with the ideas of a civilian that the thought of unwonted aggression or severity was most repugnant to him. An old comrade and personal friend of Garnier's, M. Philastre was fully conscious of that officer's sterling worth; but his patriotism and *esprit de corps* did not blind him to the evils likely to accrue from the violent partisanship Garnier had adopted with regard to Dupuis, or to the rupture of relations that his conduct was liable to bring about between France and Annam.

M. Philastre's first act on nomination to the mission was to solicit permission to proceed himself to Hué, to learn the exact views entertained by the Court of Annam on the opening of the Red River, and to solicit from them the appointment of duly qualified Ambassadors to accompany him to Hanoi; at

the same time he forwarded a private letter to Garnier, which is worth quoting, if only to show that during the history of the French connection with Tonkin, there has been one man whose conduct has been above the reproach of violence and duplicity.

“SAÏGON, 6 *Décembre*, 1873.

“MON CHER GARNIER,

“Quand j’ai reçu votre lettre elle m’a jeté dans la plus profonde stupéfaction. Je croyais encore que c’étaient là de vaines menaces.

“Avez-vous songé à la honte qui va rejaillir sur vous et sur nous quand on saura qu’envoyé pour chasser un baratier quelconque, et pour tâcher de vous entendre avec les fonctionnaires annamites vous vous êtes alliés à cet aventurier, pour mitrailler sans avis des gens qui ne vous attaquaient pas et qui ne se sont pas défendus ?

“Le mal sera irréparable et pour vous et pour le but que l’on se propose en France.

“Vous vous êtes donc laissé séduire, tromper, et mener par ce Dupuis ?

“Vos instructions ne vous prescrivait pas cela. : je vous avais prévenu que les annamites ne voudraient jamais accepter de traiter avec vous, vous en étiez convenu avec moi.

“ L’amiral ne voit pas encore toute la gravité, tout l’odieux, de votre agression ; il suit une voie bien étrange. Cette affaire va soulever un tollé générale contre lui et contre vous.

“ Que fera le Gouvernement annamite ? Je n’en sais rien. Encore les ambassadeurs sont désolés et indignés : ils veulent la paix parce qu’ils sentent très bien que c’est un coup de Jarnac amené par l’amiral et que celui-ci est décidé pour la guerre, s’il le faut ; mais je ne sais si leur Gouvernement, dont l’orgueil est considerable, se résignera à supporter cet affront et à en passer par les fourches caudines du gouvernement.

“ Je m’attends à être mal reçu, en tout cas j’aurai bien à souffrir, car ils ont beau jeu.

“ Pour moi, j’ai voulu cesser toute participation à des affaires si étrangement conduites. Je ne l’ai pas pu ; je n’ai pas pu refuser à l’amiral la mission qu’il me donne, mais je suis désolé de tout ça, et je n’en attends rien de bon ni dans le présent ni dans l’avenir.

“ Puissiez-vous de votre côté vous en tirer sans trop de mal.

“ Votre bien dévoué,

“ PHILASTRE.”

On the same day that the above letter was despatched the new Envoy left Saigon for Hué, where, after making himself personally acquainted with the King's views, he proceeded, accompanied by the Annamite Ambassadors, to the mouth of the Red River, which he reached on the 21st of the same month; there he learnt of the death of Garnier and of the occupation of the whole of the forts in the delta by French troops. The situation was far more serious than he had anticipated; the evacuation of the forts might inflict a blow on French *prestige*, but their capture had inflicted a still more cruel one on French honour and good faith. Philastre did not hesitate for one moment, his course was clear—"justice above all things"—and messengers were at once despatched to M. Esnierz, in temporary command at Hanoi, desiring him to suspend all communications with the Annamite Ambassadors; and at the same time Philastre issued orders for the evacuation of all the forts so gallantly captured and so bravely held by his comrades. On the 3rd January, 1874, M. Philastre reached Hanoi, and at once inaugurated a line of conduct totally at variance with that laid down by his predecessor. On the 8th January, Ninh Binh, and on the 10th, Nam Dinh were evacuated, their garrisons being with-

drawn to Hanoi, which was further strengthened by two companies of marines from Saigon; but a month later, in consequence of the negotiations between M. Philastre and the Annamite Government, the force was withdrawn; and whilst the French Envoy proceeded to Saigon to carry out the details of the treaty, a subordinate official was left at Hanoi, to act as a medium between M. Dupuis and the mandarins.

In August the treaty was ratified. It provided for the free navigation of the Red River as far as Yunnan, opened the ports of Thin Nai, Ninh Ha, and Hanoi to commerce, and gave the French permission not only to locate a consul with an escort at each of the treaty ports, but gave these consuls complete jurisdiction over all foreigners residing in Annam, and also the power of refusing permission to a European to settle in the country. A Resident was to be nominated by the French Government to reside in Hué, and plentiful presents of arms were made to the King. A supplementary treaty of commerce was also concluded during the same month: by it the customs duties were considerably reduced; vessels hailing from Saigon or other French ports entered Annam waters on more favourable terms than those of other nationalities; and, finally,

the whole customs service of Annam was to be re-established on a fresh basis; French officers were to be in charge of the various offices, and no foreigners of any other nationality were to be nominated to any post in connection with the administration of Annam.

Such, in brief, was the result of the calm, methodical, and impartial manner in which M. Philastre conducted the negotiations. All the points insisted on by M. Garnier, so far as in justice they could be demanded, were granted. France obtained a virtual protectorate over the Red River; but all cause of offence to Annam was removed by the withdrawal of French troops from the fortresses on the high-road between the sea and Yunnan. It may readily be imagined that Garnier was disavowed both by Admiral Dupré and the French Government. Attempts have recently been made to elevate him to the position of an ill-used hero; the history of his conduct when in Tonkin shows him to have been a man of unbounded ambition but of little judgment, and that, availing himself of the weakness of character of his admiral, he, to gratify his own thirst for power, committed the most unjustifiable acts. His one redeeming point was his indomitable gallantry, and this his defenders

have exaggerated into a whole *répertoire* of deeds, virtuous as well as self-sacrificing.

The conduct of Admiral Dupré seems equally open to censure. That his instructions to Garnier admitted of great latitude there is no doubt, and in his negotiations with the Court of Hué, prior to Lieutenant Garnier's departure for Hanoi, he showed himself an unworthy representative of his country and unfit to be entrusted with plenary power, while his disavowal of Garnier was an act of meanness of which few French admirals would be guilty.

The one person who emerged from this disgraceful expedition with increased honour is M. Philastre. Though a friend of Garnier's, he viewed his proceedings with the deepest sorrow. The letter which is quoted *in extenso* on page 142, is a clearer picture of his character than any words can give. Jealous of his country's honour, he was equally jealous of her rights, but he did not allow his patriotism to blind his sense of justice ; and thus, by judiciously waiving those points where France was legally and morally in the wrong, he carried through a more satisfactory treaty and gained greater concessions from the Annamites, without shedding one drop of blood, than Admiral Bonard succeeded in effecting, after two years' continuous fighting, in 1862.

As the treaty has been, latterly, constantly referred to, as a proof of the protectorate France enjoys over Annam, the text of its principal clauses will be of interest.

TREATY CONCLUDED AT SAIGON, MARCH 15, 1874, BETWEEN FRANCE  
AND ANNAM.

“ Article 1. Il y aura paix, amitié et alliance perpétuelle entre la France et le royaume d’Annam.

“ Article 2. S. Exc. le Président de la République française, reconnaissant la souveraineté du Roi de l’Annam et son entière indépendance vis-à-vis de toute puissance étrangère quelle qu’elle soit, lui promet aide et assistance, et s’engage à lui donner sur sa demande, et gratuitement, l’appui nécessaire pour maintenir dans ses états l’ordre et la tranquillité, pour le défendre contre toute attaque et pour détruire la piraterie qui désole une partie des côtes du royaume.

“ Article 3. En reconnaissance de cette protection, S. M. le Roi de l’Annam s’engage à conformer sa politique extérieure à celle de la France, et à ne rien changer à ses relations diplomatiques actuelles.

“ Cet engagement politique ne s’étend pas aux traités de commerce. Mais dans aucun cas S. M. le Roi de l’Annam ne pourra faire avec une nation



quelle qu'elle soit de traité de commerce en désaccord avec celui conclu entre la France et le royaume d'Annam, et sans en avoir préalablement informé le Gouvernement français.

“ S. Exc. le Président de la République française s'engage à faire à S.M. le Roi de l'Annam don gratuit :

“ 1. De cinq bâtiments à vapeur d'une force réunie de cinq cents chevaux, en parfait état, ainsi que les chaudières et machines, armés et équipés conformément aux prescriptions du règlement d'armement.

“ 2. De cent canons de sept à seize centimètres de diamètre, approvisionnées à deux cents coups par pièce.

“ 3. De mille fusils à tabatières et de 500,000 cartouches.

“ Article 4. S. Exc. le Président de la République française promet en outre de mettre à la disposition du Roi : des instructeurs militaires et marins, en nombre suffisant pour reconstituer son armée et sa flotte ; des ingénieurs et chefs d'ateliers capables de diriger les travaux qu'il plaira à Sa Majesté de faire entreprendre ; des hommes experts en matière de finances pour organiser le service des impôts et des douanes dans le royaume ; des professeurs pour fonder un collège à Hué. Il promet en outre de fournir au Roi des bâtiments de guerre, les armes

et les munitions que Sa. Majesté jugera nécessaire à son service.

“ Article 5. S. M. le Roi de l’Annam reconnaît la pleine et entière souveraineté de la France sur tout le territoire actuellement occupé par elle et compris entre les frontières suivantes :

“ À l’est : la mer de Chine et le royaume d’Annam, province de Binh Thuan.

“ À l’ouest : le golfe de Siam.

“ Au sud : la mer de Chine.

“ Au nord : le royaume de Cambodge et le royaume d’Annam, province de Binh Thuan.

“ Article 6. Il est fait remise au Roi par la France de tout ce qui lui reste dû de l’ancienne indemnité de guerre.

“ Article 7. Sa Majesté s’engage formellement à rembourser par l’entremise du Gouvernement français, le restant de l’indemnité due à l’Espagne, s’élevant à 1,000,000 dollars, et à effectuer à ce remboursement la moitié du revenu net des douanes des ports ouverts au commerce européen et américain, quel qu’en soit d’ailleurs le produit. Le montant en sera versé chaque année au trésor public de Saïgon, chargé d’en faire la remise au Gouvernement espagnol, d’en tirer reçu, et de transmettre ce reçu au Gouvernement annamite.

“ Article 8. S. Exc. le Président de la République française et S.M. le Roi accordent une amnistie générale pleine et entière, avec levées de tous séquestres mis sur les biens à ceux de leurs sujets respectifs qui jusqu'à la conclusion du traité et auparavant se sont compromis pour le service de l'autre partie contractante.

“ Article 9. S.M. le Roi de l'Annam, reconnaissant que la religion Catholique enseigne aux hommes à faire le bien, révoque et annule toutes les prohibitions portées contre cette religion, et accorde à tous ses sujets la permission de l'embrasser et de la pratiquer librement.

“ En conséquence, les chrétiens du royaume d'Annam pourront se réunir dans les églises en nombres illimités pour les exercices de leur culte. Ils ne seront pas obligés sous aucun prétexte à des actes contraires à leur religion ni soumis à des recensements particuliers. Ils seront admis à tous les concours et aux emplois publics sans être tenus pour cela à aucun acte prohibé par la religion.

“ Sa Majesté s'engage à faire détruire les registres du dénombrement des chrétiens fait depuis quinze ans, et à les traiter quant aux recensements et impôts exactement comme tous ses autres sujets. Elle s'engage en outre à renouveler la défense si sagement

portée par elle d'employer dans le langage ou dans les écrits des termes injurieux pour la religion, et à faire corriger les articles du Thâp Dieu dans lesquels de semblables termes sont employés.

“ Article 10. Le Gouvernement annamite aura la faculté d'ouvrir à Saigon un collège placé sous la surveillance du Directeur de l'Intérieur, et dans lequel rien de contraire à la morale et à l'exercice de l'autorité française ne pourra être enseigné. Le culte y sera entièrement libre.

“ Article 11. Le Gouvernement annamite s'engage à ouvrir au commerce les ports de Thin Nai, dans la province de Binh Dinh ; de Ninh Hai, dans la province de Hai Dzuong ; la ville de Hanoi, et le passage par le fleuve du Nhi Ha depuis la mer jusqu'au Yunnan.

“ Article 12. Les sujets français ou annamites de la France et les étrangers en général pourront, en respectant les lois du pays, s'établir, posséder et se livrer librement à toutes opérations commerciales et industrielles dans les villes ci-dessus désignées. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté mettra à leur disposition les terrains nécessaires à leur établissement.

“ Ils pourront de même naviguer et commercer entre la mer et la province du Yunnan par la voie de Nhi Ha, moyennant l'acquittement des droits fixés et à la condition de s'interdire tout trafic sur les

rives du fleuve entre la mer et Hanoi et entre Hanoi et la frontière de Chine.

“ Ils pourront librement choisir et engager à leur service des compradors, interprètes, écrivains, ouvriers, bateliers et domestiques.

“ Article 13. La France nommera dans chacun des ports ouverts au commerce un consul ou agent, assisté d'une force suffisante, dont le chiffre ne devra dépasser le nombre de cent hommes, pour assurer sa sécurité et faire respecter son autorité, pour faire la police des étrangers jusqu'à ce que toute crainte à ce sujet soit dissipée par l'établissement des bons rapports, qui ne peut manquer de faire naître la loyale exécution du traité.

“ Article 14. Les sujets du Roi pourront de leur côté librement voyager, résider, posséder, et commercer en France et dans les colonies françaises en se conformant aux lois. Pour assurer leur protection, Sa Majesté aura la faculté de faire résider des agents dans les ports ou villes dont elle fera choix.

“ Article 15. Lorsque des sujets français, européens ou cochinchinois, ou d'autres étrangers, désireront s'établir dans un des lieux ci-dessus spécifiés, ils devront se faire inscrire chez le résident français, qui en avisera l'autorité locale.

“ Les français ou étrangers qui voudront voyager

dans l'intérieur du pays ne pourront le faire que s'ils sont munis d'un passeport délivré par un agent français, et avec le consentement et le visa des autorités annamites. Tout commerce leur sera interdit sous peine de confiscation de leurs marchandises.

“Si des voyageurs français doivent parcourir le pays en qualité de savants, ils jouiront à ce titre de la protection du Gouvernement, que leur délivrera les passeports nécessaires, les aidera dans l'accomplissement de leur mission et facilitera leurs études.

“Article 16. Toutes contestations entre français ou entre français et étrangers seront jugées par le résident français.

“Lorsque des sujets français ou étrangers auront quelque contestation avec des annamites ou quelque plainte ou réclamation à formuler, ils devront d'abord s'exposer l'affaire au résident, qui s'efforcera de l'arranger à l'amiable.

“Si l'arrangement est impossible, le résident requerra l'assistance d'un juge annamite commissioné à cet effet, et tous deux, après avoir examiné l'affaire conjointement, statueront d'après les règles de l'équité.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Mais toutes les contestations entre français ou entre français et étrangers seront jugées par le résident français seul.

“Article 17. Les crimes et délits commis par des français ou des étrangers sur le territoire de l’annam seront connus et jugés à Saïgon par les tribunaux compétents.”

A treaty of commerce was also concluded at the same time, and it is worthy of remark that, for the first eighteen months succeeding its signature, no French merchant vessel entered the Red River. Eleven ships under English colours, with a gross tonnage of 3525; six Germans, 1852 tons; and 116 Chinese, with a tonnage of 2483, were all that availed themselves of the opening of the new route to Western China, which, according to Garnier’s chimerical views, was to revolutionise Oriental commerce.

EXTRACTS FROM A TREATY OF COMMERCE CONCLUDED AT SAIGON,  
AUGUST 31, 1874, BETWEEN FRANCE AND ANNAM.

“Article 6. Pour assurer la perception des droits et afin d’éviter les conflits qui pourraient naître entre les étrangers et les autorités annamites, le Gouvernement français mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement annamite les fonctionnaires nécessaires pour diriger le service des douanes, sous la surveillance et l’autorité du ministre chargé de cette partie du service public. Il aidera également le Gouvernement

annamite à organiser sur les côtes un service de surveillance efficace pour protéger le commerce.

“Aucun Européen non Français ne pourra être employé dans les douanes.

“Article 7. Tous les Européens employés dans les douanes relèveront directement du chef du service européen.”

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE.

“Il est entendu que la ville même de Hanoi est ouverte au commerce étranger, et qu’il y aura dans cette ville un consul, avec son escorte, une douane, et que les Européens pourront y avoir des magasins et des maisons d’habitation aussi bien qu’à Ninh Ha et à Thin Nai.”



## CHAPTER VIII.

### DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN PHILASTRE'S TREATY AND RIVIÈRE'S ACTION.

WE must now turn to France, and see with what views the new treaty was regarded by the ministers in Paris, and what efforts were made to act loyally and honourably towards a weak and semi-civilised power, which she had so thoroughly crushed. It will be seen that the one idea underlying the whole policy of Admiral Dupré and M. Garnier was distrust and jealousy of England. To wrest from us our China trade—by fair means, if possible; if not, by foul—was the aim and object of these naval officers; and that they were in the receipt of much and constant support from Paris is now a well-ascertained, if not an acknowledged fact. That this should have been so is by no means surprising, when we remember that the original treaty between Louis XVI. and the dispossessed King of Annam was entered into as “le moyen le plus sûr de

combattre les Anglais dans l'Inde, et de ruiner ou d'affaiblir leur commerce."

The Treaty of 1862 was wrung from King Tu Duc under the double pressure of a French invading army in the south and of a dangerous rebellion in the north; by it the southern province of the kingdom and its finest harbour were torn from Annam. But just as an eight months' occupation of Tourane showed Admiral Bouard there were fairer fields to conquer in the country than that barren peninsula, so did ten years' possession of Cochin-China show the Government of the Republic that the northern, not the southern, provinces of Annam constituted her real wealth. The absorption of the whole kingdom would undoubtedly have roused the jealousy of China, and might have provoked perfectly justifiable remonstrances on the part of other Powers. The annexation of the country could not be proceeded with; even to announce an open protectorate was a step France, emasculated by her struggle with Germany, dared not avow; and though, as subsequent events and official documents amply prove, France even at this period dreamt as much of annexation as of protection, the Treaty of 1874 carefully abstained from hinting at either alternative.

Indeed there were grave doubts whether the twelfth clause of the Treaty, which opened the Red River from Yunnan to the sea to European commerce, was not a violation of the Treaty of Tientsin; and Admiral Dupré, the Governor of Cochin-China, thought it incumbent on him to point this out to the then Minister of the Colonies, M. de Montaignac, suggesting that, in submitting the treaty to the Court of Pekin, the French ambassador, "en faisant valoir que l'ouverture des ports du Tonkin et la libre navigation dans le Song Coi (Red River) jusqu'aux frontières chinoises, ne modifient en rien les restrictions que renferme le Traité de Tientsin, et que nous avons acceptées; nous pourrions en même temps faire valoir les avantages de l'ouverture de nouveaux ports au commerce étranger, et témoigner dès ce présent l'espoir que le libre accès dans la province de Yunnan sera prochainement accordé. En émettant ce vœu nous ne ferions que nous associer à des démarches déjà faites par le Gouvernement britannique, qui poursuit le projet d'établir une route commerciale entre la Birmanie et les provinces occidentales du Céleste Empire."\*

\* Extract from a despatch from Admiral Dupré, Governor of Cochin-China, to Admiral de Montaignac, Minister of Marine and the Colonies, dated Saigon, 27th February, 1875.

On the same day the Minister of Foreign Affairs forwarded from Versailles to the French Ambassador in China a copy of the ratified treaty for submission to the Government of Peking. The Duc Decazes was aware of the fact that Annam was a vassal of China, and that many of the fortified towns in Tonkin were in possession of Chinese troops, who had been introduced into the country at the urgent request of Tu Duc, in order to suppress the rebellion in the northern provinces. The duke, therefore, was careful to call the particular attention of the French Envoy at Peking to the second clause of the treaty, which is thus worded :

“Son Excellence le Président de la République française, reconnaissant la souveraineté du Roi de l’Annam et son entière indépendance vis-à-vis de toute puissance étrangère, quelle qu’elle soit, lui promet aide et assistance, et s’engage à lui donner sur sa demande et gratuitement l’appui nécessaire pour maintenir dans ses états l’ordre et la tranquillité, pour le défendre contre toute attaque et pour détruire la piraterie qui désole une partie des côtes du royaume.”

And whilst expressing a hope that the *entente cordiale* now established between Annam and France

would be thoroughly appreciated at Peking, the Ambassador was instructed to add :\*

“En présence d’une situation aussi nette, il y a lieu de croire que le Tsong-li-Yamen renoncera pour l’avenir à toute idée de faire intervenir les troupes impériales dans les provinces qui font partie du territoire annamite, et dans lesquelles nous ne saurions plus reconnaître à d’autres qu’à nous-mêmes les droits de rétablir l’ordre et d’assurer la tranquillité des populations.”

At the same time, the Duke was fully aware of the difficulties of the situation; he knew that the opening of the Red River to European traffic as far as Yunnan would be strenuously opposed at Peking, as also would any overt attempt to claim a protectorate over Annam. M. Rochechouart was desired, therefore, “*de n’agir qu’avec une extrême prudence.*”

The Minister of the Colonies, Admiral de Montaignac, more of the sailor than of the politician, insisted on a straightforward course—a course honest as the day, and little calculated to be welcome either at Versailles or Peking. “Notre intervention actuelle,”

\* Despatch of the Duc Decazes, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Comte de Rochechouart, Ambassador at Peking, dated Versailles, 27th February, 1875.

he wrote, "est le jalon du protectorat qui doit plus tard être nettement établi et consenti. Nous jouerions un rôle peu digne de la France si, après les sacrifices que nous avons déjà faits et ceux que nous allons faire, au moment où l'on nous remercie de l'assistance prêtée pour la pacification de la province, et où l'on nous demande notre concours en cas d'éventualités semblables, nous faisons des concessions de nature à nous faire dévier du but réel ; l'établissement du protectorat de la France sur l'Annam." The Foreign Minister, however, scarcely felt the time had yet arrived when the word *protectorate* should be used ; he counselled prudence and patience. "Plus tard," he wrote to the Ambassador at Peking, "nous pourrons nous montrer plus exigeants si cela est nécessaire."\*

There was little need for counselling caution to such an experienced diplomatist as M. Rochecouart ; he felt, perhaps, even more than the Duc Decazes the dangers and difficulties of his position. On the one hand, the Ambassador at Peking was being pressed by the Governor of Cochin-China to announce a French protectorate over Annam ; on the other hand,

\* Despatch from Admiral de Montaignac, Minister of the Marine and of the Colonies, to the Duc Decazes, Foreign Minister, dated Paris, 19th April, 1875.

he was instructed by the Foreign Minister, his own immediate superior, to temporise, to lull the suspicions of the Chinese. In writing to Paris, the Ambassador alludes to the situation in which he found himself, owing to these contradictory orders. "Tandis que vous insistez sur l'indépendance de l'Empereur Tu Duc, il (Admiral Dupré, Governor of Cochin-China) paraît plutôt croire à un protectorat; comme ses nouvelles sont plus récentes que les miennes, j'ai craint de m'avancer sur ce terrain brûlant, et dans la lettre que j'ai écrite au Prince Kong, en lui envoyant une copie du traité d'amitié du 15 Mars, *j'ai glissé sur cette question.*" \*

It is perfectly clear from this letter that the French Government carefully abstained from alarming or annoying the Government of China, by advancing any claim to the protectorate of Tonkin. "*J'ai glissé sur cette question,*" says the Comte de Rochechouart; and no further refutation than this should be necessary of the statement so repeatedly put forward by various ministers, including Gambetta, Challemel Lacour, and Ferry, that China, by accepting the Treaty of 1874 without protest, virtually

\* Despatch from the Comte de Rochechouart, French Ambassador in China, to the Duc Decazes, Foreign Minister at Paris dated Peking, 27th May, 1875.

withdrew her claim to the suzerainty of Annam, and recognised the French protection over her ancient vassal. Though Admiral Dupré was of opinion "que la vassalité de l'Annam n'avait qu'une importance purement historique," those entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining peace between the two nations were decidedly opposed to any idea of urging, at that time at any rate, the rights of France to the since claimed protectorate.

But suddenly the old jealous fear of England arose, and whilst M. Rochechouart, at Peking, was endeavouring to lull the ever-suspicious Chinese Government, he was roused from his attitude of what we may term masterly inactivity by a telegram—"Je crois que le Gouvernement anglais, poursuivant les représentations qui lui sont dues à l'occasion du meurtre de M. Margary, compte demander l'ouverture du Yunnan par la Birmanie. Vous pourriez en prendre occasion peut-être pour demander la libre navigation dans la partie chinoise du Song Coi (Red River)"\*—instructing him to obtain from the Chinese Government what it was well known was in opposition to the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin, the opening of another port to

\* Telegram from the Duc Decazes to M. Rochechouart, French Ambassador at Peking, dated Versailles, 3rd July, 1875.



European trade. Dread of seeing the fruits of Dupuis' explorations and of Garnier's sacrifice torn from France by *les perfides Anglais*, the Duc Decazes determined to throw off the mask and insist on obtaining in full the recognition of the Treaty of 1874. But the Chinese Government were not by any means prepared to open Yunnan either to England or to France without a struggle. It now saw these two allies, whose combined forces had humiliated the ever-victorious armies of the Celestial Empire, and whose standards had waved over the Summer Palace at Peking, entering on their old paths of commercial rivalry; and the Tsong-li-Yamen determined to take advantage of this divergence of opinion by adopting the dilatory policy so dear to Chinese diplomatists. Without actually declining to sanction the opening of the Red River as far as Manghao, it pleaded the distance of Yunnan from Peking, and promised to place itself in communication with the Viceroy of the province, in order to obtain from him full information as to the possibility of carrying into effect the wishes of the French Government. But, whilst ostensibly endeavouring to carry these wishes into effect, it was clear the Chinese Ministers were not disposed to yield the point, though their innate politeness forbade their giving a direct refusal.

In 1876, the old question as to the suzerainty

of China over Annam once more cropped up. In September of that year, M. Kergaradac, the French Consul at Hanoi, reported the departure from that city of an embassy bearing the usual triennial tribute to the Emperor at Peking. We saw that Admiral Dupré, the Governor of Cochin-China, had, on the conclusion of the Treaty of 1874, insisted with much pertinacity on the necessity of fully explaining to China the new position occupied by France towards Annam; but, for prudential reasons, the Government of the Republic refused to give effect to the Admiral's wishes. When, therefore, it became known, two years later, that the King of Annam, in what Admiral Dupré considered to be a violation of the treaty, was about to forward an Embassy to Peking without any consultation with the French authorities, and when the Admiral saw that his own Ministry were unwilling to interfere with this mission, he pointed out in the most unmistakable language the inevitable result of such a lack of firmness, and begged to be relieved of his functions. He was succeeded in his post by a member of his own profession, Rear-Admiral Lafont. The new Governor of Cochin-China arrived at Saigon early in 1878, armed with powers enabling him either to strengthen himself in the delta of the Red River,

or, if he thought fit, to withdraw altogether from Tonkin—the possession of which it was found, whilst producing no real advantages, was capable of producing an infinity of mischief, and was already putting to the test the patience of the Chinese Government.

In the meantime, the tribute-bearing embassy left Hanoi under a salute from the guns of the fortress, and under the eyes of a French Consul; it was received at Peking with the usual honours, and it was clear that China at any rate did not gather that the presence of two French Consuls in the delta of the Red River meant the transfer of the protectorate of Annam from Peking to Paris. On the contrary, the Chinese Ministry were to a certain extent masters of the situation. In defiance of a treaty which recounted the “*entire independence*” of the King of Annam, that monarch, faithful to his ancient traditions, had despatched his usual tribute to Peking from a town occupied by a detachment of French troops.

Further than this, China, throughout the negotiations, had shown that she considered Annam still her vassal in spite of the recent Franco-Annamite treaty, and when the Comte de Rochechouart in 1875 suggested the withdrawal of the Chinese troops

from Tonkin—where, as the Duc Decazes owned, “*que ses armées ont eu la faculté de parcourir librement et en tout sens*”—the Government of Peking, whilst agreeing to the withdrawal of the troops as the rebellion they were sent to repress had ceased, pointed out that the imperial forces had been sent to Tonkin :

“ 1. To succour one of our tributary kingdoms.

“ 2. To assure the safety of our frontiers ;”

adding, according to Prince Kong’s despatch : “*La Chine ne pouvait refuser protection et assistance à son vassal.*”

It does not seem, however, that the Chinese troops ever were withdrawn, for in 1879, on a fresh rebellion breaking out in Tonkin, imperial troops were found at Bac Ninh, Son Tay, and Hanoi. M. de Montmorand, the new French Minister in China, pointed out the difficulties in which Tu Duc was placed at this time, “*avec deux protecteurs et deux défenseurs,*” and solicited fresh instructions from Paris. The appeal from the Ambassador led to lengthened interchanges of views between M. Waddington, the then Foreign Minister, and Admiral Pothau, the Minister of Marine. These resulted in the most explicit powers being forwarded to the

Governor of Saigon;\* the Chinese Government, however, being kept in ignorance of the intentions of France. "Nous ne devons avoir par conséquent aucun scrupule à laisser ce Gouvernement aveugle subir les conséquences de sa présomption, et j'estime que nous ne saurions hésiter à rendre plus nette une situation qui nous a déjà imposé des sacrifices considérables. Je vous envoie donc les pouvoirs nécessaires pour consacrer, par un traité nouveau, l'établissement de notre protectorat sur le Tonkin. Soit que vous ayez à entrer en négociation à ce sujet avec une insurrection triomphante dont l'Annam n'aurait pu avoir raison; soit que reconnaissant son impuissance à nous garantir les avantages stipulés par la Convention de 1874, la Cour de Hué se voie contrainte de recourir à nous, non dans les conditions du traité pour expulser des pirates, mais pour rétablir son autorité compromise, les clauses à stipuler devraient être les mêmes et peuvent se résumer dans les points suivants.

"1. Le droit exclusif de régler les relations extérieures du pays serait reconnu à la nation pro-

\* Despatch from Admiral Pothau, Minister of the Marine and of the Colonies, to Admiral Lafont, Governor General of Cochin-China, dated Paris, 10th January, 1879.

tectrice et les représentants des différentes puissances seraient accrédités auprès d'elle.

“2. Nos agents seraient chargés de rendre la justice, tant à l'égard des Français et des étrangers qu'à l'égard des indigènes, dans leurs rapports avec nos nationaux et avec les étrangers.

“Enfin les droits de douane seraient maintenus et perçus à notre profit et le produit en serait consacré à couvrir les frais de notre occupation.”

Although armed with this power, neither Admiral Lafont nor his successor, M. Le Myre de Vilers, found an opportunity of carrying out the proposed change in the Treaty of 1874 without causing an open rupture with China. The rebellion in Tonkin was of too formidable a nature for the Governor of Cochin-China to interfere with a view to its suppression, without the aid of reinforcements; though, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 1874, by which France “lui promet aide et assistance, et s'engage à lui donner sur sa demande et gratuitement l'appui nécessaire pour maintenir dans ses états l'ordre et la tranquillité,” he would have been perhaps justified in offering his assistance.

Admiral Pothau, with the brusqueness of a sailor, suggested the despatch of a force of 6000 men; and not only that it should undertake the

suppression of the rebellion, but the conquest of the whole country of Annam. More prudent counsels prevailed.

Tu Duc had ignored the provisions of the French treaty, but, mindful of his duty to his liege suzerain, had called on Peking for further assistance, and this was readily granted. The claims of France, though well known, had never been put forward with sufficient insistence, and it was easy, therefore, for China to ignore them. Without an explicit demand on the part of Tu Duc for French assistance, it was manifestly impossible, without running the risk of causing an open breach with the Court of Peking, for the French Government to send troops to suppress the rebellion. And so it came about that a brief announcement in the official *Pekin Gazette* of 25th January, 1880, made known that the insurgents in Tonkin had been defeated by the Chinese armies, and that peace had been restored in the dominion of those "whom our investiture has rendered our vassals."

Once more China had achieved a double diplomatic victory. She had reasserted her right, and very effectively too, to intervene in the affairs of Annam, and she had publicly alluded to the vassalage of Tu Duc, and to his investiture with regal

authority by the Emperor of China. Fortified by this further assurance of support from his Suzerain, Tu Duc despatched an embassy to Peking, to convey his humble gratitude to the Emperor for fresh proofs of his benevolence. These proofs of the ancient relationship existing between China and Annam were little to the liking of the French Government, and though M. de Freycinet, when appealed to by the Governor of Cochinchina for permission to forbid the departure of the embassy, declined to sanction the employment of any direct means of discouragement, he yet gave his approval to the suggestion that the Envoy at Hué should make efforts indirectly to put an end to the proposed mission.\* “Je partage vos doutes sur la possibilité de nous opposer aujourd’hui d’une manière ostensible à l’ambassade qui se prépare, *après que nous avons fermé les yeux sur une première manifestation de ce genre* il y a deux ans. Il me semble toutefois que nous pourrions sans inconvénient inviter M. Rheinart à faire des efforts pour détourner indirectement le Gouvernement annamite de son projet, en laissant entendre que la France, sans élever d’objection formelle, verrait

\* Despatch from M. de Freycinet, Foreign Minister, to Admiral Jauréguiberry, Minister of the Marine and of the Colonies, dated Paris, 24th May, 1880.



cependant d'un mauvais œil l'envoi d'une mission à Pékin."

The indirect remonstrances of M. Rheinart were of no avail. Tu Duc feared the nation on his borders more than the one whose troops had never penetrated beyond the banks of the Saigon river or the promontory of Tourane, and his attitude towards the French Resident was so marked that both the Ambassador at Peking and the Governor of Cochin-China warned the Ministry that the conduct of Tu Duc, in thus openly courting the assistance of China and avowing his vassalage to Peking, was weakening French prestige throughout the peninsula of Further India, and that only two courses were open to France—to withdraw altogether from Tonkin, or to permanently annex the valley of the Red River, and place the whole of Tonkin under a protectorate.

Hitherto the authorities at the Quai d'Orsay had been a check on the aggressive policy sketched out by the Minister of the Colonies, but M. de Freycinet was a diplomatist of the new school, he was a Frenchman who believed in the revival of French supremacy in the East, and he determined to inaugurate this revival by an annexation of Tonkin. The time had arrived when France could show herself "plus exigeant," and, addressing himself to the

Minister of Marine, he wrote: "D'après l'étude de nouveaux documents sur le Tonkin, je crois que votre première idée d'une occupation de ce pays était plus juste que celle d'une simple police des embouchures du fleuve, à laquelle s'est rallié le Conseil des Ministres. À mon sens il faudrait en revenir à la pensée d'une véritable expédition aboutissant à une solide occupation du fleuve jusque dans sa partie supérieure. D'après les derniers témoignages qui m'ont été fourni, 3000 hommes suffiraient et l'on serait largement rémunéré des frais par le produit de la douane sur les ports de commerce du fleuve. Il n'y aurait aucune complication à redouter du côté de la Chine, qui peut-être même verrait volontiers qu'on la soulageât de la police intermittente qu'elle fait actuellement aux embouchures pour protéger son commerce de Canton. Dans ces conditions, je pense qu'il conviendrait de préparer un projet de loi dans lequel on aborderait de front l'idée d'une occupation du fleuve Rouge. Si vous partagez cette manière de voir, je vous prierai de vouloir bien élaborer ce projet de loi que nous soumettrons au Conseil et au Président de la République après les vacances, vers la fin de Septembre. Je tiens à votre disposition, pour le cas où il pourrait vous intéresser, le dossier que j'ai réuni en dernier lieu sur le Tonkin."\*

Thus was France committed to an act of war, and one which was not merely the outcome of the policy of M. de Freycinet, but which was cordially approved of by M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, who, on succeeding to the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, reminded the Minister of the Colonies in the end of the succeeding October that it was time to prepare a statement for submission to the Chamber, in order to obtain a vote to carry on the proposed operations in Tonkin. The warlike intentions of the French Government were not long in leaking out, and on the 10th November the Marquis Tseng addressed a temperate and dignified despatch to M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, in which the rights of China over Annam are very plainly alluded to.

“J’ai l’honneur d’informer votre Excellence qu’à la suite des bruits qui avaient couru sur certaines cases de nature à créer un conflit entre le Gouvernement français et le Prince du Tonkin, j’ai eu le 25 Janvier une entrevue avec M. de Freycinet au Ministère des Affaires étrangères. Et après avoir fait connaître à son Excellence lors de cet entretien, les liens de vassalité qui unissent le Tonkin à la

\* Despatch from M. de Freycinet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Admiral Jauréguiberry, Minister of Marine and the Colonies, dated Paris, 26th July, 1880.

Chine, je lui ai demandé s'il y avait réellement des causes de cette nature. Son Excellence a déclaré que de pareilles causes n'existaient point, et cette assurance a pu calmer nos appréhensions sur ce sujet.

“ Mais d'après des informations plus récentes il paraît que le Gouvernement français aurait l'intention d'envoyer ou a déjà expédié des troupes au Tonkin, ce qui m'a fait renaître des appréhensions. J'ai donc l'honneur de prier votre Excellence de vouloir m'informer si ces observations sont authentiques, et si depuis l'entretien que j'ai eu avec M. de Freycinet les intentions du Gouvernement français ont subi quelque changement.

“ J'espère que votre Excellence voudra bien me faire connaître, comme son prédécesseur, les vues de votre Gouvernement relative à la question du Tonkin, car je n'ai pas besoin de déclarer à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement chinois ne saurait regarder avec indifférence des opérations qui tendraient à changer la situation politique d'un pays limitrophe comme le Royaume du Tonkin, dont le Prince a reçu jusqu'à présent son investiture de l'Empereur de Chine.” \*

\* Despatch from Marquis Tseng, Chinese Ambassador in Paris, to M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated St. Petersburg, 10th November, 1880.

The receipt of this despatch, however, was of no avail in calming the bellicose tendencies of the French Government; constant communications took place between the Quai d'Orsay and the Minister of the Colonies with a view of pushing on preparations for the occupation of Tonkin. Despatches were forwarded to Cochin-China and to the French Ambassador at Peking, apprising them of the intentions of the Government, but no notice was taken of the Marquis Tseng's communication. At the expiration of a month, M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire received a second despatch from the Chinese Envoy, who courteously demanded an explanation of the disquieting rumours as to the French intentions in Tonkin; whereupon General Chanzy, then Ambassador of the French Republic in St. Petersburg, was directed to convey by word of mouth a statement of the claims and grievances of France; but it was not until the 8th of the following January that the Marquis Tseng was placed in possession of views which France and French Ministers had studiously kept secret from China for seven years.

The policy of duplicity was past. France was recovering from the almost mortal blow she had received in 1870; she felt strong enough at any

rate to embark on a career of colonial enterprise in Africa and in Asia. China was considered *une quantité négligeable*; and being, moreover, at this period, hampered by her somewhat strained diplomatic relations with Russia, it was deemed prudent by M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire to unmask the real intentions of his Government and to claim openly the protectorate of Annam. Referring once more to the Treaty of 1874, which, France avers, confers on her the suzerain rights over Annam to the exclusion of any other Power, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, with sufficient brusqueness, wrote and requested General Chanzy to lay before the Marquis Tseng :

“Je ne pense pas qu'à Pékin on ait lieu de se méprendre sur ce point, mais si quelque doute pouvait encore se produire il importerait de couper court dès le principe à toute cause de malentendu.

“Il est nécessaire que le Gouvernement chinois se rende bien compte que l'Annam, et par conséquent sa dépendance le Tonkin, se trouvent aujourd'hui affranchis de tout lien quelconque avec une Puissance autre que la France.

“Le protectorat sur l'Annam en créant à la France des droits, lui impose aussi des devoirs qu'elle ne saurait désertier, même sur les conseils d'une Puis-

sance amie comme la Chine. Le Marquis Tseng est mieux que personne en mesure d'éclairer sur ce point son Gouvernement, et nous avons la confiance qu'un examen attentif du texte des traités qui lui ont été communiqués amènera facilement le Tsong-li-Yamen à se rendre compte par lui-même du véritable état des choses.

“Pour notre part nous ne saurions, sans altérer la position que nous avons prise en 1874, entrer en explication avec un Gouvernement étranger sur l'exercice éventuel de notre action vis-à-vis de l'Annam dans des circonstances dont nous devons rester les seuls juges.”\*

Up to this point the French policy had been one of dissimulation. The expedition of Dupuis and of Garnier had been undertaken, as we have seen, with a view of opening a commercial route to Yunnan by means of the Red River, and thus checking the attempts that were being made by the English to connect Burmah with South-Western China. The reports of M. Senez and of M. Philastre left no doubt on the minds of the French that the Kingdom of Annam considered itself a vassal of the Celestial

\* Despatch from M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire to General Chanzy, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, for submission to the Marquis Tseng, dated Paris, 24th January, 1881.

Empire, and that Chinese troops, according to the words of the Duc Decazes, "ont eu la faculté de parcourir librement et en tout sens les districts du Tonkin." On two occasions, France, without venturing on any remonstrance, had permitted China to suppress rebellions in Tonkin; on two occasions she had permitted Tu Duc to forward to Peking his long-established tribute-bearing embassies. The communications between Paris and Saigon, and between the Foreign Minister and the French Embassy in Peking, were clear enough as regards the views adopted by France and the policy she intended to pursue when opportunity offered; but the Representative at Peking was warned to act with extreme caution in the matter, and to avoid giving rise to any misgivings on the part of China as to France's real intentions. From M. Rochechouart's despatch, when submitting the Treaty of 1874 to the Court of Peking, and from Prince Kong's reply acknowledging its receipt, it is abundantly evident that, from 1874 to 1881, China had not the faintest idea of the predatory character of the French intervention; and when her suspicions were first aroused in the beginning of 1880, they were allayed by the direct statement of M. de Freycinet, that these warlike rumours were absolutely destitute of foundation.



The attitude adopted by the Marquis Tseng was evidently an earnest that China was not disposed to permit France to occupy Tonkin without remonstrance. In July, 1881, the Chambers voted the credit demanded by M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire for the purpose of undertaking the expedition proposed by him the previous year. The Chinese Ambassador immediately invited the French Minister to endeavour to arrive at an understanding with the Celestial Empire as to the best means of settling the conflicting views of Paris and Peking without recourse to an armed occupation; "car," wrote the Ambassador, "le Gouvernement français comprendra sans peine que l'invasion du Tonkin par les troupes françaises dans quelques circonstances que ce soit ne manquera pas de provoquer de grandes inquiétudes à la Cour de Pékin."

The immediate answer to this letter was the despatch of clear instructions to the Governor of Cochin-China to insist on the acceptance of a fresh and more carefully defined Treaty by the King of Annam, and that the demand was to be accompanied by "une manifestation matérielle qui suffise à faire comprendre que nous avons les moyens de faire respecter la volonté de la France." In January, 1882, Admiral Pierre, who, in July, 1883, was the cause of grave

remonstrance on the part of Great Britain for his aggressive conduct in Madagascar, was nominated to the chief command of the forces destined for the conquest of Tonkin, and orders were telegraphed to Saigon to suspend all military questions until his arrival. In the meantime the Chinese authorities, both in Peking and Tonkin, refused to acquiesce in the idea of the French protectorate, or to consider the Red River as open to European commerce. French travellers were warned not to proceed beyond Hanoi, the seat of a consulate, and two adventurous savants who had ventured as far as Laokai were compelled to retrace their steps.

Whilst affairs in Further India were fast drifting within a measurable distance of war—peace only being maintained by the judgment and humanity of M. Le Myre de Vilers—the relations between the Marquis Tseng and the Quai d'Orsay were becoming more and more strained. M. Gambetta, with a boldness scarcely justified by documentary evidence, asserted that in acknowledging the reception of the copy of the Treaty of 1874, the Tsong-li-Yamen had merely mentioned Annam as having been “*autrefois un pays tributaire de la Chine,*” and had virtually accepted the French protectorate over the country. The Marquis Tseng demurred to this statement,

averring that neither in the original reply of Prince Kong nor in the French translation had the word "autrefois" occurred, but that the real rendering of the phrase in the original was, "Annam a été depuis longtemps et est encore un pays tributaire de la Chine;" and that so far from accepting the Treaty in its entirety, the reply of Prince Kong had taken exception to several of its clauses. A reference to extracts from this reply (see Appendix, page 343) will show that the words, "depuis longtemps et est encore," were omitted by the French translator, an omission which entirely altered the whole gist of China's claim, and which it is hard to believe was unintentional.

In spite of the loyal and manly endeavours of M. Le Myre de Vilers, the Governor of Cochin-China, to avoid hostilities—endeavours little acceptable to the Ministry in Paris—it was evident that a crisis could not long be averted. The anarchy rampant in Tonkin, the close alliance existing between the Courts of Hué and Peking, the conduct of the people and of the Annamite officials towards the French, and the anxiety of the French local commanders to hasten on a war, to which the Government of the Republic was not averse, were causes which forbade all hope of peace being

maintained. In accordance with the urgent demands of the French Consul at Hanoi, who represented himself as seriously threatened by the Black Flags, M. Le Myre de Vilers directed Captain Rivière to proceed up the Red River and reinforce the consular escort. The instructions furnished by the able Governor of Saigon were precise, and admitted but of one interpretation, viz., that the naval reinforcements were to afford succour to the beleaguered French force in Hanoi, and to assist the local authorities in destroying the bands of Black Flags, which, infesting the Red River, rendered commerce unsafe. Even here moderation was enjoined: "Vous ne devrez avoir aucun rapport, direct ou indirect, avec les Pavillons Noirs; pour nous ce sont des pirates et vous les traiterez comme tels, s'ils se mettent sur votre route; seulement comme nous devons nous montrer ménagers de la vie humaine, au lieu de les passer par les armes, vous les expédiez à Saïgon et je les ferai interner à Poulo Condore."\* The despatch wound up with these words, which, now that M. Le Myre de Vilers has been disavowed by the French Government, are worth remembering: "Toute ma pensée peut se

\* Instructions from the Governor of Cochin-China to Captain Rivière, dated Saigon, 17th January, 1882.

résumer en cette phrase : évitez les coups de fusil, ils ne serviraient à rien qu'à vous créer des embarras."

How Rivière followed up these instructions the succeeding chapter will show. When the real history of France in Further India comes to be written, the names of Garnier and Rivière will be associated with the blackest deeds that ever stained the annals of European intervention in the East, whilst those of Philastre and Le Myre de Vilers will stand out as do the Lawrences in the history of British India.

## CHAPTER IX.

### RIVIÈRE'S EXPEDITION TO THE RED RIVER, 1882-83.

THE effect of the Treaty of 1874 was not so much to open Tonkin to French commerce as to French exploration. The former was to a great extent forbidden by the heavy transit dues at Nam Dinh and other inland ports, as well as by the action of the piratical bands on the river-banks, who, it was asserted by the French, were in the pay of Tu Duc, and were organised with a view of frightening innocent traders. The country, however, was thoroughly exploited. M. Dupuis, in his voyage to Manghao, had conclusively proved its richness, but his reports were characterised by some vagueness, and it was determined by the Colonial Government at Saigon that a thorough survey of Tonkin should be undertaken.

In 1876, M. de Kergaradac, the French Consul at Hanoi, who, in accordance with the terms of the

Treaty of 1874, was permitted to maintain a steam-launch and a company of fifty men as his personal escort, penetrated as far as Laokai, in latitude  $22^{\circ} 30'$ , some 300 miles N.W. of Hanoi; his progress was stopped by the Black Flags. In the following year, on a boat of lighter draught (three feet), he ascended to Manghao, about 100 miles above the confluence of the Nan Si Ho. At the junction of these two streams the Red River forms a magnificent basin nearly two miles across; above this the banks narrow, but the river is easily navigable even in the winter months for flat-bottom boats of light draught. At Manghao, M. de Kergaradac found an ample market for European commerce; Manchester goods from Burmah, silk and tea from China were being freely exchanged for the produce of the local mines, which it was said gave employment to upwards of 10,000 souls; there was also a considerable trade in horse-flesh, large numbers of spirited little hill ponies being exported to Burmah for sale to English residents. Extensive coal-beds were also discovered in the neighbourhood of the sea-coast by other surveying parties. The possession of these was of the most vital point to the French, making them, to a very great extent, masters of the situation in Asiatic waters, were a European war to break out.

France is but poorly provided with this valuable material of war, and her naval operations in Europe would be seriously crippled were she debarred from the use of English or Belgian coal. In the East her fleets would, under such circumstances, be completely paralysed, as supplies from Europe could easily be cut off by an enterprising foe, and it would be difficult for her to obtain sufficient from neutral ports in distant waters. The possession of the coal-beds of Tonkin became therefore a point of great importance, and efforts were made to induce the King of Annam to cede them to France. He declined. It became therefore necessary to seek some means of a quarrel by which a new Treaty more favourable than that of 1874, could be forced upon him. Little difficulty was experienced in finding a good cause for strong diplomatic pressure.

Clause 12 of the Treaty of the 15th March, 1874, contained the following words: "Les sujets français, en respectant les lois du pays, s'établir, posséder et se livrer librement à toutes opérations commerciales et industrielles. Ils pourront de même naviguer et commercer entre la mer et la province de Yunnan par le voie de Nhi Ha." It was well known that the action of the pirates rendered this route excessively dangerous for junks unless well armed and



strongly manned; the Annamite authorities, after their experience of M. Dupuis, looked with disfavour on the entry of well-found merchant gunboats. France had yet another complaint to make; she asserted that the safety of her consuls was endangered by the state of anarchy into which the country had drifted, owing to the weakness of Tu Duc's Government; and, by virtue of the second clause of the same Treaty,\* the Governor of Saigon demanded permission to send an expedition to Tonkin for the purpose of restoring order in that country. Tu Duc pleaded that the Treaty gave the French no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the kingdom unless called upon, and he refused admission to the French forces. The Treaty was violated, said the Colonial Governor, and this was due either to the weakness or bad faith of the Annam Government; in either case it was necessary to provide for the safety of the consuls by increasing their escorts, and thus ensuring the blessings of peace and the development of commerce to the country. Unfortunately,

\* "S. Exc. le Président de la République française reconnaissant la souveraineté du Roi de l'Annam, lui promet aide et assistance, et s'engage à lui donner sur sa demande et gratuitement l'appui nécessaire pour maintenir dans ses états l'ordre et la tranquillité, pour le défendre contre toute attaque et pour détruire la piraterie qui désole une partie des côtes du royaume."

in 1881, there was no Duc de Broglie to forbid unjustifiable measures, but there was the danger of arousing other susceptibilities, and of causing diplomatic complications with other Powers, and it was necessary to act cautiously and secretly; and in July, 1881, the Minister of Marine demanded a small credit of 2,487,851 francs for the purpose of constructing steam-launches of light draught and great speed for service against the pirates in the Annam waters. "Nous sommes chargés de maintenir l'ordre dans ce pays. Or pour cela nous n'avons pas des forces suffisantes. Ce sont ces forces que nous vous demandons. Nous ne voulons pas faire de conquêtes, nous voulons avoir une situation honorable, et en ce moment elle n'est pas honorable." Such were the words used by the Minister in asking for the necessary powers, well knowing that the intention of France at that moment was the annexation of Tonkin and the final absorption of Annam into her Eastern provinces.

In March, 1882, the Red River Expedition was organised, in order that France might have a "situation honorable" in Tonkin. It consisted of the sloops of war the *Drac* and *Parseval*, with the gunboats *Fanfare*, *Hache*, *Yatagan*, *Carabine*, *Surprise*, *Kiang Nam*, *Tonquin*, *Whampoa*, despatch

boat *Pluvier*, and steam-launch *Haiphong*; detachments of the Infantry of the Marine, numbering in all 620 men, were also embarked, the whole being placed under the command of Captain Henri Rivière. This officer's war service had been confined to the suppression of a native rising in New Caledonia, and having only recently arrived on the Cochin-China station, his Oriental experience was not of an extensive character. On the other hand, he had written several excellent novels, more than one indifferent play, was well known in the literary world, and possessed strong and influential friends in Paris.

The French Governor of Cochin-China at this time was a M. Le Myre de Vilers, a gentleman of the old political school, who firmly believed in the possibility of the extension of French influence in the East by pacific means, and who as firmly believed in the disastrous effect active operations would have in the minds not only of the Annamites, but also of the Chinese. Privately and officially, he never failed to impress upon Captain Rivière the necessity of adopting a conciliatory attitude towards the officials of Hanoi, and had these instructions been followed, in all probability France would at this moment have been paramount in Annam. M. Ferry has thrown doubt on the ability of M. de Vilers in the Chamber, has

accused him of coquetting with the Court of Hué, of neglecting to maintain "les droits et l'honneur de la France," and the present Ministry, following the lead of their chief, have combined to throw odium on all M. de Vilers' acts, and to make him to a certain extent responsible for the misfortunes which have since occurred in Tonkin. A perusal of the memorandum which the Governor of Cochin-China handed to M. Rivière will be useful and instructive. It shows how strongly he enjoined pacific measures, and how persistently his orders were disregarded.

"SAIGON, le 17 Janvier, 1882.

"À la suite de l'attaque dont ont été victimes MM. Courtin et Villeroi, voyageurs français, munis de passeports réguliers, j'ai dû faire des représentations au Gouvernement annamite et l'engager à expulser de son territoire les mercenaires chinois à sa solde connus sous le nom de 'Pavillons Noirs.'

"Sans repousser ma demande la Cour de Hué, sous le prétexte que ces irréguliers lui avaient rendu des services, mais en réalité par impuissance, n'a pu me donner satisfaction; elle s'est contentée de me répondre qu'elle éloignerait ces bandes.

"D'un autre côté, j'apprends que Lun Vinh Phoc vient de se rendre en Chine, salué sur son passage

comme un chef d'armée et emportant des sommes considérables destinées sans aucun doute à recruter de nouveaux soldats.

“En même temps des saisies opérées par la douane ont prouvé qu'il se faisait un approvisionnement considérable d'armes à tir rapide et de munitions de guerre.

“Dans ces conditions il me paraît nécessaire de mettre nos troupes à l'abri d'une surprise, et j'ai décidé que la garnison de Hanoi sera doublée.

“Vous voudrez bien donner des instructions pour que le *Drac* appareille jeudi soir et porte au Tonkin deux compagnies de renfort ; je désire que vous présidiez à cette opération.

“Vous connaissez les vues du Gouvernement de la République. Il ne veut à aucun prix faire à 4000 lieues de la France une guerre de conquête qui entraînerait le pays dans des graves complications.

“C'est politiquement, pacifiquement, administrativement que nous devons étendre et affermir notre influence au Tonkin et en Annam ; aussi la mesure que nous prenons aujourd'hui est-elle essentiellement préventive.

“Vous devez donc n'avoir recours à la force qu'en cas d'absolue nécessité, et je compte sur votre prudence pour éviter cette éventualité, peu probable d'ailleurs.

“ Nous n’avons pas à Hanoi les casernements nécessaires pour loger 450 hommes. Vous aurez à créer une installation provisoire ; je vous recommande de la faire aussi salubre que possible, car avant tout il faut ménager la vie et la santé de nos soldats.

“ Comme vous le savez, des douanes intérieures ont été placées par les Pavillons Noirs, sur le cours du Song Coi et de ses affluents, contrairement aux Traités.

“ Vous aurez à surveiller le fleuve, et je considère comme très-utile d’établir un poste fortifié à l’embouchure de la rivière Claire. Vous ferez étudier le projet par l’officier du génie que je mets à votre disposition, et vous commencerez les travaux lorsque vous jugerez pouvoir le faire sans sortir du programme pacifique que je vous ai indiqué.

“ Incontestablement, les autorités annamites auxquelles nous nous adresserons pour obtenir la cession du terrain, feront des observations, demanderont à en référer à Hué, et chercheront à gagner du temps ; vous passerez outre lorsque le moment vous paraîtra venu ; j’ai du reste tout lieu de croire que vous ne rencontrerez aucune opposition sérieuse.

“ Vous ne devez avoir aucun rapport, direct ou indirect, avec les Pavillons Noirs ; pour nous ce sont des pirates et vous les traiterez comme tels,

s'ils se mettent sur votre route ; seulement comme nous devons nous montrer ménagers de la vie humaine, au lieu de les passer par les armes, vous les expédiez à Saïgon et je les ferai interner à Poulo Condore.

“ Dans le cas peu probable où vous rencontreriez des troupes impériales chinoises, vous éviterez soigneusement un conflit.

“ Il est possible que votre présence seule provoque un mouvement insurrectionnel de la part de la population, vous aurez grand soin de ne pas vous y associer sans m'en avoir référé.

“ Les fonds nécessaires à la première installation seront mis à votre disposition par le chef du service administratif ; ultérieurement je prendrai les mesures nécessaires pour que les travaux d'établissement soient payés sur les douanes.

“ Si vous avez besoin de forces complémentaires vous m'en feriez la demande et j'y satisferais immédiatement.

“ Je ne crois pas devoir vous donner d'instructions plus détaillées, elles ne feraient que vous entraver, car probablement il se produira des incidents et des nécessités que je ne puis prévoir, mais je compte sur votre patriotisme et votre sagesse pour ne pas engager le Gouvernement de la République dans une voie qu'il ne veut pas suivre.

“Toute ma pensée peut se résumer en cette phrase : évitez les coups de fusil, ils ne serviraient à rien qu'à vous créer des embarras.

“LE MYRE DE VILERS.”

In the face of the events which occurred almost immediately after Captain Rivière's arrival at Hanoi, the above instructions are worth a careful study, more especially as Admiral Jauréguiberry, the Minister of the Colonies, on the 4th March, 1882, and M. de Freycinet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 16th March, announced their complete approval of them.

It will be noticed that Captain Rivière was enjoined to avoid all hostilities; to forward prisoners to Saigon for disposal; not to carry into effect executions upon any Black Flags who might be captured; and, finally, was warned to be most careful in his operations not to come in contact with the imperial Chinese troops. In the Chamber and elsewhere it was repeatedly stated by French Ministers, prior to the recent advance on Son Tay, that there were no Chinese regulars in Tonkin, and that the only enemy to be faced were the irregular Black Flags; but here we have not only M. le Myre de Vilers warning Captain Rivière of their presence,



but M. de Freycinet, in a despatch to Admiral Jauréguiberry, on the 16th March, writes: "J'ai vu avec satisfaction que les plus grandes précautions étaient recommandées à M. Rivière pour prévenir tout contact avec les troupes régulières chinoises qui se maintiennent dans le Tonkin."

Leaving Saigon late in March, on the 2nd April, 1882, Rivière anchored off Hanoi, having experienced no difficulty in the ascent of the river. The arrival of this strong flotilla, a breach of the Treaty of 1874, caused the liveliest emotions in the minds of the mandarins. Fearing, and not without reason, an assault on the citadel, they closed its doors and at once commenced executing fresh defensive works on its dilapidated walls. Strong reinforcements were also drawn in from Son Tay and Bac Ninh, and efforts made by a show of force to answer the steps taken by the French. Rivière remonstrated with the Governor in a tone which showed that he was determined to act on a line scarcely foreshadowed by his official instructions, and complained that the hostile attitude of the mandarins was calculated to provoke war. He further informed the Governor that his object was not merely to rid the Red River of the piratical bands which rendered its navigation insecure, but also to carry through a Treaty, the draft

clauses of which were at the same time submitted. He demanded :

“ 1. The abolition of all transit dues.

“ 2. Free passage for all French ships through all the waterways of Annam.

“ 3. The transfer of the various forts between Hanoi and the sea to the French.

“ 4. Reconstitution of the customs service.

“ 5. Assistance to be afforded the flotilla in the destruction of the piratical bands which haunted the banks of the Red River.

“ 6. The withdrawal of all Chinese troops from Tonkin.”

The Governor professed his inability to discuss such terms, which he maintained were beyond his powers and could only be granted by his supreme Government. On the 21st April, Captain Rivière forwarded an ultimatum, announcing his intention of attacking the citadel in the event of the Governor not having acceded to his demands by eight o'clock on the following morning.

It is clear that the French commander, in thus acting in defiance of the instructions of his immediate superior, M. le Myre de Vilers, was in possession of secret orders; the terms of the ultimatum and the prospect of its being rejected must have been fore-

seen in Paris, for in writing to a friend in March, M. Rivière says: "Nous allons tâcher de nous établir au Tonkin plus solidement que nous n'y sommes. Rien n'est bien précis dans mes instructions."

To this ultimatum the mandarins made their stereotyped reply, viz., that being without orders they were unable to act. Rivière determined therefore to carry out his instructions. At 8 a.m. on the 26th April, the squadron opened fire on the citadel, whilst under cover of the ships' guns, the storming column, amounting to 800 seamen and marines, issued from the French concession, and, lining the low walls to the south and south-west of the citadel, kept up a well-sustained rifle fire on the embrasures of the fortress, preventing the Annamite force making use of their smooth-bore artillery. By eleven o'clock the enemy's defence had much slackened. The heavy guns of the flotilla had breached the old walls in many places, and the garrison was in much disorder; many who were escaping by the northern gates were being shelled in their flight by some of the gunboats, which had moved up stream for this purpose. Shortly before noon the assaulting parties moved forward, and in a few moments the Tricolour was floating from the citadel. The French loss was

only four wounded, amongst them being the second in command of the expedition, a M. Villers ; that of the Annamites was very heavy. It is said that upwards of 1100 dead bodies were buried by the victors.

With the capture of Hanoi, Rivière seems to have come to an end of his instructions ; for, though he had by this act deprived the Governor of the province of all semblance of authority, he took no steps either to take over the administration into his own hands, or to aid the mandarins in restoring order. Consequently, anarchy reigned supreme. The Annamite authorities were powerless, the French indisposed to act ; and, by the early days of May, it was evident that the whole country was in a state of ferment, and that extensive operations would have to be adopted ere order would reign in Tonkin.

The Governor of Saigon was by no means prepared to approve of Rivière's conduct in thus forcing on a conflict. To effectually reduce the delta of the Red River, a considerable body of troops would be necessary, and the Ministry in Paris were never very generous in affording pecuniary aid to distant colonies. It is a far cry from Hué to Hanoi, and Tu Duc was by no means inclined to conclude a treaty handing over Tonkin to the French, merely because a distant

fort had been captured. He was much in the same mood as the absentee Irish landlord whose agent is threatened. In fact, the reluctance of the French Ministry to lend material assistance, and the reluctance of Tu Duc to treat, placed the Governor of Saigon in an awkward position. He had however, fortunately, a precedent to work on; it was easy to disavow Rivière, and a despatch, very conciliatory in its general tone, was forwarded to Hué, in which transparent excuses were advanced. Rivière was accused of having exceeded his orders, and promises were made of an immediate restitution of the citadel. Indeed, orders were sent to this effect to Hanoi, and Tu Duc on his part promised to coerce the Black Flags.

It would seem, however, as if both parties were desirous only to gain time. Captain Rivière was given great latitude in the matter of the restitution of the citadel, and when pressed to fulfil his part of the contract, positively refused to evacuate the Royal Pagoda — a building sacred in the eyes of the mandarins, and which was the *réduit*, or key of the fortress—until the banks of the Red River were cleared of pirates. Virtually, therefore, the citadel remained in possession of the French. Tu Duc, on the other hand, felt himself powerless to act alone,

and he solicited aid from his suzerain, the Emperor of China. It is well here to recall the fact that for many years the fortresses of Bac Ninh and Son Tay had been held by Chinese troops, that China received triennial tribute from Annam, that the sovereigns of the latter country, on ascending the throne, always made obeisance to the Celestial Emperor, who recognised them as his vassals; in fact, it was well known in Paris from the days when Bishop Pigneau de Béhaine led his mission to the Court of Louis XVI., in the year 1787, that Annam was but an outlying province of China, and that in striking Tu Duc through Annam, France was unwisely irritating a powerful Oriental kingdom.

In the meantime the position of Captain Rivière was becoming serious; the half-hearted measure of the Governor of Saigon fomented disturbances in Tonkin. The mandarins were well aware that the capture of Hanoi had been disavowed, and they openly encouraged the Black Flags to molest and irritate the French. Conflicts between the two nationalities became of daily occurrence, and it was evident that Rivière must be strengthened. Even the evacuation of the Red River could not be attempted unless reinforcements were despatched, to enable the weak force at Hanoi to retire without danger of annihilation.

In December, 1882, Admiral Jauréguiberry demanded a credit of £440,000—"qu'il avait préparée pour pouvoir expédier des secours au Commandant Rivière, et se vit contraint de renoncer à un projet de loi qui aurait affirmé et organisé *notre protectorat au Tonkin*"—and a battalion of 750 marines was at once despatched as reinforcements to Hanoi. Not before they were required, China, always jealous of its frontiers, had strengthened the garrisons of Bac Ninh and Son Tay by troops from Yunnan, and went so far as to land reinforcements at Monghai, a port on the sea-coast, to the north-east of the mouths of the Red River.

The knowledge of this fact strengthened the Annamites in their aggressive attitudes, and Rivière, who doubtless had received private instructions as to how far he might proceed, instructed the commander of the *Drac* to occupy Hong Gai, an important strategical point at the mouth of the Bay of Alung, and he himself prepared to seize Nam Dinh. The capture of Hong Gai was actuated by more than strategical reasons. There are valuable coal-fields in the vicinity, and Tu Duc was in negotiation with a syndicate of Chinese merchants in Hong-Kong for their concession; this syndicate had, it is stated, already made over its rights to an English company, and it was to cripple English

commerce in this district that this stroke was carried out.

The capture of Nam Dinh required more careful preparation. In 1873 it had offered serious resistance to Garnier, and since then it had been much strengthened by the construction of lesser works above and below stream, which afforded a flanking fire to the citadel, and it mounted a number of cannon, the gift of the French under the terms of the Treaty of 1874. Since its evacuation by M. Philastre it had not been visited by a French force, as by treaty French commerce was restricted to the northern branch of the river; but enough was remembered of its strength and defence to justify care being taken in the composition of the attacking force. It was known that the Black Flags, whose depredations on the banks of the Red River seriously impaired the commercial success of the occupation of Tonkin, were assembled in large numbers in the vicinity of Nam Dinh, and it was believed that they received encouragement, if not support, from the Annamite Governor. Rivière therefore determined to take with him such a force as would place his success beyond all doubt.

The expedition consisted of the gunboats *Fanfare*, *Hache*, *Yatagan*, *Carabine*, *Surprise*, *Kiang Nam*,



*Tonquin, Whampoa, despatch-boat Pluvier, steam-launch Haiphong, and four large junks ; in addition to the crews of the above vessels, 800 marines were embarked, 400 being left at Hanoi for the defence of the Royal Pagoda and consular concession. Rivière reached Nam Dinh on the 25th March, 1882, and at once forwarded the following summons to the Governor :*

“ MONSIEUR LE GOUVERNEUR,

“ Depuis un an, vous avez eu envers nous l'attitude la plus hostile, et vous avez armé votre citadelle, autant que vous l'avez pu, de soldats et de munitions.

“ Tout dernièrement, vous avez préparé des barages que l'arrivée seule de nos bâtiments vous a empêché de faire. Depuis l'arrivée de nos bâtiments vous avez encore augmenté vos armes et vos soldats, excité la population contre nous et proféré contre les Français des insultes et des menaces.

“ Il faut pour le respect qui nous est dû, pour la liberté de notre navigation, pour notre sécurité au Tonkin, pour que la paix ne soit plus menacée par vous, que la citadelle de Nam Dinh soit désormais inoffensive pour nous. Et pour cela il faut que vous la remettiez entre mes mains.

“ Si vous n'êtes pas venu demain matin, à huit

heures, à bord de mon grand bâtiment blanc, je serai forcé de vous traiter en ennemi.”

The Governor naturally refused to surrender the fort, and further denied not only all knowledge of the construction of the barriers alluded to by the French commandant, but also all connection with the Black Flags. Consequently at daybreak, on the 27th March, the squadron opened fire upon the forts; the marines, with some field-pieces, landed under the command of Colonel Carreau; and by nightfall, after an encounter in which the French showed much discretion and a marked disinclination to expose their infantry until the artillery fire of the forts had been completely silenced, the Tricolour for the second time floated over the bastions of Nam Dinh. The losses on the side of the assailants are said to have been slight; Colonel Carreau, it is known, was mortally wounded. That of the Annamites was put down at the usual figure, viz., a thousand killed and wounded; and all prisoners taken, to the number of forty-nine, were summarily executed at the yard-arm of Rivière's own vessel, in direct defiance of the instructions of M. Le Myre de Vilers.

On the news of this second act of aggression reaching Hué, the French Minister, M. Rheinart, presented his letters of recall, and it was of course

evident that hostilities between the two countries could no longer be confined to the unofficial warfare within the circumscribed limits of the delta of the Red River; before, however, any steps could be taken by the authorities at Saigon to send further reinforcements to Rivière, the Annamites determined to crush him and his small force, and advantage was taken of his absence at Nam Dinh to make a vigorous assault on Hanoi.

The presence of Chinese garrisons at Bac Ninh and Son Tay afforded a moral *point d'appui* for the irregular Annamite forces. Safe from the much-dreaded heavy guns of the French flotilla, the Black Flags collected to the number of several thousands in the neighbourhood of Bac Ninh, and threw up an entrenched camp at the village of Gia-lam, on the left bank of the Red River, and nearly opposite Hanoi. On the night of the 26th–27th March a very determined attack was made on the citadel by a strong body of men from Gia-lam, but the garrison, 400 marines, with eight field-pieces, held the enemy at bay until the morning, when the arrival of the gunboat *Leopard* enabled M. Le Berthe de Villers to assume the offensive. He not only pushed them back across the river, sinking many of their junks as they were recrossing, but following

them up to their entrenchments, carried these with the loss of fifteen marines wounded, capturing a standard and several small bronze guns. The heavy rifled cannon of the *Leopard* proved of the utmost assistance to the infantry during these operations.

This determined attack marked a new phase in the operations. The French had no longer to deal with badly armed, undisciplined villagers. A goodly number of breech-loading rifles and of revolvers were among the trophies found at Gia-lam, whilst the usual thousand of killed included many regular Chinese soldiers. Indeed, it was evident that the garrison of Bac Ninh had been partially engaged, and it was rumoured—though this is a standing rumour in all Oriental campaigns—that the enemy were led by European officers. It is needless to remark that the rifles and revolvers bore English and German marks, and that these same perfidious nationalities had not only furnished the arms, but also the leaders to the Black Flags.

On the 2nd April, Captain Rivière returned from Nam Dinh, and found that, nothing daunted by their defeat on the 27th March, the enemy had re-occupied Gia-lam, and that every day some fresh plan was devised to harass and annoy the garrison. Sentries were fired at, watering parties assailed, indi-

vidual men cut off, and all the many devices we have experienced on our Afghan frontier were now practised on the French. Inaction under such circumstances was intolerable, and only served as an encouragement to the enemy, who ever and anon, emboldened by the impunity with which they were treated, entered the town in gangs of considerable size, plundering and destroying the shops and stores, thus depriving the French to a great extent of local supplies. On all sides Rivière learnt of large assemblies. Whilst the men from Bac Ninh occupied Gia-lam and threatened him on the east, others, pushing on from Son Tay, strengthened themselves in Phu Hoai to the west.

Rivière determined to make a demonstration in the direction of Son Tay, and for that purpose detached the *Leopard* and *Carabine* to shell that fort—one, it must be remembered, which for many years had been always held by a Chinese garrison. The depth of water, however, prevented these vessels proceeding more than a few miles up stream when the *Leopard* grounded, and it was some hours before the *Carabine*, which was of lighter draught, could, by lightening her, succeed in towing her off. During the whole operation the Black Flags kept up a galling musketry fire on the vessels, which materially added to the difficulties of the situation. The gun-

boats were obliged to return to Hanoi, and the enemy profited by the failure to become more enterprising than ever. The next morning the walls of the town, even the gates of the citadel, were placarded with a proclamation which vowed death to the invaders.

“You, French freebooters, are forcible dwellers in Europe, and look like tigers on the world at large, seeing how to give vent to your crafty schemes and cruel deeds. There is no land for which your mouth does not water; there are no riches you do not desire to devour. Religious teaching you employ as a means to undermine and injure the people. International commerce is to you the pretext for swallowing up countries. Your cruelty is infinite. Your wickedness is extreme. On your strength you rely to debauch (our women), which excites the indignation of gods and men, and is unendurable in heaven and on earth. Now you want to avail yourselves of an excuse to endeavour to acquire Annam, and under the pretext of international commerce to depart from the Treaty, trying to befool the world in order to give vent to your martial designs, and to seize cities and storm towns, slaughtering officials and robbing the revenue; killing the innocent and encouraging secret bands. Your outrages and cruelties have reached far and wide.

Your crimes are almost too numerous for words. Your shame could not be washed out, though you were to exhaust the water of the West (or Canton) River. The issuer of this proclamation having received commands to avenge the wrongs inflicted by you, and having sworn, with an army with justice on its side, to lead his troops to the slaughter of you vile lot, his first desire was to proceed at once with lightning speed to beat down your rabbit-holes and to exterminate you pack of foxes without pity, which would be a matter of great rejoicing to the heart of man, and would manifest Heaven's vengeance. But reflecting that Hanoi is also old territory belonging to Government, and that the traders there are all respectable, loyal people, I could not endure that the city should be reduced to ruins, and young and old be killed at the edge of the sword. I therefore issue this proclamation that you may all know that on the day this proclamation arrives, you French robbers, who have already acted unlawfully, relying on your powers, may lead forth your crowd of dogs and sheep to meet our army of heroes, and decide which is to be master. I have fixed on Wai-tak-fu, an empty space, as the spot where I shall establish my fame. If you know you are no match for us, that you vixen Jews will only go to grease the edges of our swords,

and are desirous still to maintain your lives, then if you will at once decapitate your leaders and present their heads at my official abode, return to squat in your own dens, leaving our city, I, out of regard for the lord of Heaven, for humanity, and for my commission from Government to maintain peace, will not kill those who surrender to gratify myself. If you dilly-dally and are irresolute, coveting and hanging on still in our land, one morning the soldiery will arrive and with it unforeseen misfortune. Ah! You ought to see your chance and yield. Do not be mulish, and so involve yourselves in death. Each one ought to seriously consider the matter, and so save himself from future ill."

On the following night, some light guns, dragged silently from Gia-lam to the left bank of the stream, opened a heavy cannonade on the French flotilla; the fire, owing to the darkness, was ineffectively returned. On the night of the 13th May, an attack was made on the town and the French church burnt. On the 14th May, 300 marines, drawn from vessels on the China station, arrived in the despatch-boat *Pluvier*, and Rivière now felt himself strong enough to act with more vigour. Ten short years had served to work a vast change in the opinions of the French; in 1873, Garnier, with his 200 men, overran the whole



Delta, boats' crews captured forts which Rivière, with 1200 marines and half-a-dozen gunboats, shrank from opposing. Verily audacity is the secret of Oriental warfare, as duplicity is the secret of its diplomacy.

Reinforced by these marines, Rivière determined to resume the offensive, and on the 16th, Berthe de Villers moved out on Gia-lam, burnt the village, captured four guns, killed a large number of the enemy, and at nightfall, like the Greeks before Troy, withdrew to his ships. The success of the expedition was mainly due to the fire from the squadron. There is no doubt that the French commander now fully realised the danger of his position. In his final despatch recounting this sortie, he writes: "La situation n'est pas sans une certaine gravité. Nous sommes pris, entres ces bandes nombreuses avec *les soldats chinois de Bac Ninh et de Son Tay*, et la saison plus encore que le nombre, restreint de nos forces, ne nous permet pas de recommencer fréquemment les opérations comme celle de ce matin, opérations dont le résultat lui-même n'est pas assez important.

"Il est très probable que dans les villages déjà réoccupés le feu de la rive gauche recommencera la nuit prochaine.

"Il y a des Européens parmi les Annamites. Je crois qu'il aura lieu de sortir des difficultés où nous

sommes par la prise de Bac Ninh et de Son Tay, postes chinois, ce qui sera possible quand les eaux auront monté, mais seulement aussi quand nous aurons des grands renforts.”

Was it advisable to wait for reinforcements? Rivière was aware that the Chambers had voted the necessary credits, but some months must elapse before troops could arrive from France. The Governor of Cochin-China could only spare some four or five hundred men; the Admiral on the China station had already forwarded him all the marines in his fleet. Was it advisable to submit to the loss of prestige involved in tamely submitting to a blockade, or was it the safer course to strike boldly, even though unable to reach Son Tay? Audacity is often preferable to prudence. “*Tear'em is a good dog, but Holdfast is a better,*” is not a proverb suited to Oriental comprehension; “*L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace,*” is the only saying worth remembering when brought into contact with Eastern enemies. But there must be no shrinking when matters reach a crisis; the blow when struck must be struck home—half measures are fatal. It was this ignorance of the Oriental character, this doubtful course of action, this hesitation to adopt rapid and crushing blows, which proved so fatal to the commander who wrote:

“Je m'en vais par le Tonkin à l'Académie Française.” There was none of the dash and spirit so observable in Garnier; all Rivière's dreams were of Paris, of the Cercle Pailleron, the Hôtel Rambouillet, of fresh triumphs in the fields of literature, not of the admiral's star to be won in Tonkin. All his letters breathed discontent at his position, his surroundings, and dismal forebodings as to his future. Of his personal gallantry not a word can be said; like all French officers he was brave to a degree, exposing his person with a freedom bordering on rashness. But his experience of warfare was limited; he was not a student of that art which can only be learnt by long years of study, and then only acquired if the soil is worthy of the cultivation. *Dux nascitur, non fit*, and then the born soldier can only rise to the top of his profession by hard work, by a close mastery of detail, by a broad grasp of organisation, by untiring energy, by sound common sense, and by good fortune.

Each day the Black Flags grew more and more bold, the situation of the French more and more insupportable, until, on the 19th May, Rivière felt that unless he could inflict some crushing blow before the commencement of the hot season, there was small chance of the French flag floating o'er Hanoi at its close. The eastern side of the city was now

fairly covered by the gunboats. It was from Son Tay and its advanced post Phu Hoai that the more galling attacks came, and Rivière determined to destroy the latter village, level all obstacles within range of the citadel, and thus render surprise from that side a matter of difficulty and danger. Since the sortie to Gia-lam, opposition from the side of Bac Ninh had much slackened, the transport of the assaulting bodies across the river being forbidden by the French gunboats. Although suffering from fever, Rivière insisted on commanding in person, and at 4 a.m. on the 19th May the little force, composed of 400 marines and 100 blue-jackets with three light field-pieces, advancing from the citadel, pushed along the road leading to Phu Hoai—fatal road, on which Garnier and Balny fell ten years previously. All went well until the column reached some rice swamps with a few mud hovels on their farther side, at the junction of the Bhai Tu and Phu Hoai roads. Here a check occurred; owing to the swampy nature of the soil, the troops were compelled to move on a restricted front, there were no scouts thrown out ahead, nor were there flankers. Suddenly, from a small pagoda on the right front, a heavy musketry fire was poured, and at the same moment from the houses on either flank a lively fusillade was kept up. Crowds of armed

men appeared in front, and the leading forces being struck down, the column was thrown into confusion. Shots were now heard in rear, and a panic occurred; the dread of having their communications cut off acted like magic on the blue-jackets and marines, unused to this kind of warfare. Berthe Villers and Captain Jacquin dashed to the front and endeavoured to rally the men, who were falling back in disorder. Rivière at once brought up the guns, and opened fire with shrapnel on the dense crowds of the enemy. As usual, fuses would not act, though the missiles cut wide lanes through the swarming masses. The Black Flags were not to be denied, and step by step they bore the French back towards the citadel. It was only the heroism of the officers that saved the expedition from annihilation; some few of the men showed courage and self-devotion, but the *débandade* was complete. The bodies of four officers, including that of Rivière, and over fifty men were left on the field, as also, if rumour can be accepted as more reliable than official despatches, the three guns. Thus, twice in the year had the indiscretion of a subordinate led to the capture of Hanoi and a rupture with Annam; twice had a French commander in Tonkin paid for his indiscretion with his life.

It is worthy of note, that on the 15th May,

just four days before Rivière's ill-fated sortie, the Chamber had decided to despatch reinforcements to Tonkin, and had voted a sum of £200,000 to enable the Government of Cochin-China to carry out the required operations. The news of the disaster reached Paris on the 26th May, and the Colonial Minister telegraphed these cheering words to Saigon : "La Chambre a voté à l'unanimité le crédit pour le Tonkin. La France vengera ses glorieux enfants."

## CHAPTER X.

### OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO RIVIÈRE'S DEATH.

THE death of Rivière was felt beyond the walls of Hanoi, and though the sympathetic telegram from the Ministry relieved the Saigon officials from all apprehension of the disavowal of the Government, and thus permitted M. Charles Thomson, who was now Governor of the province, to act with greater vigour than his predecessor had been able to after the failure of Garnier's sortie in December, 1873, yet the situation was one of the greatest gravity. In Hanoi, the garrison was actually confined within the walls of the citadel, and rumours of a Chinese advance on Haiphong crowded the ships of war with fugitives. Admiral Meyer at once ordered Hong Gai and Quinhon to be evacuated, and despatched their garrisons, amounting to 150 marines, to Hanoi; whilst General Bouët, commanding the troops at Saigon,

in obedience to instructions from Paris, proceeded towards Tonkin to assume chief military command. A squadron was named for special service and placed under the orders of Admiral Courbet; and M. Harmand, an old coadjutor of Garnier, was named the Commissaire Civil. Thus the conduct of operations was placed in three different hands; each chief, jealous of his own proper department, perhaps unwittingly thwarted the other, and the result was, that the Tonkin question quickly drifted into an open war, in which France showed herself mercilessly aggressive, shamelessly deceitful, and amazingly incompetent.

General Bouët was determined to risk nothing until the arrival of the long-expected reinforcements. He cordially approved of the conduct of Admiral Meyer in withdrawing troops from the newly acquired posts of Hong Gai and Quinhon, and sought further opportunities of lessening the number of his posts, and of concentrating his troops in large bodies. On his passage up the Red River he remained some days at Haiphong, in order to carry out some defensive works, on which he mounted machine guns, and thus placed that important link in the chain of communications beyond the possibility of surprise. General Bouët reached Hanoi on the 16th June, and there



his hand was at once felt. An entrenched camp was formed, connecting the *concession française* with the citadel; the left, resting on the river, was protected by gunboats, and wharves were constructed for the rapid embarkation of men and material. All buildings within range of the new fortification were levelled, new barracks constructed, and Hanoi placed in a thorough state of defence. Nam Dinh was also considerably strengthened, and placed under the command of an experienced officer, Colonel Badens.

Events soon proved the value of the new general's measures. On the 5th July, Haiphong, and, on the 11th, Nam Dinh, were attacked by large bodies who, in the most determined way, pushed close up to the works; the fire of the breechloader and Hotchkiss, however, mowed down the Black Flags in terrible numbers, and roused the drooping spirits of the French. On the 19th July, Colonel Badens, reinforced by 100 marines, ventured on a sortie, in order to destroy some neighbouring villages held by Annamite troops recently despatched to Hué. The little expedition was completely successful. Three villages in the immediate neighbourhood were burnt, three guns captured, and a number of scaling-ladders, evidently intended for an assault on Nam Dinh, were destroyed. The French loss was 3 killed and about 15

wounded ; that of the enemy, “ un millier d’hommes, parmi lesquels cinq haut mandarins, notamment le dé doc (général de division),” also a general of brigade. So ran the official despatch. On the 7th August, the enemy again proving troublesome, Colonel Badens organised and carried out another successful sortie ; the results, however, being no more permanent than on the former occasion.

The civil commissioner, M. Harmand, reached Hanoi shortly after General Bouët, and at once issued a proclamation which very plainly shadowed forth the intentions of the French Government. It was not only forwarded to all head men of villages, but placarded on the walls of such places as were within the range of French guns.

“ Aux hommes du peuple, marchands, lettrés et mandarins du Tonkin. La France est un grand et puissant royaume, dont le nom est craint et respecté dans le monde entier. Ayant la force incontestable, il lui est permis, sans compromettre sa gloire, sans mentir à son génie, de se montrer patiente et généreuse.

“ C’est pour ces raisons qu’elle a employé vis-à-vis de l’Annam tous les moyens de conciliation et qu’elle a supporté bien des choses.

“ Mais tout a une limite, et le temps de la patience

est aujourd'hui passé. La France est décidée à montrer ici comme d'ailleurs que les Traités avec elle sont une chose sérieuse, et que de même qu'elle les respecte elle entend qu'ils soient respectés.

“ Votre pays est ravagé depuis bien longtemps par des bandes de brigands et de scélérats, qui sont la honte de tous les nations, qu'aucun peuple ne pourrait reconnaître comme les siens.

“ Ceux-là nous allons les chasser et vous en débarrasser en leur faisant payer chèrement le prix de leurs crimes.

“ Nous allons rétablir chez vous la paix, qui enfante la richesse, et veiller à ce qu'elle ne soit plus troublée. Nous voulons que chacun puisse jouir tranquillement des fruits de son travail.

“ Notre intention toutefois n'est pas de conquérir votre pays. La France veut seulement que les mandarins qui vous gouvernent soient tous des hommes justes et intègres. Nous voulons aussi que les impôts que vous payez servent à améliorer l'état de votre pays, à augmenter le bien-être général, à assurer la sécurité des personnes et du commerce, qui sera libre dans l'intérieur de toutes les provinces.

“ Nous laisserons donc en place tous ceux des mandarins qui accepteront le nouvel état des choses et qui nous donneront des garanties suffisantes. Ceux-là

nous les protégerons, et ils n'auront qu'à se féliciter de notre présence.

“Quant aux autres qui nourrissent dans leur cœur de mauvais desseins contre nous, nous les chasserons impitoyablement, et s'ils essayent encore de nous troubler nous irons s'il le faut les chercher jusque dans la citadelle de Hué, qui tombera entre les mains de nos marins et de nos soldats aussi facilement que les autres forteresses. Le sort réservé à ceux-là fait trembler.

“Ayez confiance en nous. La France ne vous abandonnera plus, et vous verrez bientôt le Tonkin retrouver son ancienne prospérité.

“RESPECTEZ CECL.”

Just one month after his arrival at Hanoi and within a week of the issue of M. Harmand's proclamation, General Bouët found himself compelled, despite the non-arrival of reinforcements and despite his desire to remain on the defensive, to undertake a sortie. Seeing the French abandon all signs of the offensive, and busying themselves only in the construction of works, the enemy had waxed bolder and bolder. The comparative ease with which Rivière's expedition on the 19th May had been repulsed, and the inaction of the garrison since that day, impressed the

Annamites with an exaggerated idea of their own military qualities. Harmand's proclamation had been followed up by no decisive action ; it was looked upon as a vain boast. Ten years before, the mandarins had seen Hanoi evacuated after the defeat of its French garrison ; they naturally ascribed that retreat to their own prowess, ignoring (simply because they were ignorant of them) all other causes for the French withdrawal. Harmand's proclamation, though promising peace and plenty, was not of a nature to prove pleasing to the people or to the mandarins ; the people lived by piracy, the mandarins by extortion ; it was only foreign traders who suffered, and if piracy was put down and customs dues paid into a French treasury, the occupation of the pirates and the wealth of the mandarins was cut away at one blow. It was with no feelings of pleasure that the inhabitants learnt that "*La France ne vous abandonnera plus,*" and one and all determined to drive out the barbarians as they had done in 1873.

A cordon of Black Flags was drawn close round Hanoi. Son Tay acted as their base, and a circle of villages on the western front of the town was occupied in strength. From Phu Hoai, and Ve in particular, marauding bands became most menacing, and every night some casualties or some destruction of property

occurred, which rendered it imperative that these villages should be cleared. At daybreak on the 15th August, General Bouët moved out from Hanoi at the head of 1500 men; his objective was Son Tay, and he advanced in three columns: that on the right, under Colonel Revillon, with instructions to move by the road through Ve, its flank being protected by the gunboats advancing parallel to it on the river; a second column, under the general's own personal command, was to move on Phu Hoai, and, having cleared that village, was to work across country and act in co-operation with the right wing; the third column was in support of General Bouët until after passing the lake, when its orders were to move as nearly as possible in rear of the centre of the two leading columns. Having cleared Phu Hoai and Ve, where it was anticipated some resistance would be offered, the right and left columns were to converge and advance on Son Tay, the supporting body then taking steps for keeping open communications with Hanoi, as well as to afford support to either column.

On nearing Ve, Colonel Revillon found himself much harassed by the enemy's sharpshooters, but he gradually pressed them back, aided by the fire of five gunboats, which advanced parallel to his advance. The front of that town was covered by a series of

entrenchments before which the French marines recoiled. The enemy here showed themselves capable of a stubborn resistance, and had so well constructed their defences that, though the gunboats steaming up stream exposed them to a heavy cross-fire, all efforts to dislodge them were fruitless. Colonel Revillon then had recourse to the bayonet; but the Black Flags of 1883 were different to the squalid beings whom Garnier had chased over the Delta with a paltry fifty seamen. They had learnt that, like themselves, the French, too, were mortal; and the panic which had shaken Rivière's detachment on the 19th May had increased the self-confidence of the enemy. On the other hand, inaction, the nameless dread which so often paralyses Western troops when acting against savages, the knowledge of certain death, and still more certain mutilation, in case of capture, all tended to demoralise the French, who hung back from facing the walled village. Revillon and his officers showed a bold front, and finally shamed their men into action. Three half-hearted attempts were made on the village, but all were beaten off.

Night coming on, and finding he was making no impression upon the enemy, Colonel Revillon determined to bivouac in front of Ve, until, by the

advance of the General's column, the communication between it and Son Tay being cut, the Annamites would be compelled to evacuate their position. At intervals he kept up a well-sustained fire on the entrenchments in concert with the flotilla, but, though the enemy fitfully replied, no attempts at bringing on the fight were made during the night. In the words of General Bouët's despatch, the fighting in front of Ve was styled "*un combat acharné.*" One may be permitted to remark that a total list of eleven killed and wounded out of a column of 500 men was no more an excuse for such an expression than it was for the failure of Colonel Revillon's attack.

The left column in the meanwhile passed over the fatal spot where Garnier and Rivière had fallen, and clearing the cross-roads to Ve, sent the supporting column some way up it, whilst the general, throwing out troops to his left, endeavoured to envelop Phu Hoi. A heavy fire was opened on the village, but no reply being given the French dashed forward to find it deserted; leaving a company of marines in Phu Hoi, to destroy the defences and maintain communication with Hanoi, General Bouët pushed on towards Yennoi, a village some five miles to the north-west, which it was rumoured would be



strongly and stubbornly defended; before reaching it, however, an unexpected obstacle appeared in the shape of a series of earthworks thrown round a small village called Vong, about two miles to the left of Yennoi. Some irregular Annamite levies, under a man named George, who made an attack on its left flank, were first repulsed, and then the French troops under Bouët met with a similar fate. Repeated attacks were delivered with no better result. The artillery fire apparently had no impression on the defenders, who made little or no attempt to respond to it, and who always remained under cover until the French infantry arrived within about 300 mètres of the works, when, opening a heavy fire, they invariably checked an advance. At last, at 2 p.m., finding his ammunition running short and his men suffering much from heat, the general determined to retire. This retrograde movement was carried out with much steadiness, being covered by the irregular Annamites, who, throughout the day's operations, had shown themselves most valuable auxiliaries, and who had always been exposed to the brunt of the enemy's fire. On nearing the cross-roads near the spot where Garnier fell, heavy firing was heard to the right front, and the general then learnt that the centre column, after waiting

impatiently for his advance, had carried Yennoi ; but that at 5 p.m., being attacked by a very strong body of Chinese, they had been driven out, and were now falling rapidly back, hard pressed by the enemy. Bouët faced about to cover their retirement, and at 10 p.m., worn out and discouraged, the defeated and demoralised brigade re-entered Hanoi. The right column, having bivouacked that night in front of Ve, at daybreak found the village in their front abandoned. The joy at this intelligence was somewhat damped by the non-arrival of news from the general, and by the menacing appearance of formidable bodies of the enemy in the rear ; in fact, their communication with Hanoi was cut off. Fortunately the gunboats were at hand, and not caring to risk an encounter with the Black Flags, who barred his retreat, Colonel Revillon embarked his men on board the flotilla, and reached the citadel by 10 a.m., to learn of the ill-success that had attended the other column. The total loss sustained by the French amounted to 2 officers and 40 men killed, and 3 officers and 54 men wounded, the dead being left on the field—not a very large proportion of casualties in a force of 1500 men ; certainly not large enough to account for its premature retirement.

Though matters were wearing a sombre aspect

at Hanoi, in other parts of Tonkin the French were gaining successes. The important towns of Hai Dzuong and Phu-Binh, on the Thai Binh River, had been captured; 150 guns of various sorts and 400,000 francs in specie formed the plunder. This money was of great value in enabling the local authorities to carry on the war.

This last success gave the French complete command of the Thai Binh, a navigable stream running parallel to the Red River, and connected with it by the Canal of the Rapids, which gave water communication between Hanoi and Bac Ninh. At the same time, Quang Yen, a sea-port on the Bay of Alung, was also seized, thus forming an admirable base for any operations that might have to be undertaken in the mountainous region to the south of the Chinese province of Kwang Si.

These operations were naturally but the prelude to an ultimatum which was addressed to the Court of Hué by M. Harmand. He demanded the immediate fulfilment of the Treaty of 1874, and the acceptance of the French protectorate over Tonkin. As reinforcements to the extent of 7000 men had now arrived from France, the ultimatum was supported by the appearance of an armed force off Tourane, which ought to have convinced

the Court of the futility of resistance. The death of Tu Duc, which had occurred on the 20th July, might also have furnished his successor with an opportunity or excuse for treating. The Annamites, however, considered they had good ground for complaint. The conduct of Captain Rivière was certainly open to censure, as also was M. Harmand's proclamation (given *in extenso* on page 223), issued as it was without Tu Duc's sanction or knowledge; it was impossible for them tamely to submit to the appropriation of the northern provinces by France. In 1862, the kingdom had been shorn of the wealthy districts of Cochin-China; in 1868, other provinces had been appropriated; with the French at Saigon and Hanoi, Hué would indeed be in the position of an earthen pot between two iron vessels; and the King determined to appeal for help to his suzerain at Peking, and though the French were thundering at his doors, to make some show of resistance.

On the 18th of August, Admiral Courbet, with a squadron composed of the *Bayard*, *Atalanta*, *Chateau-Renaud*, *Drac*, *Vipère*, and *Lynx*, appeared at the entrance of the Hué River. He had with him a Naval Brigade consisting of 1200 marines, and fifteen light field-guns drawn by coolies. After sustaining a heavy bombardment for two days, the forts at

the entrance of the river surrendered; when the gunboats *Vipère* and *Lynx*, steaming over the bar, cannonaded the town itself. The Naval Brigade was then landed, and, meeting with only a feeble opposition, penetrated the principal fort, which it found deserted. During the afternoon of the 20th, the Foreign Minister arrived under cover of a flag of truce, and an armistice was agreed on; all the forts and vessels of war in the neighbourhood of Hué were to be handed over to the French, pending the execution of a new Treaty, which was to be immediately drawn up. The French loss in this affair was limited to some half-dozen men wounded; the enemy's loss was very heavy, no quarter being given, and all prisoners being summarily shot by the Admiral's orders.

On the 25th August, the Treaty was concluded between the new King, whose reign commenced under such unhappy auspices, and M. Harmand, acting on the part of France. Well may it be said that the signature was wrung from him at the point of the bayonet. The principal clauses may be briefly summarised:

1. Annam recognised the French protectorate, and bound herself to hold no communication with any Foreign Powers except through the intermediary of the French Resident at the Court of Hué.

2. The province of Binh Tuam (in the South

of Annam, bordering on the French possession of Saigon) was ceded in perpetuity to France.

3. The forts on the Hué River, guarding the entrance to the capital, to be permanently occupied by French troops, as also all forts the possession of which is judged by the French commander to be necessary for the preservation of peace in Tonkin.

4. Immediate recall of all Annamite troops serving in Tonkin.

5. The customs of Annam to be placed under French administration.

6. Opening of the ports of Quinhon and Tourane to commerce.

7. Construction of a road and telegraph line from Saigon to Hanoi.

8. The French Minister to have the right of private audiences with the King.

9. French Residents, with suitable garrisons, to be appointed to all the chief towns.

10. French Residents to have jurisdiction over the Annamite authorities in all districts, as well as over all foreigners.

11. France charged herself with the task of opening the Red River to commerce, and of suppressing all piracy, all rebellions, and repelling all foreign aggression.

12. Annam cedes to France all her ships of war, and agrees to pay an indemnity, the amount to be hereafter fixed, in order to defray the expenses of the French occupation. Until the payment of this indemnity all customs dues to be retained by the French.

Such, in brief, were the terms of a Treaty which virtually made Annam a French province, a Treaty wrung from a sovereign whose reign might be counted by days, a Treaty devoid of all elements of moderation or justice, one which ignored the fact of the vassalage of Annam to China—a fact of which France was well aware—and one which must inevitably recoil on the heads of those who enforced it. Colonies are not founded by the sword, nor are they retained by tyrannical unscrupulousness.

China was not slow in protesting formally against the conduct of France, and announced her intention of defending, if necessary, by force of arms any infringement of her territory. Not only was the French Minister in Peking made aware of the views of the Celestial Empire on the Tonkin question, but the Chinese Ambassador to the French Republic represented to the authorities at the Quai d'Orsay the grave results likely to accrue from any ill-judged action on the part of the officials in Tonkin. It was

pointed out in firm and unmistakable language that Annam was a vassal state of China, that her kings rendered tribute and homage to the Emperor, and were in turn recognised by him as rightful possessors of the throne, and that no Treaty with Annam could be valid unless approved of by the Court of Peking. M. Challemel Lacour, with that *brusquerie* for which he has unfortunately been long noted, received the representations of the Marquis Tseng with studied discourtesy, and the Ambassador's powers were openly discredited in the Chamber.

Whilst France was thus ostensibly treating China as a power of no concern, as one whose interests were in no way affected by the change of position in Tonkin, she was preparing for meeting the troops of the Celestial Empire in what she felt would be now more than a mere punitive expedition against pirates. Steam-launches of great speed and light draught were ordered of English firms, battalions of seasoned troops were despatched from Algeria, the construction of ironclads was pushed on with vigour, encouraging telegrams were forwarded to Saigon, and though the season was not propitious for military operations, instructions were sent to General Bouët to act with vigour. And so the country, blind to the future, ignorant of the conflicting interests that must



naturally be irritated by any interference with Oriental trade, even by the blockade of the Tonkin ports, taking no concern of the spread of anti-European feelings in China, drifted aimlessly within a measurable distance of war. China, too, was not slow in taking precautionary measures; an aggressive power whose Ministers openly asserted that distant colonies were necessary for the purposes of affording a home and subsistence to her surplus population, and which did not hesitate to found new homes for her emigrants by armed expeditions, was not a neighbour to be welcomed. Troops were hurried down from Yunnan to Son Tay and Bac Ninh; large quantities of arms and ammunition were ordered from America; the incomparable gunboats of the Alphabet class, furnished by the Elswick firm, were commissioned; and crews sent to Germany for the purpose of navigating to Chinese waters the ironclads being built at Stettin.

And so, while the diplomatists were endeavouring to stir up war, General Bouët was nominally endeavouring to restore to Tonkin the blessings of peace, by improving the Black Flags off the surface of the delta of the Red River. Nothing daunted by his defeat on the 15th August, he once more, on the 1st September (knowing that the place was held by Chinese troops), made a vigorous sortie in the direc-

tion of Son Tay. Avoiding his previous fault—namely, the dispersion of his columns—he advanced along the river-road through Ve; his left, the weak and exposed flank, with commendable caution, was covered by the battalion of Annamite irregulars, under George; his right, resting on the Red River, was protected by gunboats. The heavy fire from the flotilla drove the enemy out of Ve, and, resting one night in that village, the force on the 2nd pushed on to Pallen, midway between Hanoi and Son Tay. Here a gallant defence was shown by the combined Chinese and Annamite forces. The entrenchments having been destroyed, and the village set on fire by the shells from the flotilla, the garrison withdrew, having inflicted a loss of 2 officers and 26 men killed, and 5 officers and 35 men wounded, on the French; the loss of the enemy was undoubtedly very heavy. The day's success was marred by the severity of General Bouët, who ordered all prisoners to be beheaded. On the morning of the 3rd September, finding farther advance impossible, owing to the inundations caused by the enemy, the general returned to Hanoi after destroying all the works at Pallen, as well as those existing between that place and his headquarters.

On the 10th September, one week after the successful sortie against Pallen, General Bouët handed

over the command to Colonel Bichot, and left Hanoi for Saigon. Various reports were current as to the real reason for his thus voluntarily abandoning a position of such responsibility and honour as naturally accrued to the command-in-chief of a force. Some journals asserted that sickness compelled him to seek change; others, that he wished personally to explain the situation in Tonkin to his Government in Paris. The official *communiqué* in the *Havas* ran as follows:

“Le Général Bouët est parti hier de Saïgon pour la France, par le paquebot de Cochinchine. Il a reçu du Commissaire Civil de la République, à la date du 10 Septembre, la mission qu’il a lui-même sollicitée d’informer le Gouvernement français de la situation des provinces du Tonkin voisines de la Chine, et de l’entretenir des moyens les plus propres à assurer le prompt fonctionnement de notre protectorat. Le Colonel Bichot remplace pendant son absence le Général Bouët. La mauvaise saison impose d’ailleurs un temps d’arrêt forcé aux opérations actives.”

It was, however, generally accepted in military circles that differences of opinion between the general and the civil commissioner, arising from undue interference on the part of the latter with the

military operations on the Red River, were the true causes of the general's behaviour, and subsequent events have proved that this surmise was the correct one.

Admiral Courbet, in command of the squadron in Tonkin waters; now endeavoured to assume control over the operations in the Red River, and proceeded to Hanoi with that view. He protested energetically against any interference on the part of M. Harmand, and demanded absolute and unfettered freedom of action. The new commander's first step was to undertake a reconnaissance towards Son Tay. This disclosed the fact that that fortress was a far stronger position than was originally thought; and, even with the 7000 men at his disposal, the Admiral did not think it advisable then to attempt its reduction. The weather was too severe, the heat still too overpowering, and the health of the men by no means good enough to admit of any lengthened operations, whilst the force was too weak to hold out hopes of success by a *coup de main*.

If caution reigned at Hanoi, daring gallantry was equally conspicuous at Nam Dinh. Colonel Badens, who commanded at that post, was being much harassed by bands of Black Flags, who had made Ninh Binh—an important town of over 40,000 in-

habitants—their head-quarters. Remembering how in Garnier's time, Balny with a steam-launch and twenty men had captured all the fortresses in the delta, Badens determined to emulate the heroism of the previous decade, and, taking only the despatch-boat *Pluvier* and five-and-twenty marines, suddenly appeared before the citadel and demanded its surrender. The plan was perfectly successful; without shedding a drop of blood, this town and district were placed under French control.

Even this success could not shake the belief of Admiral Courbet in the necessity for reinforcements. According to official reports, he had with him at Hanoi, by the early part of November, a force consisting of over 9000 men with fifty guns, besides twelve Hotchkiss revolving cannon from the fleet. This little army was composed as follows :

Infantry of the Marine	3700
Artillery of the Marine	800
Algerian troops, three battalions	1800
Naval Brigade on shore	1200
Annamite riflemen	1200
Crews of the flotilla	600

We may well wonder at the inactivity of the Admiral when we remember that Roberts, with a force far less than this, comprising less than 2000

British troops, forced the Paiwar Kotal, fought a pitched battle, and captured Cabul. Admiral Courbet, with a river protecting his flank, hesitated for two months to attack a fort in the open plains, even when supported by the heavy guns of his fleet. But were not political reasons delaying his advance—was not France playing the game of brag? That Son Tay was a Chinese fort the Ministry well knew, and any attack on it, they had been fairly warned, would be construed into an act of war. An attack on Son Tay, then, meant to expose Admiral Courbet to the full force of an opinionated attack on the part of the Chinese forces, and the French fleet in Eastern waters to a naval war for which they were ill prepared. A temporising campaign was therefore desirable, and though the French journals daily announced that Admiral Courbet's advance was to commence on the morrow, it was not until the middle of December that he felt himself strong enough to resume the offensive.

The Admiral's inactivity produced its own fruits, for, on the 17th November, a very determined attack was made on the French post at Hai Dzuong, and though supported by the gunboat *Carabine*, the little garrison lost severely; indeed it appeared as if the fort would have been carried. Fortunately, the

firing was heard by another vessel, the *Lynx*, which, steaming up to the sound of cannon, lent powerful aid with her small arms and heavy guns. The enemy were beaten off at nightfall with heavy loss, but the victors, too, suffered severely, and though defeated, the Annamites were far from discouraged.

On the 14th December, having drawn up large reinforcements from the lower towns, Admiral Courbet advanced against Son Tay. Taking advantage of the effective support of the gunboats, he moved along the river-road with a force amounting to 8000 troops, exclusive of nearly 2000 Annamite irregulars. On the 16th, the environs of the town were reached. The gunboats commenced a heavy shell fire on the exterior works, against which the irregular troops were thrown; by nightfall the outworks were carried, and, taking advantage of the darkness, the Chinese commander, feeling it useless to prolong a struggle where smooth-bore field-guns were exposed to the heavy rifled cannon of the flotilla, evacuated the citadel. On the morning of the 17th, the French troops entered the place. Their gallantry during the engagement was sufficiently lauded by the Admiral, who considered it to have been beyond all praise, whilst the French indulged in wild pœans of ecstasy, declaring that Sedan was eclipsed by Son Tay. The

loss of the victors, exclusive of casualties in the irregulars, amounted to 75 killed and 245 wounded. It is worthy of note that very few losses were incurred by the French-born troops, the Turcos and Annamites being utilised in the van.

With the fall of Son Tay the Tonkin question opens on to a new phase; for the first time in the history of operations Chinese troops had been officially engaged, and the French Ministry had been warned by the Marquis Tseng that any attack on either Son Tay or Bac Ninh would be looked upon as a *casus belli*. But though Son Tay was captured with extreme ease, the fact must not be overlooked that a well-equipped land force of 8000 men was acting in conjunction with an admirable flotilla carrying very heavy guns, weapons of far greater value than any which an army could hope to transport in its train. The effect of a shell fire from such pieces of artillery against defenders crowded behind entrenchments must have been very severe, and that these guns contributed not a little to the success of the operations must be acknowledged by the French themselves. But it will not be possible for Admiral Courbet or General Millot, his successor, to continue their operations in districts where they can depend on the fire of their gunboats, and it will be a very



different matter to the taking of Son Tay, when they find themselves in front of mud walls with no artillery to breach them. Although defeated at Son Tay, the result was highly satisfactory to the Chinese, and by no means redundant in glory to the French. One company of the Turcos was practically annihilated, and it was owing to the valour of these Mohammedans that the place was captured. General Millot will not always be in a position to thrust Turcos into the van, and when the boy soldiers of the conscription are used instead of the fanatical men of Algeria, assaults will not always be so successful. The action of the 16th December was stained by acts of cruelty with which the French unfortunately mar all their operations of war. Quarter was refused, and all prisoners were ruthlessly butchered by "nos glorieux enfants." The slaughter of Egyptian prisoners at Jaffa by Napoleon, the burning of Algerians by Pellissier, the wholesale hangings by Rivière at Hanoi, the pitiless fusillade of fugitives by Courbet at Hué, the beheadings by Bouët at Vong, were equalled if not eclipsed at Son Tay by the nation which professes to wage war in Tonkin for the purpose of introducing civilisation.

## CHAPTER XI.

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND CHINA DURING  
1882-1883.

IT may readily be surmised that China did not permit the aggressive action of France to pass without protest. In a manly and temperate despatch, the Marquis Tseng, on learning of the capture of Hanoi, requested that the French Government would recall its troops from Tonkin, pointing out at the same time that, as in 1873 they had disavowed the action of M. Garnier—who, in defiance of his instructions, had committed an unjustifiable act of war—so now, in the same way, they could, without in any way compromising their own honour, follow a similar course.

“ Les assurances que votre Excellence m’a formellement autorisé à transmettre à mon Gouvernement ne manqueraient pas de calmer l’émotion que la Cour de Pékin aurait autrement éprouvée à la réception de la nouvelle de l’attaque et de la prise de Hanoi par

les troupes françaises, et cela non seulement à une époque où la République est en pleine paix avec la Chine et avec son vassal le Prince de l'Annam, mais au moment même où une correspondance amicale s'échange sur la question du Tonkin entre la France et la Chine.

“J'espère que votre Excellence aura reçu une réponse aux explications qu'elle a bien voulu demander à propos de ce qui s'est passé, et dans le cas où la nouvelle précitée serait exacte que le Gouvernement français voudra bien, suivant les sentiments de justice et d'amitié qui le distinguent, ordonner le rappel de ses troupes, comme il l'a royalement et spontanément fait en 1873, quand un jeune et intrépide officier, poussé par un excès de zèle, avait pris la même ville en pleine paix et sans autorisation de son Gouvernement.”\*

But though the actions of M. Garnier and of M. Rivière were almost identical; though the latter, in capturing Hanoi, had acted in wilful defiance of the express order of his immediate superior, M. le Myre de Vilers,† the members of the French Government of 1882 were by no means prepared

\* Despatch from the Marquis Tseng to M. de Freycinet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated Paris, 6th May, 1882.

† See page 193.

to act as loyally and spontaneously as their predecessors of 1873. The craze for colonial aggrandisement was upon them, and support was to be given, not to those officers who, like MM. Bourée and Le Myre de Vilers, acted on principles of honour and justice, but to those who, like Garnier, Rivière, and Pierre, sought to lay the foundation of an Oriental France in states too weak to withstand the power of European arms. Adopting that spirit of haughty pretension which French Ministers of all shades of political opinion so frequently assume, M. de Freycinet left the despatch of the Chinese Ambassador unanswered for three weeks. Then, denying his own peaceful overtures, made at the commencement of the year; denying his personal assurances, verbally made to the Marquis Tseng, that France had no intentions of prosecuting any armed intervention towards Annam, on the 31st May the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a despatch to the Chinese Ambassador, couched in language which might surely have been considered tantamount to a declaration of war, or at any rate have afforded the Government of Peking a pretext for war, had it not been determined to exhaust all efforts to maintain peace.

“ Aux préoccupations que vous m’exprimiez, je me suis borné à répondre que le Gouvernement de la

République, soucieux de faire respecter un acte qu'il a signé, avait donné aux autorités coloniales l'ordre d'assurer l'exécution du traité conclu entre la France et l'Empire annamite en 1874.

“J'ai ajouté que les suites de l'action que nous entendons exercer dans cette vue ne concernaient que les deux États signataires de ladite convention, et qu'en conséquence nous n'avions aucune explication à fournir au Gouvernement chinois.”\*

Such language, so little in accordance with diplomatic usage, tended to cause a breach between the Marquis Tseng and the French Ministry, and very naturally had also a retarding effect on the progress of the negotiations. Seeing that the Chinese Ambassador was not a person to be browbeaten, M. de Freycinet transferred the scene of negotiations from Paris to Peking, and instructed M. Bourée, the French Minister in China, to endeavour to procure the recognition by the Celestial Empire of the interpretation which the French Government had chosen to place on the Treaty of 1874, and the withdrawal of the Chinese forces from Tonkin.

Like M. le Myre de Vilers, M. Bourée was a gentleman who, though trained as a diplomatist,

\* Despatch from M. de Freycinet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Marquis Tseng, dated Paris, 31st May, 1882.

did not realise that his functions were "to lie for the good of his country," and he carried with him to the execution of his duties a profound conviction that the best interests of the Republic would be served by adopting a straightforward and honourable course with the Tsong-li-Yamen. It was by no means easy, after the crooked tergiversation of the past ten years, to enter on such a line of conduct, and the Ambassador was moreover hampered by instructions from Paris which fettered him at every turn, and which rendered his task day by day more difficult. The formal complaint advanced by M. Bourée (acting under M. de Freycinet's direct instructions) of the tone adopted by the Marquis Tseng in his official communications, tended only to irritate the Chinese Ministry, who, being in possession of copies of all despatches which had passed between their Ambassador and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, were able themselves to judge of the truth of such an unjustifiable accusation. M. de Freycinet's conduct in neglecting to answer a despatch, in which he was desired to formulate his charges against the Marquis with more precision, was in itself an act which, while placing him out of court, increased the indisposition of the Tsong-li-Yamen to accept the French bases of negotiation.

Starting from two separate standpoints and pursuing diverging roads, it was impossible that France and China should, even under the straightforward guidance of M. Bourée, ever arrive at a satisfactory solution of the Tonkin difficulty. France stood upon the ground that China, in accepting the Treaty of 1874, had accepted the French protectorate over Annam, but French Ministers were forgetful that despatches, proving the duplicity of their conduct, were in existence, forgetful that the publication of these despatches would be fatal to their claim. China asserted that on the submission of the Treaty no mention of such protectorate was made, and even French Ministers have been compelled to own this was the case. They further contended that in acknowledging M. Rochechouart's covering despatch, Prince Kong distinctly pointed out that Annam had for many years been a tributary State, that its kings had received their investiture at the hands of the Emperor of China, and that twice since the signature of the Treaty of 1874, tribute-bearing embassies, in accordance with immemorial custom, had proceeded from Hué to Peking, without any remonstrance being made by France.

And this not through ignorance; in 1876 and in 1880, the French Chargé d'Affaires at Hué advised

his Government of the despatch of these missions, and the Minister in China forwarded to Paris extracts from the official *Gazette* of Peking, in which the letters of Tu Duc were literally given. Further than this, M. Bourée requested to be furnished with instructions as to the action he should take in the matter, and was ordered by his Government to avoid all reference to the question. The French Ministry and French Press assert that in signing the Treaty of 1874, Tu Duc threw off the Chinese yoke, and that in accepting that Treaty the Court of Peking virtually abdicated their suzerainty; yet the fact that France, so far back as 1876, permitted the tribute-bearing embassies to be continued, shows that she then, and as lately as 1880, accepted the historical connection between the Courts of Peking and Hué, which is so clearly laid down in the following extract from the official *Gazette* of December 25th, 1880, which was recently published in the Yellow Book on Tonkin :

“The Governor of Kwang Si announces the arrival of a tribute mission from the King of Annam within the frontiers of Kwang Si, charged with the conveyance of articles of tribute and letters to his Imperial Majesty, copies of which he appends to his memorial.

“ ‘Yuan Fu Shih, King of Annam, your Majesty’s



humble servant, bows his head and reverently addresses your Majesty in the matter of the respectful preparation of a humble offering, the tribute-day being near at hand.

“‘My nation, a tribute State from time immemorial, has been graciously confirmed in its possession by you. It has been ordained that the tribute-day shall recur once in four years without change. On each occasion offerings have obediently been sent. On the 8th day of the 1st Moon of the sixth year of Kuang Hsü, the appointed time having come round, I requested, through the Governor of Kwang Si, your permission to start, and I received an answer from him appointing the 1st day of the 9th Moon for admission across the frontier. When I received these commands I was filled with thankfulness and awe. That the hills and streams of my country enjoy security and rest is because I have obeyed your behests, and we have not failed, generation after generation, to send our bounden tribute. .

“‘Now the day is at hand (once more), and I am again permitted to send my offerings; truly this is because you have deigned to consider my loyalty and love, and the hearts of my subjects are satisfied and grateful. As is the duty of a vassal prince gazing

from afar at the Heavenly abode, I have entrusted to my envoy, Yuan Shu, and others, various offerings to be next year presented to you. In all humbleness I await your acceptance of them.'

"List of articles of tribute: 1. Two elephants' tusks: 2. Two rhinoceros' horns. 3. Forty-five catties of betel nuts. 4. Forty-five catties 'grains of paradise.' 5. Six hundred ounces of sandal-wood. 6. Three hundred ounces of garroo-wood. 7. One hundred pieces of native silk. 8. One hundred pieces of white silk. 9. One hundred pieces of raw silk. 10. One hundred pieces of native cloth.

"THE KING OF ANNAM TO THE EMPEROR OF CHINA.

"Now, as I look up and see on the northern horizon a mounting light, the south must send its golden gifts of happy omen. Over the countless ridges of a thousand hills for thousands of *li* we hold our faithful course, our heads, like the sunflower, still turned to the sun of our Lord.

"Reverently I send this letter of congratulation; prostrate, I think, at this happy time, when the sky is unclouded, when the remotest domains of ocean have learnt the softening influence of a common language, how that the 'southern lands of fire,'

too, though remote, should send their rightful offerings. As I reverently spread these before me and kindle incense, I fly in spirit to the Heavenly Portals. I think, in all lowliness, of your Majesty as of the sun shining unceasingly along a pathway whose brightness increases ever, as of a sovereign filling the first place under Heaven and upholding the teaching of the 'Ch'un ch'iu,' that unity is of more worth than aught else, as of one who by love to the vassal princes and tenderness to those from afar fulfils the nine rules of the 'Chung Yung,' as of him who has received the Divine commission to govern the nine regions, as of one 'who displays his virtues until they permeate all quarters of the kingdom,' as of a leader who is a fair sight for his people, and as of a King who is an all-pervading influence.

"I, your vassal, in the torrid heat of the south, was long since enrolled among tributary States, and have held my fief in all reverence, ever obedient in my duty. Now that the frontier pest (the rebellion under Li Yang-ts'ai) is laid and the general assemblage of princes is at hand, now that no waves are raging on the sea of Chou and the auspicious gifts of every clime are collected at the palace of Yü, I, your vassal, relying on your kindness, hasten to do my duty as befits my station. I am about to send my

envoy with my offerings, and it seems as though myself were about to gaze on the Heavenly countenance ; so do I rejoice in the rising light of sun and noon and breath of strife put down for ever. May I be enabled to receive your favours without end by walking in the same path, and transgressing never ; unworthy to glance at Heaven or to gaze at the Holy Man. I wait in most earnest expectation. Besides this letter, I have entrusted to my delegate a list of the tribute offerings to be given to your Majesty."

Had the Tsong-li-Yamen been in possession of the despatches which have recently appeared in the Yellow Book, they could still further have confuted the French Ambassador by extracts from writings of his predecessor, who, in announcing to his Government the submission to the Court of Peking of the Treaty of 1874, by which France claimed the protectorate, reported : "J'ai craint de m'avancer sur ce terrain brûlant, et dans la lettre que j'ai écrite au Prince Kong en lui renvoyant une copie du Traité d'amitié du 15 Mars, *j'ai glissé sur cette question.*" Despite the repeated assertions of the French Ministers — and these, too, in face of Chinese denials—that Peking had acquiesced in the rôle of a French protectorate over Annam, it was evident that neither M. le Myre de Vilers, the Governor

of Cochin-China, nor M. Bourée, the Minister in Peking, was of opinion either that force should be applied in Tonkin, or that the game of brag was one which would secure the ultimate recognition of France's claims. In January, 1882, the former gentleman wrote: "Je ne saurais trop le répéter, c'est pacifiquement, administrativement, politiquement que nous devons opérer au Tonkin; une action militaire pourrait avoir des conséquences graves, et entraînerait le Gouvernement de la République dans des complications hors de proportion avec les résultats à atteindre. J'ai la conviction qu'avec de la fermeté, de la persévérance et de l'esprit de suite nous ferons ce que nous voudrons." Later on, in June of the same year, M. de Vilers wrote, alluding to the capture of the citadel of Hanoi: "Ces événements prouvent une fois de plus qu'avec de la fermeté il nous sera facile d'imposer notre autorité et au Tonkin et en Annam sans avoir recours à une expédition militaire."\*

In spite of these warnings from the experienced Governor of Cochin-China, the Ministry of the Republic pressed upon M. Bourée the necessity

\* Despatch from M. le Myre de Vilers, Governor of Cochin-China, to M. Rouvier, Minister of Marine and the Colonies, dated Saigon, 18th January, 1882.

of demanding the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Tonkin, and the recognition, not merely of the much-disputed Treaty of 1874, but of a more clearly defined proclamation, setting forth in detail French rights over Annam as well as the opening of the Red River to Manghao. The Tsong-li-Yamen held firm. With much courtesy, but with equal determination, it refused to waive its rights over its old vassal; it refused to recall troops sent to Tonkin in response to an appeal for assistance from the King whose investiture it had granted; it refused to relax the provisions of the Treaty of Tientsin as regards Manghao. In fact, by insisting on the unreasonable demands of the Government, M. Bourée saw that he was straining the patience of the Chinese Government to its uttermost limits, and raising a question, not of unofficial hostilities with Annam, but of open war with Peking.

In February, 1883, he warned the Government of the consequences of such action. "Il est clair que nous allons provoquer les susceptibilités de la Cour de Pékin, et que nous nous exposerons par cela même à perdre le bénéfice de tout ce que j'ai pu obtenir pendant ces derniers mois. En somme, du côté de l'Annam qu'est-ce qui nous presse, et qu'avons-nous à craindre? Les seules complications

que nous ayons à redouter et à prévenir sont celles qui nous exposeraient à un conflit avec la Chine.”

Such plain speaking, so diametrically in opposition to the wishes of the Government of the Republic, was most displeasing. The politicians in Paris were of a new order, ignorant of the conservative traditions of the Chinese Empire, and loth to understand how any Oriental power could stand before *la belle France*. They remembered how Palikao's weak division had advanced practically unopposed from the Peiho to Peking, and forgetting the moral and material support afforded by Sir Hope Grant's magnificent forces and by the British fleet, they imagined that the Chinese Ministry, mindful of their defeat twenty years before, would be willing to accept any terms rather than expose their young Emperor to a like humiliation. They were ignorant of the great strides made by China in what we should call Western civilisation; they were ignorant of the fact that China possessed an army little inferior in discipline to the masses who compose the Republican forces of France; they were ignorant that the troops of the Celestial Empire were for the most part armed with breech-loading weapons of precision, and that her navy, supported as it is by native coal-fields, is superior to any squadron

France could spare to oppose it; they were ignorant that China was well aware of the history of the campaign of 1870, and of the unfortunate attempts made to reorganise that magnificent army which Napoleon I. raised to the pinnacle of fame, and which, under the third Republic, has become a standing menace to the peace of Europe, a dangerous political tool in the hands of unscrupulous Ministers, and unsuited, as even these Ministers have been forced to confess, for operations beyond the seas. To quote M. Bourée's own words, in a despatch to his Government in May, 1883: "En un mot, la Chine est considérée comme un facteur négligeable dans la situation que nous allons avoir à régler sur les bords du fleuve Rouge."

M. Challemel Lacour, the successor of M. de Freycinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was a gentleman who combined in the most marked manner all those qualities which should be absent in a statesman, whilst those which are generally considered essential to statecraft were equally conspicuous by their absence. As French Ambassador in London, he succeeded in producing an impression which was far from complimentary. London society, not usually very particular as far as princes and ambassadors are concerned, resolutely shut its doors in his face, and



in a few months M. Grévy felt compelled to recall a man who seemed to take a pleasure in outraging public opinion. This was the man whom the French Government entrusted with the task of carrying on negotiations with Peking. Possessed of an unpleasant manner, his first act was one of studied discourtesy to the Chinese Ambassador. Gifted with a fluent pen, his next one was to indite a series of despatches to M. Bourée, which were marked by a tone that none but a most loyal and devoted servant would have accepted. But M. Bourée knew the danger into which the Ministry were rushing headlong, and disdaining to notice the manner of his superior, he addressed him temperate rejoinders, warning him of the real feeling in China, and imploring that all claim to the protectorate of Annam should be withdrawn, unless, indeed, France desired war. Telegraphing on the 16th of April, 1883, he says :

“ J’ai la crainte que la gravité de la situation ne soit pas comprise à Paris. Je me suis efforcé par ma correspondance d’expliquer que si nous n’arrivions pas à une entente avec la Chine au sujet du Tonkin, elle nous y devancerait et nous en disputerait la possession par les armes. On a jugé devoir passer outre. On ne s’arrête pas aux protestations pacifiques que je

prodigue, non plus qu'à nos droits conventionnels avec l'Annam que la Chine n'a jamais reconnus. On veut des garanties effectives, et pour se les assurer plus de 10,000 hommes du Yunnan, comprenant le détachement des troupes de Li-Hong-Tchang, sont déjà rentrés au Tonkin. C'est l'avant-garde d'une autre armée d'invasion, et nous aurons bientôt devant nous des masses considérables avec un fort appoint de soldats exercés, bien armés, et d'officiers étrangers.

“ On assure que la mise sur le pied de guerre de toutes les forces de l'Empire vient d'être ordonnée par la Cour. Si vous persistez dans la ligne adoptée, préparez-vous à une lutte des plus sérieuses qu'aucune assurance amicale ne saurait plus conjurer. Je serais un agent déloyal si je ne vous tenais ce langage.”

M. Bourée had previously, on the 17th March, written to the Minister :

“ Je souhaite vivement que l'événement me donne tort, Monsieur le Ministre, mais je ne puis me défendre d'éprouver les plus vives appréhensions quand je vois ce qui se fait et ce qui se prépare autour de moi ici ; quand supputant les chances d'un conflit qui me paraît devenu inévitable, je cherche à mettre en balance ce qu'il nous coûtera et les avantages que nous sommes appelés à en retirer.

“ Le Gouvernement chinois ne perd d'ailleurs pas

de temps pour s'assurer la possession d'un gage utile à tout événement, car si je suis bien renseigné—et je crois l'être—l'ordre va être donné (s'il ne l'est déjà) aux troupes impériales de rentrer au Tonkin et de reprendre les positions qu'elles y occupaient au mois de Décembre dernier. Nous allons donc avoir à les déloger tout d'abord. C'est la guerre. Et en admettant que les opérations se coalisent dans les districts septentrionaux de l'Annam, il faut s'attendre à avoir de ce côté sur les bras des masses considérables que nous pénétrons facilement, mais qui tiendront tout le pays, enveloppant nos colonnes, et entravant leurs mouvements. Il est permis de compter tout d'abord sur de faciles succès, mais la lutte prendra un caractère plus sérieux, à mesure que des contingents exercés arriveront du Nord, pourvus d'armes à tir rapide et d'une excellente artillerie.

“ Cette guerre, qu'on le remarque bien, n'exposera la Chine à aucun revers décisif, puisqu'il ne saurait entrer dans notre esprit d'attaquer désormais les formidables ouvrages qui couvrent Pékin. Elle pourra donc se prolonger indéfiniment en nous imposant des sacrifices de plus en plus lourds, et quand nous voudrons en finir et nous composer par un Traité indispensable une sécurité quelconque dans la vallée du fleuve Rouge, nous nous retrouverons en présence

des difficultés mêmes que je signale aujourd'hui et qu'il est plus facile de nier que de supprimer. Alors le maximum de ce que nous pourrions obtenir du Gouvernement chinois serait précisément ce qu'il nous offrait hier encore dans le projet d'arrangement que je vous ai soumis, et dont il voudra à ce moment nous faire payer cher les avantages." \*

Events have fully justified the views thus enunciated by M. Bourée, although M. Ferry has openly stated in the Chambers that the Ambassador allowed himself to be deceived by the Chinese, and that he utterly failed to realise the true character of Chinese diplomacy. In judging the conduct and attitude of M. Bourée by the light of succeeding events, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the French Ministry were merely seeking a pretext for war with China, and not endeavouring to find a *modus vivendi*. On the 3rd May, M. Bourée's despatch of the 17th March reached the Quai d'Orsay; on the 5th, a telegram was received from that Minister, briefly announcing the despatch of 2000 Chinese troops to Tonkin; and on the 8th, an equally brief telegram advised M. Challemel Lacour of the murder

\* Despatch from M. Bourée, French Minister in China, to M. Challemel Lacour, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, dated Shanghai, 17th March, 1883.

of a French missionary with fourteen native Christians. Verily, if evidence were needed in support of M. Bourée's views, it was being accumulated wholesale. But the French Government would have none of these things. It demanded a full recantation of China's claims to the suzerainty of Annam; it demanded a recognition of the rights of France to the whole western portion of the peninsula of Further India; it demanded the opening of the Red River as far as Manghao; and these demands were not only formulated in a most peremptory tone, but were supported by the appearance of a powerful French squadron in Chinese waters. The Tsong-li-Yamen were now more than ever determined to uphold their rights by armed force, and to entrust their cause to the God of battles.

France in the meantime actively pursued her policy of aggression. A credit of 5,300,000 francs was demanded of the Chambers, which in a fit of spontaneous generosity voted a sum of 5,500,000 francs. The squadron in Annam waters was reinforced by one ironclad, one gunboat, six steam-launches, and two transports; 1500 Algerian troops and 1000 Annamite riflemen were ordered up to Tonkin; General Bouët, a rising officer in the Marines, was directed to assume chief command on the Red River;

M. Harmand, a comrade of Garnier in the ill-fated expedition of 1873, was nominated to the political charge of the new province of Tonkin ; and M. Bourée was recalled in disgrace from Peking, his place as Ambassador being filled by M. Tricou, then Minister in Japan, a pliant tool in the hands of the war party.

And when I use the words "war party" I use them advisedly, for in the first despatch addressed by M. Challemel Lacour to M. Tricou, in instructing him as to the course to be pursued when negotiating at Peking, the Foreign Minister writes :

"Il importe toutefois que nous soyons fixés sur la portée des préparatifs de guerre, qui d'après les indications de M. Bourée auraient pris des proportions considérables. Dans l'état où sont les choses, il ne nous est plus permis de reculer, mais il est nécessaire de savoir, si nous devons rencontrer des troupes impériales parmi nos adversaires dans le bassin du fleuve Rouge, quel en pourrait être le nombre et la valeur au point de vue militaire dans le cas où le Céleste Empire songerait réellement à s'opposer par la force à l'établissement définitif de notre protectorat au Tonkin."\*

\* Despatch from M. Challemel Lacour, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, to M. Tricou, Ambassador at Peking, dated Paris, 18th May, 1883.

Ten days after the despatch of these instructions, the Tonkin question entered on a new phase. Captain Rivière, encouraged by the success of his attack on Nam Dinh, determined to push back the Annamite forces who were encircling him on every side, and ventured on that disastrous sortie, which resulted in the signal defeat of the French troops and in his death.

With a view of averting open hostilities between the two countries, which on Rivière's death became more and more probable, the Marquis Tseng submitted a proposal to M. Challemeil Lacour, offering to withdraw all opposition to the French operations in Tonkin, if France on her part would agree to respect the integrity of Annam. At the same time, the Court of Peking resolutely refused to recognise in any way the clauses of the Treaty of 1874, as interfering with the suzerain rights of China over Annam. To this latter clause, the French declined to assent, but readily gave assurances that they had no intention whatever of operating against Annam.

Whilst these negotiations were actually in progress, M. Challemeil Lacour authorised the Minister of the Colonies to undertake an expedition against Hué, in order to compel Tu Duc to withdraw his troops, at

that time operating against Hanoi, and to punish him for his supposed complicity in the resistance offered to Rivière's expedition of the 19th May. In addition to this, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared the coasts and ports of Annam in a state of blockade. It would appear that it was the earnest desire of M. Challemel Lacour at this juncture to precipitate matters, to force China into war. In spite of his protestations that France had no intention whatever of acting against Annam, the expedition against Hué was carried out, and on the 25th August, as we have seen, the city surrendered after a severe bombardment. The young King, Tiep Hoa, who had been on the throne but a few weeks, and whose position was as yet not firmly established, was only too glad to secure peace on any terms, and on the day following the French occupation, he signed a Treaty which added one more province to the colony of Cochin-China, and placed the keys of his kingdom in the hands of the conquerors.

This fresh act of hostility only tended to increase the difficulties already existing between France and China. The Marquis Tseng was not slow in pointing out to M. Challemel Lacour the real cause of anarchy and misrule in Annam, and held out small hope of order being re-established in the province until the



withdrawal of the French forces. As he justly remarked, in times of perfect peace their troops had invaded Tonkin, and executed as pirates the regular soldiers of Tu Duc, who, in the strict performance of their duty, had defended their posts. Conduct like this was well calculated to inflame the minds even of the peaceable inhabitants against the French, and render the task of pacifying the country, to whomsoever it might fall, long, tedious, and costly.

The honour of France was, however, pledged to a colonial policy, and, as if determined to carry the policy out at all risks, M. Ferry, in order to snatch a vote from the Chambers endorsing the action of the Government in Tonkin, gravely announced that he had received a message from M. Tricou, the Ambassador at Peking, informing him that the Marquis Tseng was disavowed by Li Hung Chang. The ignorance of Frenchmen, even of French Ministers, on all subjects outside their own unhappy country, is so proverbial that it was not surprising to find the Chamber of Deputies run away with the idea that Li Hung Chang was Prime Minister of China, and that the recall of the doughty Ambassador, who had fought and defeated six successive Foreign Ministers, was imminent. The dignified despatch, in which the Marquis Tseng contradicts M. Ferry's statement on

the authority of his own Government, stands in the Yellow Book a lasting disgrace to the French Minister, who has not yet had the grace to apologise for his unjustifiable misstatement, or even to acknowledge its inaccuracy.

The further political history of the Tonkin question is soon told. On the 10th December, M. Ferry demanded a credit of 10,000,000 francs, which was voted after an interesting debate, in which the fallacy of France being able to embark on colonial enterprises was very clearly shown. There was, however, a very laudable desire on the part of the Deputies to relieve their beleaguered countrymen in the Red River, and to send reinforcements, so as to enable them to carry out with professional honour a campaign so unnecessarily entered upon, and so disastrously commenced.

On the 15th December, news reached France that the unfortunate young King, Tiep Hoa, whose reign opened under such unhappy auspices, had been poisoned by the anti-French party, that the position of the garrison at Hué was one of some danger, and that the whole of Annam had risen against its hated conquerors. That evening, M. Ferry moved a further vote for 20,000,000 francs, a sum more than enough to reinforce the garrison on the Red River, but far

from being sufficient even for the preliminary expenditure of a war with China ; and orders were forthwith issued for the organisation of an expeditionary force, which should bring up the strength of the troops on the Red River to a total of 16,000 men. The command of the whole was entrusted to General Millot, an officer of the land forces, whose advanced Republican views, more than any success he has obtained as a commander in the field, led to his selection.

## CHAPTER XII.

### THE MILITARY FORCES OF FRANCE AND CHINA.

A BRIEF summary of the armed strength of France and China may be of interest at the present moment, in enabling us to decide how far the former Power has judged rightly in treating her opponent as *un pouvoir négligeable*.

To me it seems that France will be compelled to put forth her whole strength, to indulge in a lavish expenditure of men and money, to dislocate her whole military system, in order to achieve that success which she must eventually gain if she wishes to maintain her position as a great Power. Her army is eminently unsuited for foreign service, and she has already been compelled to call for volunteers, in order to put a brigade of infantry of the line and a couple of batteries of artillery into the field.

Exclusive of the marine army, which has up to the present furnished by far the greater part of the force under Admiral Courbet's command, France possesses, in round numbers, 500,000 men with the colours, inclusive of officers and train. Of these, 140,000 joined their regiments in December, 1883, and may be dismissed from further consideration; and 127,000 joined in October, 1882, and can scarcely be looked upon as very valuable lads to embark on an Oriental campaign. In fact, at the present moment there is not a battalion in the French army which could put 150 effective bayonets into line of battle, whilst the proportion of reliable non-commissioned officers each one could furnish is far less. I have been assured by a French officer of experience and distinction that, in order to put a complete division into the field, it would be necessary not only to call out all the men of the active army now at their homes, and all men of the Reserve that are borne on the rolls of the mobilised regiments; but also to demand 4000 volunteer privates, and at least 300 non-commissioned officers, together with a very strong contingent of officers.

It is well known that General Camponon views with disfavour and apprehension the present inability of France to embark on a colonial war, and the

difficulties in the way of despatching even one brigade of the line to Tonkin will considerably strengthen his hands when presenting to the Senate his scheme for a Colonial Army. The system of filling the ranks of a battalion ordered on service by means of volunteering, is one to which all practical soldiers have a rooted objection. The late Lord Clyde, whose wide experience as a regimental officer and whose great successes as a commander equally entitle his opinion to respect, wrote and spoke most strongly on the subject. In Zululand, when skeleton battalions were hastily filled up with drafts from other corps, discipline was at a discount; and in India, the provisional battalions which assisted in the relief of Lucknow required a very great deal of leading on more than one occasion. It would be strange if it were otherwise. Civilian administrators are apt to look upon officers and men as interchangeable pieces of a machine, capable of acting with equal force in any fresh situation. They ignore the value of *camaraderie*, of *esprit de corps*, of the thousand and one little customs which vary in various regiments, and the strict observance of which impresses all ranks with a religious belief in the infallibility of *the* regiment. They ignore the fact that volunteers are eyed askance by their new comrades,

who view with contempt all fresh importations from another school, whilst the volunteers themselves are apt to regret their old home in their new barrack-room, and endeavour, until checked by visits to the cells, to carry old regimental customs with them. I remember it used to be said of a gallant and distinguished officer whose services, once thought worthy of the Victoria Cross, are now lost to the country by superannuation, that the cardinal point in his religion was, that the kingdom of heaven only could be reached through the ranks of the 90th Light Infantry. We have ample evidence in French military literature that this was the feeling which animated the old Imperial regiments. Very different is the system followed now; the battalions which have recently been despatched to Tonkin are composed of volunteers from every district in France; whilst, to take one corps as an example, the non-commissioned staff of the 2nd Battalion of the Foreign Legion has been brought to a war strength by transfers from the 50th, 108th, 117th, 126th, and 130th Regiments of the Line, and the 1st Regiment of Zouaves. The discipline in such a heterogeneous mass may well be a little slack, for motives of economy have induced the French Ministry to limit the number of officers to five per company of 200 men—a number far from

sufficient for French troops. So long as the operations progress smoothly, so long as victory graces their path, these scratch battalions will fight well enough ; but if they have to face adversity before the bonds of *camaraderie* are well cemented, it will fare badly with General Millot's command. Little can be expected from battalions with non-commissioned officers drawn from six different corps, and with men strange to their leaders and to their comrades. Unfortunately for France, the constitution of its army is such that it cannot put one complete battalion in the field, and it is obliged to have recourse to a system which, if any disaster arises in Tonkin, may lead to grave national disturbances. The military budget weighs heavily on the country, and the burden is borne, though not with cheerfulness, because the ignorance or conceit of French journalists keeps the nation in the dark as to the real condition of her army ; but, if a repetition of General Bouët's reverse occurs, if the people thoroughly realise that the enormous expenditure incurred since 1870 has given them a paper army, which cannot place 5000 men in the field without drawing reservists from their firesides, a revulsion of feeling will occur such as drove the Imperialists from the Tuileries after Sedan. Still, if France means to carry the campaign to a speedy end, she must call upon her reservists to furnish her expeditionary army ;



the untrained lads who now fill the weedy battalions of the line are all unfit to cope with the hardships of active service, nor are they sufficiently reliable troops, if we except the Algerian contingent, to trust in jungle warfare.

Of the forces which China can bring against France we have no very reliable data. On the various occasions they have opposed us we have found no difficulty in vanquishing them; and it is perhaps the remembrance of the bloodless victories achieved by Palikao that induces France once more to measure her sword with Peking. There is, however, good ground for believing that the recent craze for army reorganisation, which has imposed on European nations such heavy charges, has not been without its fruits in China, and recent observers have reported highly on the visible improvement in the Chinese forces. These are at present divided into two distinct bodies :

I. The Active Army, which comprises :

1. The Army of MANCHURIA.
2. The Army of the CENTRE.
3. The Army of TURKESTAN.

II. The Territorial Army.

*The Army of Manchuria* consists of about 70,000 men, and is recruited from amongst the most warlike inhabitants of China proper. Like the Sikhs, the people of Manchuria form as it were a military caste.

They marry amongst themselves ; cowardice in action is looked upon as, perhaps, the most deadly sin ; in fact, their religion is one in which war and bloodshed play not an inconsiderable part. This force comprises two distinct Army Corps. The head-quarters of one being at Tsitsikar—a small fortified town, the capital of Northern Manchuria, built on the Nonni, a branch of the Amoor—it bars the shortest route between the Russian possessions and Peking, and is as it were the frontier fortress watching the Czar's garrison at Blagovichensk. The Second Army Corps is quartered round Moukden, the capital of Southern Manchuria ; from this spot it menaces any force threatening to disembark in the Gulf of Pechili, and whilst thus covering the capital in this direction it also possesses facilities for concentrating in support of the corps at Tsitsikar. The Manchurian Army possesses a liberal supply of Krupp's 8-centimètre (about three-and-a-half inch) field cannon, and the men are armed chiefly with the Mauser rifle.

*The Army of the Centre*, which has its head-quarters at Kalgan, an important town lying to the north-west of Peking, consists of about 50,000 men in time of peace ; but it is capable of expansion to fully double that number in time of war. Its special function is the defence of the capital. The men are principally recruited from amongst the hardy

mountaineers of Northern China, men well skilled in the use of arms, and in whose hands the Remington, with which they are furnished, should prove a most formidable weapon. This force is well situated, not only to afford support to the corps at Tsitsikar, but to assist the Army of Moukden in repelling any landing in the Gulf of Pechili, which might have for its objective an advance on the capital, while at the same time its western garrisons are connecting links with the Army of Turkestan. A large number of irregular troops recruited from the Mongol tribes of Western China have recently been incorporated (through the exertions of the indefatigable Minister, Li Hung Chang) with the Army of the Centre, and these men are garrisoned chiefly in sea-coast towns on the Gulf of Pechili. Owing to their organisation and armament, they would prove formidable foes in a warfare conducted on the principles laid down by Colonel Gordon in his recent memorandum.

*The Army of Turkestan*, which proved its military qualities in the campaign against Yakoob Beg, is entrusted with the defence of the western province of the empire; it is too distant from Peking to afford any assistance to the Armies of Manchuria or the Centre, should a sudden descent be made on the seaboard; but if China were to delay the opening

of operations by lengthened negotiations, there is no reason why the defence of Turkestan should not be entrusted to its local militia, and the trained and well-equipped regular troops pushed southward and eastward to harass an enemy.

*The Territorial Army* has replaced, to a great extent, the militia or Army of the Green Standard, which, in former days, was entrusted with the defence of the country, and which was then organised in corps, under the command of the Governors of provinces, each of the eighteen provinces of China Proper furnishing one corps. Now a more permanent system has been adopted. The whole eighteen corps are under the central administration of the Minister of War, each provincial governor being entrusted merely with the duty of providing funds for the maintenance of his disposable troops. Each corps has its own commander, reporting direct to the Minister at Tientsin; and whilst the numbers are kept down in peace time, rolls of able-bodied inhabitants are furnished by the civil authorities; these permit of an easy augmentation of the force should necessity arise. The strength of each corps depends entirely on the population of the province, those on the sea-coast furnishing a stronger proportion than those inland. We have no means of ascertaining the exact strength of the Territorial Army, but recent writers,

notably the author of a very excellent article in the "Nuova Antologia," place the cadres at about 200,000, with capabilities of expansion, should war arise, to nearly a million. When we endeavour to realise that the population of China Proper, exclusive of the outlying provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, Thibet, Dzungaria, and Turkestan, exceeds 350,000,000 souls, these figures seem by no means extravagant when compared with European armaments.

According to Behm and Wagner's "Die Bevölkerung der Erde," published at Gotha last year, the administrative divisions of China Proper were as follows :

PROVINCES.	INHABITANTS.
Pechili . . . . .	28,000,000
Shantun . . . . .	29,000,000
Kiangsu . . . . .	38,000,000
Nganhoi . . . . .	34,000,000
Kiangsi . . . . .	23,000,000
Chekian . . . . .	8,000,000
Fokien . . . . .	15,000,000
Quangtung . . . . .	19,000,000
Quangsi . . . . .	7,000,000
Yunnan . . . . .	6,000,000
Quaichow . . . . .	5,000,000
Sechuen . . . . .	35,000,000
Kansu . . . . .	10,000,000
Schensi . . . . .	10,000,000
Schansi . . . . .	14,000,000
Honan . . . . .	23,000,000
Houhe . . . . .	27,000,000
Houan . . . . .	19,000,000
	<hr/>
	350,000,000

To these must be added the following outlying provinces, from which, it must be remembered, a very large proportion of the regular standing army is recruited :

PROVINCES.	INHABITANTS.
Manchuria . . . . .	12,000,000
Mongolia . . . . .	2,000,000
Thibet . . . . .	6,000,000
Dzungaria . . . . .	600,000
Turkestan . . . . .	580,000
Corea . . . . .	8,500,000
	<hr/>
	29,680,000

Giving a grand total, with China Proper, of nearly 380,000,000 souls.

The military qualities of the contingents furnished by the various provinces naturally vary very considerably: when we consider climatic and other considerations, it is difficult to imagine that it could be otherwise. The Manchurians, descended from war-like ancestors, have retained their bellicose qualities; whilst the Mongolians, owing to the hard life of exposure they lead, and their constant feuds with neighbouring tribes, are still more reliable soldiers. The highlanders of Yunnan and Quangsi, of Schansi and Honan, are by no means despicable foes, and under good leadership, like highlanders all the world over, are capable of great things. But the vast

mass of the population of Central China is of an essentially peaceable disposition, and though the seafaring population on the coasts might furnish some good men, the troops from the heart of the country are not what we should consider good soldiers. They are devoid of warlike instincts, and their military training has not been sufficient to convert them into a formidable force.

In many of the eastern provinces, a European system of drill has been introduced; but as instructors have been borrowed from Russia and from Germany, from England and from France, the result has not been of such a nature as to satisfy the eye of a drill-sergeant. "In the multitude of counsellors there is wisdom," but it is doubtful if the efficiency of an army is increased by the multitude of its tactical systems. The superior officers, however, have wisely restricted the manœuvres to those absolutely necessary for simple changes of formation, and it is said these are fairly well executed by the majority of regiments. Large sums have been expended in order to secure that uniformity of equipment which Colonel Gordon so strongly insisted on, and which, under the old system of each governor being responsible for the army of his own province, was impossible. At the present moment nearly the

whole of the Territorial forces are armed with the Mauser rifle, and recent contracts with Krupp have resulted in the importation into China of 700 breech-loading field-guns of a calibre of about three-and-a-half inches, besides a large number of heavier guns, furnished from Essen and Elswick, which are devoted to the defence of the fortresses.

In 1860, the Tartar horsemen did not show to much advantage when opposed to the K. D. G.'s or to those magnificent regiments which Fane and Probyn led against them. The stalwart British troopers and the fine Sikh swordsmen, mounted on big horses, overrode the brave little Mongols on their wiry ponies, but the Tartars were not deficient in bravery, and there was a day when, had it not been for the watchful eye of a young subaltern of Fane's Horse, the French would have lost a battery. The gallantry which prompted that dashing charge of 100 Sikh troopers into 4000 Tartar horse has since been shown on many a hard-fought field, and perhaps no one contributed more to the success of our operations in Afghanistan in 1878-80 than Sir Charles Macgregor.

But if unsuited to regular warfare, the Tartar horsemen are admirably adapted for irregular fighting. Individually brave and self-reliant, they would be



most useful in harrying an enemy's line of communication, in cutting off convoys, and in necessitating great caution in an advance. Should France carry the war away from the friendly shelter of the Red River, she will need a strong force of cavalry to cope with these hardy troopers, who will worry her like mosquitoes, and whom it will be equally impossible to exterminate.

There is no doubt that the Chinese army is unsuited to take the field in regular operations against a European foe ; its only chance of success lies in irregular warfare. As Chinese Gordon reminded them, their strength lies in their numbers, in their powers of marching, and in the smallness of their requirements. The Chinese army, he said, should never venture on a pitched battle ; it should harass an enemy by every means in its power, cut off his convoys, deprive him of rest by constant night attacks, draw him away from his base, compel him to waste his strength in fruitless attacks on entrenched towns, and leave the climate to decimate his ranks. This seems to be the policy already adopted with such successful results in Tonkin, and which in all probability will be followed in its entirety should the French continue their operations.

In comparing the navies of the two Powers, we

have more reliable data to work on. Many distinguished British admirals have recently been at some trouble to prove that the French fleet is the equal, if not the superior, of our own. If such is the case, there is no doubt that France could spare a squadron which would be able without much difficulty to sweep the Chinese fleet, formidable as it is, off the seas. But there are one or two vital adjuncts to naval warfare which must be taken into consideration in discussing the value of a navy, and these are wanting to our neighbours. In the first place, no fleet can now keep the sea unless it has immense stores of coal to draw upon, and these stores must be close at hand; secondly, officers and men must be in a state of high training, and this only can be effected by the constant assembling of evolutionary squadrons. France, unfortunately for herself, possesses no coal supplies; she is dependent entirely on foreign nations—even her railways look to England for their fuel; and it is difficult to conceive how her Eastern fleet could keep the sea for four-and-twenty hours were English ships and English coal denied her. Even the transports conveying reinforcements to Tonkin are dependent for their motive power on foreign assistance, and it is quite within the capacity of the fast cruisers of China

to prevent either coal or reinforcements reaching their destination.

As to the *personnel* of the French navy, it is fair to look upon; but, if we except the hardy fishing population of the northern coasts, I doubt whether a British captain would not sooner have a Chinaman in the fore-castle than a "Johnny Crapaud." In British naval circles at any rate, the contempt that Nelson felt for a French sailor still holds sway; and having seen French seamen in fair weather and in foul, I am inclined to think that contempt is not wholly undeserved. Undoubtedly there are many officers in her navy, as Garnier and Rivière showed us, who are brave even to rashness, and skilled in arts beyond the immediate sphere of their own profession.

But if France possesses one of the finest navies in the world, China has not been behindhand in securing a very formidable fleet, and the following tabular statement will show that France will need to put forth all her strength to cope with the vessels China can place against her. Of the powerful iron-clads which head the list, two are now in Eastern waters, and they are more than a match for any ship France can despatch to Admiral Courbet's support. Upwards of forty vessels in the Chinese fleet carry

armour-piercing guns, whilst many of them have such high rates of steaming that, irrespective of their armament, they would prove very effective cruisers in hampering the movements of the French squadron. Sir William Armstrong's powerful gunboats and his still more dangerous torpedo launches will prove very effective in coast defence. These, together with the heavy Krupp guns and vast array of torpedoes of various sorts, now stored in Chinese arsenals, ought to make the near approach of a French squadron to the shore a matter of considerable danger. If China, in the event of war with France, can retain the services of her present very efficient naval instructors, it is quite within the bounds of possibility that she may be enabled to inflict at the outset of a war some very serious defeats on the French fleets, and if, as I have said before, the use of British coal be denied to France, her operations must of necessity be brought to a disastrous termination.

The following shows the more formidable ships in the Chinese fleet :

Name.	Armament.	Tonnage.	Horse-power.	Speed in Knots.	Crew.	Armour plates of 14" thickness.
1. Ting Yuen ...	4 12" Guns ...	7430	6200	14½	300	Armour plates of 14" thickness.
	5 8" " ...					
	2 5" " ...					
	8 Nordenfeldts ...					
	2 Torpedo boats ...					
	2 Torpedo tubes ...					
2. Chen Yuen ...	Same ...	7430	6200	14½	300	" "
3. (In Stettin) ...	Same ...	7430	6200	14½	300	" "
4. Tion Sin ...	1 6" Krupp ...	195	450	12	40	{ Armour plates of 10" thickness.
5. Hong Sin ...	" " ...	195	450	12	40	{
6. Alpha ...	1 27-ton Armstrong	310	310	10	30	Armour plates of 14" to 10".
7. Beta ...	1 27-ton "	310	310	10	30	" "
8. Gamma ...	1 38-ton "	400	310	9	30	" "
9. Delta ...	1 38-ton "	400	310	9	30	" "
10. Epsilon ...	{ 1 35-ton "	440	380	10	30	" "
	{ 2 Nordenfeldts }					
11. Zeta ...	" "	440	380	10	30	" "
12. Eta ...	" "	440	380	10	30	" "
13. Theta ...	" "	440	380	10	30	" "
14. Iota ...	{ 1 25-ton Armstrong }	440	380	10	30	" "
	{ 2 Nordenfeldts }					
15. Kappa...	" "	440	380	10	30	" "

Name.	Armament.	Tonnage.	Horse-power.	Speed in Knots.	Crew.	
16. Lamma	{ 1 25-ton Armstrong ... } { 2 Nordenfeldts ... }	440	380	10	30	Armour plates of 14" to 10".
17. Chao Yung	{ 2 26-ton Armstrong } { 4 40-pdr " ... }	1350	2600	16	120	Steel corvettes.
18. Tang wei	" " " "	1350	2600	16	120	" "
19. Kiangsu	" " " "	1000	2000	17	120	" "
20. Yangwoo	1 8" Whitworth ... 12 6" " "	1600	1250	15	300	" "
21. Yang Tse	22 9" Krupp ... 2 6" " " 20 5" " "	1450	750	12	180	Iron corvette.
22. Yungwoo	1 12-ton Armstrong... 8 40-pdr. "	1450	1000	15	180	" "
23. Yungpao	3 7" Vavasseur guns 2 5" " "	1450	600	10	180	Wooden corvette.
24. Hai King	" " " "	1450	600	10	180	" "
25. Chen Hang	" " " "	1450	600	10	180	" "
26. Wan Ngang	" " " "	1450	600	10	180	" "
27. Wo Kai	" " " "	1450	600	10	180	" "
28. Fai Yau	1 7" Vavasseur gun... 6 40-pdr. "	1250	600	10	150	Iron sloop.
29. Foopoo	" " " "	1250	1000	12	150	" "
30. Teng-yin chen...	" " " "	1250	1000	12	150	" "

Name.	Armament.	Tonnage.	Horse-power.	Speed in Knots.	Crew.	
31. Tai Ngau	1 7" Vavasseur gun... 6 40-pdr.	1250	1000	12	150	Iron sloop.
32. Tsi Ngau	" "	1250	1000	12	150	"
33. Yuan Kai	" "	1250	1000	12	150	"
34. Kang Tsi	" "	1250	1000	12	150	"
35. Wei Yuan	" "	1250	1000	12	150	"
36. Chanyun	" "	1250	1000	12	150	"
37. Fu cheng	1 18-ton Armstrong..	180	250	10	60	8" armour-plate.
38. Kiu cheng	" "	180	250	10	60	"
39. Cheu wai	2 7" Vavasseur guns 2 40-pdr. Armstrongs	600	600	10	100	Wooden corvette.
40. Tsing yen	" "	600	600	10	100	"
41. Chen Hai	" "	600	600	10	100	"
42. King sung	1 7" Vavasseur gun... 4 40-pdr. Armstrongs	500	600	10	75	"
43. Mai yau	" "	500	600	10	75	"
44. Nie sung	" "	500	600	10	75	"
45. Fu Sing	" "	500	600	10	75	"
46. Hok Sing	1 7-ton Vavasseur ...	120	250	12	35	Ironclad gunboat, 8" plate.
47. Tinghai	" "	120	250	12	35	"
48. Chen To	" "	120	250	12	35	"

In addition to the above, the Chinese possess twenty screw corvettes of various sizes, carrying rifled guns of a lighter calibre,—chiefly Armstrong's forty-pounders—besides fifteen paddle-steamers, which are borne on the Navy List as transports, and which may be usefully employed in transporting troops from the northern ports during the ensuing rainy season, when operations in Tonkin will be forbidden to the French. Recent purchases in Germany and in England of twenty-five torpedo boats have also strengthened China's defensive resources; so that at sea, France, or indeed any European Power, would find her far from being "un pouvoir négligeable." Our own experience of Chinese seamen, especially of late years, proves them to be made of stern stuff; in the Peninsular and Oriental service they are especially useful, and, no doubt, many thousands could be found who have mastered their profession in the practical school of British seamanship. It is in officers that China would find herself deficient, but just as Bishop Pigneau de Béhaine found French gentlemen willing to undertake the command of the forces of King Gia Long one hundred years ago, so the Marquis Tseng would find no difficulty in providing efficient leaders for the magnificent fleet China has at her disposal. In fact, at sea, as well as on land, France must



prepare herself for an obstinate resistance by forces in which the European element is not wholly wanting.

A march on Peking would be by no means the holiday campaign of 1860 ; the forts at the mouth of the Peiho have been considerably strengthened, and are now defended by very heavy Krupp guns. The Chinese, thanks to their own mechanical powers and the initiation of their European employés, possess arsenals at Nankin, Shanghai, Lianchow, Foochow, Tientsin, and Canton, where repairs of all sorts can be executed, rifled cannon cast, cartridges manufactured ; and they have a powder factory capable of turning out 3000lbs. of excellent powder per day. Recent purchases in America and Europe have, however, so filled her magazines that no strain would be felt by the home factories, unless a campaign of prolonged duration was waged. In having stores at hand, and ample means for replenishing them, China possesses one great advantage over France, and though, finally, France must emerge triumphant from the struggle, if she values her political existence, a comparison of the resources of the two countries shows us that if China will but follow the advice of her old leader, there is every chance of her prolonging the war until, in the interests of commerce, other

European Powers interfere and compel France to accept terms which will be but a just reward for the policy devoid (as the Marquis Tseng wrote) of "all honour and justice," which she has so systematically pursued.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### FRANCE AS A COLONIAL POWER.

ANY efforts made by the French towards the re-establishment of a colonial empire must of necessity be of interest to Englishmen. We are unable to forget the desperate attempts made by our neighbours at the end of the last and commencement of this century to destroy our colonial supremacy and to ruin our commerce ; whilst every glance at a map serves to remind them that many of the most flourishing colonies of the British Crown were once dependencies of the Fleur-de-Lys. But as the lilies of France have withered and faded so have the colonies of France dropped away from the parent tree, and with the exception of Algeria and some few distant possessions which add vastly to the expenditure without adding to its glory, the Republic can boast of no colonial territories. It is difficult to realise

what gave birth to this new craze for colonial expansion in the brains of French Ministers. It is not as if the experiments of the last century had been crowned with success; it is not as if there had been no humiliating treaties by which her colonies had passed into other hands; it is not as if the administration of her few colonies had been marked by any pecuniary advantages; nor as if her surplus population showed any inclination to flock to a New France in Oriental seas. The whole colonial history of France is simply the recital of one gigantic failure. No greater condemnation of the present policy could be found than in the rejection by the Chamber on the 29th December, 1883, of M. Waldeck Rousseau's bill for a loan of 2,000,000 francs to encourage emigration to Algeria, or than in the publication of the fact that the annual number of emigrants from France does not exceed 4000, none of whom (with the exception of about 300, who visit Algeria) proceed to French colonies. Indeed, the bureaucracy, the petty tyrannies of subordinate officials, which is so marked in the mother country, are reproduced in an aggravated form in French colonies; and the freedom for which the expatriated man sighs is denied him if he merely translates his lares and penates to a dependency of the Republic.

Préfets and sous-préfets, maires and their adjoints, précepteurs of contributions directes and indirectes, bureaux of enregistrement, bureaux of octroi, bureaux of police, bureaux of douanes, juges de paix, juges of the tribunal civil and of the tribunal correctionnel, greffiers and huissiers, and all the hundred and one tyrants who tend to make life insupportable to the man who longs for freedom, all flourish with tropical profusion and with more than their native vigour in the colonies of France. When the emigrant leaves Havre or Marseilles he flatters himself that he is now leaving a land where one half the population is taxed in order that the other half may wear a uniform ; but when he lands in his new home he finds the proportion of officials to private Frenchmen as ten is to one, and he then realises that his only hope of escaping vexatious and inquisitorial supervision is to accept some subordinate post himself, don the kepi, and abandon all hope of a free life. That this is well understood in France may be gleaned from the fact that over ninety per cent. of French emigrants eschew their own and migrate to British colonies. Even men of business who go abroad, not to colonise but to develop their own trade and to create new branches for their home establishments, flock to the free cities of Calcutta and Bombay, rather than to Chander-

nagore and Pondicherry, to British rather than French Guiana, to Singapore and Rangoon rather than Saigon.

Conscious of their own failure as colonisers, but ignorant of the true causes why they have been unsuccessful, the French, every now and again, make fresh efforts to found new colonies. Every now and again, the French press bursts forth with some new impracticable scheme for the foundation of a Nouvelle France in some tropical jungle. Climatic considerations are of naught to a French Minister; the broiling banks of the Congo, the malarious marshes of Tonkin, the rocky ravines of Madagascar, each and all offer outlets for French ambition, and present fields of emigration for the able-bodied youth of France. The editor in his easy-chair, and the Minister in the tribune, appear to have but one idea as to the method by which colonisation can be carried out, by which civilisation can be introduced, and this method is—conquest. M. Waldeck Rousseau, as Minister of the Interior, brings forward a Bill by which loans are to be made to intending emigrants, in order to assist them in driving the indigenous Algerians from the soil of their fathers. M. de Grainville, with equal *naïveté*, writes :

“Pour introduire la civilisation à Madagascar, il faut commencer par faire la conquête de l’île, chose

beaucoup plus facile qu'on ne pense, et qui serait loin, bien loin de coûter aussi cher en hommes et en argent qu'on en a dépensé pour prendre Alger. Je suis convaincu qu'il ne faudrait pas plus de quatorze mille de nos troupes et de six mille nègres enrégimentés et disciplinés, pour faire et conserver cette conquête. Si plus tard on sentait le besoin d'augmenter les troupes noires, la côte d'Afrique nous fournirait autant d'hommes que nous en pourrions désirer. Ce suppose donc que le Gouvernement rassuré sur la paix du monde, veuille entreprendre la conquête de Madagascar, et que pour former le plan de ses opérations, il fasse un appel aux renseignements que pourraient lui offrir ceux qui ont des notions sur ce pays, j'y répons en exposant ce que ma connaissance des lieux et mon expérience me font juger propre à assurer le succès de l'entreprise.

“ Il faudrait se prendre longtemps d'avance pour la préparer, commencer par engager à la côte occidentale d'Afrique pour douze ou quinze ans au moins, six mille hommes dont on formerait six régiments, les transporter immédiatement à Mayotte et à Bourbon, où l'on s'occuperait de leur instruction militaire. Pour officiers jusqu'au grade de capitaine-inclusivement, d'abord, leur donner des mulâtres de nos colonies ou de jeunes esclaves émancipés que leur

conduite rendrait dignes de cette faveur. Il s'en présenterait un si grand nombre que l'on n'aurait que l'embarras du choix. Je propose des mulâtres ou des noirs parce que l'expérience a prouvé que le climat de Madagascar n'est pas à redouter pour eux, que, pendant que l'instruction de ces régiments aurait lieu à Bourbon ou à Mayotte, on transporterait de France dans ces dépôts les approvisionnements de tous genres nécessaires à l'expédition. À Mayotte, on s'occuperait à dresser deux ou trois cents bœufs pour le service de l'artillerie, on confectionnerait un millier de bâts pour ceux qu'en débarquant on emploierait aux transports des vivres et du bagage indispensable de l'expédition. Dès que le temps nécessaire pour compléter ces préparatifs serait à peu près écoulé, vingt vaisseaux de ligne embarqueraient chacun sept cents hommes et, accompagnés de huit ou dix grands bâtiments à vapeur, se rendraient à Bourbon et à Mayotte, pour prendre les régiments noirs et une partie des approvisionnements qui y auraient été déposés. Je demande des vaisseaux de ligne afin de n'avoir que le moins de navires possible. Une flotte de trente voiles éprouve moins de pertes de temps en route qu'une autre de cinquante.

“L'expédition réunie se rendrait dans la baie de Bombétoque pour faire son débarquement. Une



première division des troupes blanches serait d'abord mise à terre, ensuite les régiments noirs, et enfin le reste des troupes blanches. Aussitôt les régiments noirs à terre, la première division devra se porter quelques lieues en avant et être suivie le lendemain de la seconde division, afin d'être le plus promptement possible à une vingtaine de lieues de la mer et en pays sain. Les noirs resteraient sur la côte, pour recevoir et garder tout ce que l'escadre aurait à débarquer.

“On pensera avec raison que la longueur des préparatifs aura donné le temps aux Hovas d'en être instruits et d'en faire de leur côte ; c'est ce qu'il y aura de plus heureux pour nous. Dans les premiers mois ils seront pleins d'ardeur, et réuniront tout ce qu'ils pourront d'hommes pour nous repousser. Il serait à désirer qu'ils fussent bien fixés sur le lieu du débarquement afin d'y concentrer toutes leurs forces. Comme il est impossible qu'ils résistent au choc de nos troupes, le combat sera d'autant plus désastreux pour eux qu'ils seront plus nombreux. Dès le moment qu'ils reculeront, leur déroute sera complète et leur extermination commencera en même temps. Les Sakalaves et les Bénimtsaras qu'ils auront forcés à grossir leurs rangs se tourneront contre eux et les massacreront sans pitié. Après la première

bataille, nos troupes arriveront à la capitale sans recevoir, sans tirer un coup de fusil. Les auxiliaires Sakalaves et Bénimtsaras qui marcheront en avant et sur nos flancs ne nous permettront plus de voir l'ennemi.

“ Une fois établi à Tananarive, le chef n'aurait plus qu'à faire marcher des troupes en petit nombre vers quelques points principaux de l'île, en les faisant tenir toujours dans l'intérieur tandis que les régiments noirs garderaient les côtes et empêcheraient toute tentative de soulèvement.

“ Il ne resterait plus qu'à envoyer des émigrants blancs dans ce pays ; c'est à cela que le Gouvernement devrait apporter le plus grand soin et faire, sans parcimonie, quoiqu'avec l'économie possible, les frais considérables et cependant nécessaires pour le transport de familles européennes. Le gouverneur général ferait à chacune des concessions de terre, d'abord dans un rayon un peu court afin de les protéger et aussi pour que leurs rapports entre elles soient plus appréciables pour les naturels. Ce sera le grand moyen d'introduire la civilisation.”

“ *Ce sera le grand moyen d'introduire la civilisation* ”—to massacre without pity the defenders of their own country, people who have shown no disposition to interfere with peaceable settlers, and

against whom the French have not the shadow of a pretext of a quarrel. This is apparently "le grand moyen d'introduire la civilisation." Many a smile has been called up by Victor Hugo's absurd description, in "L'Histoire d'un Crime," of the mob at the Paris barricade standing spell-bound at the sight of a solitary infantry soldier moving majestically towards them. "*C'est l'avant garde de la civilisation,*" was the hushed whisper that passed from man to man as the baggy-breeched, badly-clothed, abominably set-up, dirty little ruffian, abandoning his colours, joined the howling mob, who then, as since, have been ever the bitterest foes of law, of order, of any form of government. M. de Grainville's publication has given a new meaning to Victor Hugo's words. It is by force that France hopes to spread French civilisation in countries yet too weak to stand up against French arms, too ignorant even to cope with French tactics. Admiral Courbet's Turcos are the advance guard of the civilisation France designs to bestow on Tonkin.

Is civilisation to be introduced into Annam by means of the cowardly butcheries of the fugitives from Hué, for recounting which in the pages of the *Figaro* a naval officer was removed from the service? Is Tonkin to be civilised by the wholesale execution of prisoners, as carried out by Captain

Rivière, in defiance of the strict orders of his immediate superior, and by Admiral Courbet, without remonstrance from his Government? Does France hope that her cause will be improved by the conduct of her troops, who refuse quarter because they recognised the bodies of some slain Turcos lying beheaded on the ground? Turcos have been known to mutilate even European foes, and in meeting the Black Flags they are face to face with an enemy who can and will repay them their cruelties in their own coin. Is Madagascar to be civilised by the bombardment of open villages by the heavy guns of a fleet, of villages which can make no attempt to reply even to rifled small arms, and which had never heard the sound of cannon before they felt the effect of French shell? If Sedan has been eclipsed by Son Tay, as one French paper hysterically affirmed, surely Bazeilles has been avenged in the burnings of Tamatave and of the environs of Hué.

It is a disgrace to the Christian world that a country calling itself civilised should burn and slay, should pillage and massacre, and these not with the definite object of repressing turbulent tribes, of checking wanton aggression, but merely with the view of spreading civilisation. God save the mark! Europe has more than once remonstrated with Turkey

for cruelties practised on its own subjects ; it once banded together to teach France a lesson, which, though repeated thirteen years ago by United Germany, seems to have been forgotten ; but surely it is to the interest of mankind to prevent war and devastation being carried into all quarters of the globe. We have no hesitation, in private life, in apprehending a criminal who sets our neighbour's ricks on fire, and we do so not more on our neighbour's account than on our own, fearing that our ricks may be the next to suffer.

France seems determined to alienate every ally, to outrage European feelings, to emulate the days of the First Revolution. The bitter attacks of her semi-official press on Germany ; the wanton insult tardily apologised for to the King of Spain ; the outrageous conduct of her Ambassador at Irun ; the persistent annoyances at the Ecrehos Rocks off the coast of Jersey ; the double-faced dealings with regard to Admiral Pierre ; the cruelties of Brazza on the Congo ; the unjustifiable bombardment of the Malagayan towns ; the studied insolence to the Chinese Ambassador ; and the unnecessary and barbarously-conducted warfare in Tonkin, all show a disregard of international courtesies, which does not need the ministerial persecution of the clergy and

the venomous attacks on all monarchical institutions by a press which is granted licence but denied liberty, to teach us that the spirit of evil is abroad in France, and that it will not be long before Europe will have once more to take measures to suppress the firebrand which so constantly lights the torch of war in her midst.

England, with her boundless wealth, her marvellous commerce, her enormous colonial empire, is the *bête noir* of France. It was England's wealth that at last crushed Napoleon, it is England's wealth that now inspires France with dreams of ambition, and these dreams portend no good to us.

One hundred years ago, Louis XVI. offered money and ships and men to put King Gia Long on the throne of Annam, and the principal reason for embarking on such a distant enterprise, as good Bishop Pigneau de Béhaine is careful to tell us, was to weaken England's commerce in time of peace, and to secure a base to attack her Indian possessions in time of war. Ten years ago, Dupuis pushed up the Red River to Yunnan, in order to forestall us in opening a trade route with Western China, and Garnier's fatal indiscretion was prompted by the same cause. It is idle for France to attempt to cope with us as a maritime Power, but in time of war she can do us

incalculable damage so long as the present Treaty of Paris remains in force. In times of peace she does her utmost to ruin our trade by the imposition of heavy duties and of equally onerous bounties. Every fresh conquest made by France, every new Custom-house over which the Tricolour flies, is an injury to the trade of the world; the heavy duties realised help to reconcile the exiled Frenchman to his new home, but they do France no ultimate good, whilst they inflict on Germany and England—the two trading nations of Europe and the two hereditary foes of France—untold harm.

Germany and England are alike secure from invasion by the Republic, but their commerce is dangerously open to attack, provided France can secure some fresh territory which shall give her that priceless necessary for modern warfare—coal. With a naval station in Cochin-China drawing its supplies from the immense coal-fields of Quang Yen, our trade with China would be paralysed, our outlying Oriental possessions grievously threatened, and our colonial military budget necessarily increased. It must be remembered that our steam mercantile fleet numbers close on 5000 vessels, with an aggregate tonnage of over 6,000,000, whilst our sailing fleet, with an equal tonnage, exceeds 18,000 ships. The havoc that

well-found cruisers could create in such an armada can readily be imagined. Retaliation is impossible; France does not possess 500 steamboats and only just 2000 sailing ships, some hundreds of these being the unseaworthy coffins which annually drown a large proportion of the manhood of Brittany off the coasts of Newfoundland. Every additional harbour occupied by France in the fair way of our great trade routes threatens our maritime supremacy, and her occupation of Tonkin and Madagascar menaces us in no small degree. It is no use for us to stand idly by because peace now reigns and to allow France to enlarge her border, trusting to our usual good fortune in war to enable us to transfer more French colonies to the British flag. No doubt, the ease with which we captured the West Indian Islands in 1796, and recaptured them in 1809, have clearly demonstrated the possibility of our performing a like feat whenever opportunity might arise; but prevention is better than cure, and by adopting a firm attitude now, and by acting cordially with China and Germany, who are both equally interested with ourselves in checking the development of France, we shall save ourselves an immensity of trouble in the future.

There are, of course, many who profess to trace the hand of Prince Bismarck in this colonial activity



of France. It may well be that he would wish to see the Republic fruitlessly expending its strength in distant enterprises; but where those enterprises threaten Germany's new-born commerce, the Prince is not the man to permit them to gather head. No one knows better than Prince Bismarck that the real weakness of France is within her own borders, and that her life-blood is being sapped by her enormous internal expenditure. The millions wasted on useless public works, on armies of worthless functionaries, on subsidising venomous prints, on bribing mutinous officials, and in granting douceurs to unprincipled Ministers—all these things tend to weaken France far more than a few million francs spent in shelling Tamatave or in equipping Brazza. So long as France pushes her filibustering expedition in regions where German interests will not be affected, the veteran Chancellor will note with satisfaction any and all efforts which will weaken the Republic financially; but the war in Tonkin is a different matter. Germany is just developing a valuable trade with China, second only to our own. Her ships have shown the German flag even in the waters of the Red River of Tonkin, and her statesmen and merchants are realising the fact that her future greatness is dependent as much on the extension

of her commerce as on the increase of her military glory.

This development of wealth has been retarded by the necessity of maintaining those huge standing armies which in 1870 so well avenged the disasters of Jena; but united Germany in 1884 can afford to look with equanimity on the vapourings of exasperated France. An attack on isolated Prussia was a feat within the bounds of possibility—one which France, thirteen years ago, thought was as easy of accomplishment as in the year 1806. Imperial Germany is a foe from which even French conceit shrinks from encountering; and thus secure in her own strength, Germany can now turn her thoughts to those acts of peace which she sees have been the real source of England's strength. Whilst still retaining her proud position as the first military nation, Germany is rapidly assuming a very high position in the maritime world, and at the present moment possesses a mercantile fleet exceeded only by those of England and France. Any action on the part of the Republic which would tend to injure German trade would be very warmly resented, and China is fully aware of this. If the war can be localised in Tonkin, the trade of the Treaty Ports not interfered with, and commerce between Europe and China permitted to

flow unchecked, Germany may view the operations with unconcern ; but it is unlikely that either France or China will consent to such a course. Already the *mot d'ordre* has gone forth that China must be made to pay the cost of the expedition, and French ministerial journals are demanding excessive war indemnities.

General Millot will have considerable difficulty in drawing dollars from Pekin to the Red River, unless he visits the Summer Palace with a force considerably larger than that which Palikao and Hope Grant commanded three-and-twenty years ago, and it may be, in her mad greed for glory, that France will carry the war into the eastern provinces of China. Disastrous as such a course would be for the sea-port towns, there is no doubt that eventually it would be for the benefit of the Court of Pekin. Europe has already judged between the two Powers. There is not a journal of any weight which has not definitely pronounced against the conduct of France in this uncalled-for war, and which has not denounced both the cruelty with which it is being waged and the wanton spirit of aggression with which it was commenced. The latter might have been overlooked, had there been a prospect that France would have introduced the blessings of peace into

her newly acquired colonies ; but the spirit which insists on the compulsory use of the French language in all French colonies, which insists on compulsory military service amongst the indigenous races of Cochin-China and Algeria, which insists on the observance of the Code Napoléon by Europeans, Mohammedans, and Buddhists alike, which compels the criminals of Annam to undergo their sentences in the prisons of Toulon and Rochelle, is not the spirit by which new colonies are made. Algeria, though conquered fifty years ago, is not yet pacified, and though French garrisons have held the forts on the Red River for ten years, no European is safe beyond the range of the sentries' rifles, and it may safely be inferred that the cruelties perpetrated by the conquerors have tended not a little to delay the task of pacification.

The Sikhs in the Punjab, and the Pathans of our trans-Indus provinces, welcomed the even-handed justice meted out by the Lawrences, Edwardes, and Nicholson. After the tortures and cruelties of the Sikh rulers, and of Avitabile and his French coadjutors, English justice was mercy to them ; and, immediately after the campaign of 1849, we held the trans-Indus provinces from Kohat to Scinde without the aid of a single British soldier. For five-and-twenty years, the

turbulent tribes who inhabit the eastern slopes of the Suliman range have been kept in check by native troops recruited from those very provinces we conquered after Chillianwalla. Since 1849, upwards of thirty expeditions have been undertaken beyond our border, to punish refractory neighbours, and in twenty of these the strange spectacle has been witnessed of Mussulman troops led by British officers coercing their own co-religionists, and this, too, without the support of that thin red line which Dr. Russell has immortalised in our language. To my mind, one of the most striking monuments of England's greatness is to be found in those pacified provinces on the trans-Indus frontier, which in 1848 Sir Herbert Edwardes described as paradise peopled by devils. To-day, an English lady might ride from Kohat to Kurrachee with as little fear of molestation as if she were riding in the Row. And all this has been accomplished, not by the indiscriminate hanging of prisoners, as by Rivière in Tonkin, nor by the indiscriminate butchery of fugitives, as by Courbet at Hué, nor by the beheading of all captured men, as by Bouët at Hanoi, but by taking into our confidence and into our service those loyal servants of the Lahore Raj who fought against us in defence of their kingdom, and who have since been equally loyal servants of their new masters.

Instead of rigidly applying the law of England to the natives of India, we have grafted their laws on to our own and produced a code remarkable for simplicity, whilst the officers to whom its execution is entrusted show themselves, indeed, too often inclined to temper justice with mercy. It is this, perhaps, which permits us to entrust the protection of our colonies, comprising upwards of 8,000,000 square miles, with over 250,000,000 inhabitants, to a British force amounting in the aggregate to under 70,000 men, composed of 10 regiments of cavalry, 69 battalions of infantry, and 107 batteries. France, with a colonial empire of 380,000 square miles—less than one-twentieth of that of England—employs, not to protect but to overawe the 6,000,000 souls over whom she holds sway, 19 regiments of cavalry, 135 battalions of infantry, and 72 batteries. No more striking contrast could be adduced between the colonial system of France and England than a comparison of their foreign armies. India, with a population of 150,000,000, is garrisoned by 50,000 British troops, whilst Tunis and Algeria, with less than 3,000,000 souls, necessitate an army of occupation 75,000 strong!

It is now upwards of fifty years since we acquired permanent rights in the western provinces of the

peninsula of Further India, and our own experience of Burmah proves how little suited for colonisation is the neighbouring territory of Annam. Wealth can indeed be amassed by merchants and small capitalists who embark in the rice, indigo, or tea trades; and perhaps, in the mountainous regions, the life of a planter may not be without its enjoyments. But to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow is forbidden to the European in the far East; and we, recognising this fact, have turned our stream of emigrants to more temperate climates, and have only sought to develop native industries in Oriental countries. It is perhaps for this reason that the Kingdom of Annam has never been looked upon as a field for English enterprise, although, upwards of two centuries ago, some of our fellow-countrymen established a factory in Tonkin. A regular trade was then commenced between the Red River and Bengal, and English vessels plied between Calcutta and Haiphong; but the daughters of Tonkin were fair to look on, and were not endowed with more virtue than their sisters on the banks of the Irawaddy, nor were the morals of the early traders proof to their seductions. But though concubinage in Tonkin was freely accepted by both parties, the Tonkinois did not approve of their daughters being carried away

into what they looked upon as hopeless slavery ; so when the supercargo of a British vessel endeavoured to take back to Hindostan one of these ladies, with whom he had carried on a *liaison* during his sojourn in Tonkin, her friends interfered. The Englishman refused to surrender his mistress, who herself was willing enough to accompany him ; the natives attacked the vessel, determined to release her ; a sharp struggle ensued, in which the British were victorious, and the supercargo carried off his fair prize to his factories at Calcutta.

The conduct of the Tonkinois now changed towards the English merchants in their midst ; their little fortalices were subject to constant attack ; the natives refused to trade with them ; and finally, being reduced to the condition of besieged persons, and fearing death from starvation more than from the assaults of the enemy, the little band of Englishmen gladly welcomed the next Calcutta packet, in which, in the year 1719, they returned to Bengal. The Dutch and Portuguese then took our place in Annam, and the trade of the country passed entirely into their hands ; missionaries of the latter Power establishing their stations all over the country. At intervals, some English merchantman, trading with China, through stress of weather would run into



one of the ports of Annam, and so an irregular communication was maintained between the merchant traders of Bengal and the Annamites. In 1764, the East Indiaman *Admiral Pocock* put in for shelter to the Bay of Tourane, and received much cordial assistance from the King of Hué, who was prompted to these good offices by a Jesuit missionary, Père Lorico.

Some few years later, in 1778, another Indiaman, the *Rumbold*, entered Tourane Bay, and the Jesuit father, accompanied by two mandarins of distinction, begged a passage to Calcutta, where they were cordially received by Warren Hastings. Efforts were made to re-establish commercial relations between the East India Company and Cochin-China, and it was determined by the Governor-General to despatch an embassy to Hué, in order to obtain from the new King those trading privileges which the mandarins led Warren Hastings to believe would readily be granted. A Mr. Chapman was entrusted with the mission, and on the 16th April, 1778, the E.I.C. ship *Amazon*, with the mission on board, left the Hooghly for Hué, accompanied by a small trader, the *Jenny*, which had been freighted by two enterprising merchants. After a lengthened voyage at the very worst season of the year, and after many

vicissitudes, the little squadron dropped anchor in Tourane Bay in the month of August, and Mr. Chapman at once demanded an audience of the King. This was accorded him, but the conduct of the sovereign was so decidedly hostile that the Envoy foresaw the failure of his mission. Insult upon insult was heaped upon him, and very shortly he received private information that his life was in danger. Thus warned, he succeeded in embarking in a native boat, and so regaining the *Amazon*, which was lying at the mouth of the Hué River. On his flight becoming known, the King gave orders for his war-junks to attack the British vessel, which, by reason of adverse winds, was unable to make an offing. For seven days the *Amazon* withstood the unequal contest; but at last, on the 14th November, having beaten off all attacks, she succeeded in reaching Tourane Bay, where she regained company with the *Jenny*, and the two vessels returned without further molestation to Calcutta.

Despite this failure, Lord Macartney, on his voyage to China in 1792, put into Tourane Bay, and as soon as the usurper king—for Gia Long was now an exile in Bangkok—was thoroughly persuaded the British fleet was not the French squadron, the arrival of which he was dreading as the result of

Bishop Pigneau de Béhaine's mission, he received the embassy very favourably. Lord Macartney was not disposed to offer the usurper any material assistance against the French, though he was enabled to calm his fears as to the probability of any active assistance being afforded to Gia Long by the French Government, who were then struggling with united Europe in the early wars of the Revolution.

In 1821, one more effort was made by the East India Company to renew commercial relations with Annam. During Gia Long's reign all efforts to this end it was known would be fruitless. He was firmly convinced that Lord Macartney's mission had been undertaken with the object of strengthening the usurper on the throne, and the influence his French *entourage* possessed over him naturally prevented any cordial reception being given to the advances of the enemies of France. On Gia Long's death the Governor-General of India despatched a mission under Mr. John Crawford to the Court of Hué; but King Minh Mang had a hatred of all Europeans, and he was by no means disposed to welcome an Envoy from a nation which was even then meditating a war against the neighbouring kingdom of Burmah. Wrapping himself up in his Oriental pride, he declined to treat with an envoy from a Governor-

General, and refused even to see Mr. Crawford. He insisted that any documents addressed to his Ministers should come from the King of England, and not through the intermediary of a Colonial Governor. Crawford, however, was a man used to the Oriental character, and was not to be easily rebuffed; by means of that golden salve which works such miracles in the East, he established relations with the Foreign Minister at Hué, and before many weeks had elapsed was enabled to return to Calcutta with a treaty which accorded to English merchants the right of trading with any ports in the kingdom of Annam, save only those in Tonkin.

By degrees commercial relations were re-established; no recurrences of the unfortunate episode of 1719 have served to mar the good feeling existing between British traders and Annam merchants. We have never found it necessary to order our ships of war to bombard villages on the sea-coast in order to support our missionaries, nor have we, under the pretext of spreading the Catholic religion, wrested from the kings of Annam their most fertile provinces. Consequently the British flag is welcomed in Annam ports, and four-fifths of the export trade of the country is in the hands of British merchants.

In spite of the enormous difficulties she must in-

evitably encounter, it cannot be doubted that France will eventually succeed in the war she has so light-heartedly undertaken. No Oriental Power can hope to withstand European arms and European discipline; the magnitude of their forces may enable them to prolong operations, they may gain fitful successes, the ranks of their foes may be decimated by disease, but skill in the long run must overcome brute force, and breechloaders drive the matchlock out of the field.

But in thus predicting French success, I am by no means sure that the campaign will redound to the glory of France, nor am I sure that she will emerge from it with anything beyond the barren honour of victory; and if China can only interest Europe in her cause, which there is some probability of her doing, France will have to satisfy herself with a serious deficit in her finances and an infinitesimal acquisition to her colonies.

The Court of Peking is well aware of the uncertain tenure of power French Governments possess. The popularity of the Republic may vanish in the battle-clouds of a defeat, and the restoration of a Monarchy may depend on the consummation of peace. The death-blow of the First Empire was struck in the retreat to Moscow; the Third Republic may be

shattered in the southern wilds of China. M. Ferry is playing a dangerous game, one in which the defeat of the Tricolour means the victory of the White flag of France. China knows this full well, and her course is clear as noon-day. She has full instructions from her old leader Gordon, and she need only follow them to the letter in order to sicken the people of France of a policy which can lead to nothing except a little empty glory, and to a great deal of very real taxation.

So long as operations are confined to the delta of the Red River, and English coal is placed at the disposal of the French Government, General Millot will have little difficulty in carrying out his instructions to open Tonkin to French commerce; but if the rights of neutrality are strictly observed, and supplies of coal interdicted, the passage of steamers up the Red River will be impossible, and France will then be compelled to organise land-transport trains, in which she has had no experience and for which she has no aptitude. And even should the supply of coal prove plentiful, and steam-launches economise the transport as far as Hung Hoa, when once that place is captured, the Chinese will only have to retire inland and harass the French garrisons from points beyond the range of their river gunboats. The

country is not well adapted for military operations when once the neighbourhood of the river is abandoned. Hitherto, all the French successes in 1872, in 1882, and in 1883 have been gleaned when their troops have been fighting under cover of the ships' guns. On every occasion that advances have been made inland—even as much as five or six miles—failure has been the result. Garnier and Rivière were both killed and their forces defeated within a couple of miles of Hanoi; Bouët was entangled in the intricate rice-fields five miles from the same town, and driven back in disgrace on his entrenchments. At the capture of Son Tay, when the troops were held back until the enemies' works had been well searched out by the shells from the heavy guns of the flotilla, the French losses were more than half those sustained by them at either the Alma or Inkermann; and these losses, be it remembered, do not include the casualties in the Annamite tirailleurs. If every petty fortress in the Red River is to cost France from 300 to 400 in killed and wounded, she will need still heavier reinforcements before embarking on the task of punishing China for what M. Ferry is pleased to call her perfidy.

The total French losses in the campaign of 1860 were but 12 killed and 271 wounded; already their

casualties in Tonkin have exceeded 1000 *hors-de-combat*. France has now a far more formidable foe to encounter than she met twenty years ago—one who realises to the utmost the value of delay in war. For when an enemy is carrying on operations at a distance from his base, heavy losses can be inflicted on him in other ways than in action. Already Admiral Courbet has so gauged the fighting qualities of his opponents, that it is said he has decided not to risk an attack on Bac Ninh until after the arrival of fresh reinforcements, and this delay will bring the French into the third rainy season since Rivière occupied Hanoi. The real losses of the French, the real difficulties of the campaign, will commence when the tactics of the Chinese compel them to leave the friendly shelter of the Red River, and to advance into the mountainous regions to its north. If such operations are ever undertaken—and China can never be reached unless they are—an army not of 15,000, but of 50,000 at least, will be necessary; and to lead such an army into an unknown country will tax indeed the ability of any general on the French Army List, whilst the Intendance Militaire will be fairly puzzled how to arrange for the transport of such a force. The huge unwieldy waggons which accompany French corps during the autumn manœuvres are little suitable



for Oriental warfare ; the equipment of the French soldier, which is only supplemented by a helmet in Tonkin, is equally badly adapted for the service the army is now entering on ; the field-guns, with their heavy iron carriages and limbers, have already been found too cumbersome for the soft marshy roads of the delta ; in fact, the 30,000,000 francs which have already been voted will be all swallowed up in equipping an army corps for Eastern service.

It is not only on shore that France must be prepared to fight. China possesses a fleet admirably adapted for coast defence, and more than one cruiser, which should effectually interfere with the passage of the reinforcements France is now despatching to Tonkin. With an able and energetic man at the head of naval affairs in Peking, the corvettes *Tchao Yung*, *Jangwei*, or *Kiangsu*, with their heavy guns and high rates of speed, should make no difficulty in capturing the transport *Vinhloug*, with its precious freight of 1300 French soldiers, or the still more valuable telegraphic cable now *en route* to Saigon.

In fact, it is on the sea that China might reap her first victories, for she possesses ironclads of a type which, if properly handled, the French squadron in Eastern waters dare not face. From her sea-board

populations she can draw many thousands of admirable seamen—many trained in English schools—and if she can succeed in enlisting on her side some of the many unemployed British and American naval officers, who in time of war are as the Free Lances of old, there is no reason why a Chinese squadron should not retaliate on Saigon for the injuries inflicted on Tonkin.

On sea as on land, China's greatest weakness is in officers; her men fight with undeniable gallantry, they are well armed, and possess military attributes which make them especially valuable for irregular warfare, and no other warfare is possible in the districts to which they will eventually lead the campaign. Did she possess a sprinkling of Europeans she might yet prove victorious. But though she can scarcely hope to succeed, she knows full well that Europe, which is fast realising the value of her trade, will not permit her to be crushed by any indemnity France may think fit to impose on her. She possesses a valuable ally in Germany, and she is sure to obtain good military counsel from the German officers in her employ. China can afford to prolong the war; the loss of a fortress or two in Tonkin is of no moment to her, and even if the whole Kingdom of Annam is wrested from her, she

will have the satisfaction of knowing that the operations for its reduction cost the French more than the Crimean War, and that its maintenance will entail an annual loss to the Republic which she can ill afford to bear.

If France were wise she would withdraw from these foolhardy operations while there is yet time, and would consider her honour satisfied by the capture of Son Tay. It is now too late for M. Ferry to try and impose on his countrymen the idea that the possession of Tonkin is necessary to ensure the safety of Cochin-China; a study of maps has been going on in the country since those words were spoken, and voters are now aware that Annam intervenes between the colony founded in 1862 and the province Garnier tried to conquer ten years later. It is, of course, evident that the intention of the present Ministry is to annex the whole of the western portion of Further India from Saigon to the Chinese frontiers, and by force of arms to compel the trade of Yunnan to pass into Europe by the Red River, thus check-mating our attempts to reach China from Bhamo. Her past colonial history should teach France that if Annam proves a valuable province, she may rest assured that the next great European war will see it transferred to some other flag; if, on the other hand,

French estimates of its value have been erroneous, and it proves as unhealthy as Senegal and as expensive as Cochin-China, she will be hampered with it for eternity.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### FRANCE AS A COMMERCIAL POWER.

FEW things strike the English resident in France more forcibly than the general ignorance of the mass even of educated French people, not only of the manners and customs of foreign countries, but also of everything outside their own immediate business. The ludicrous mistakes which are of daily occurrence in leading journals, such as the *Débats* and the *Temps*, when discussing our own country, would be considered unpardonable if committed by a third-rate provincial English paper in the treatment of French questions, and would speedily be answered by sheaves of letters to the unfortunate editor; but in France the gravest errors are permitted to pass unchallenged, and thus the average standard of information possessed by the masses is very low indeed. If the ignorance of the French with regard to other nations

is astounding, what can be said of the jealousy they display towards them? Officially and unofficially, the most glaring falsehoods are circulated with a view of stirring up this feeling, which for many centuries was almost exclusively reserved for the English, but which, since 1870, has been as vehemently directed towards the Germans, whom the French are pleased to style *les barbares du Nord*. It is this jealousy of foreigners which has given rise to the policy of colonial expansion, and in order to enable the Ministry to gain the support of the "sovereign people" they have traded freely on the national characteristics of ignorance and jealousy. To permit the country to remain in ignorance of its own colonial history, and to foment jealousy of the peaceful successes of other nations, is the course which is being at present pursued by Ministerial prints. *Les droits et l'honneur de la France* is the text on which many a recent speech, many a blatant leading article, have been based, both speaker and writer ignoring the fact that these pretended rights have been established by acts repugnant to all civilised nations.

The whole history of the French operations in Tonkin shows them to have been actuated simply by jealousy of England. The treaty entered into

in 1787, between Louis XVI. and Prince Canh Dzue, was due, as I have pointed out, to the initiative of the combatant prelate, Bishop Pigneau de Béhaine, and was solely for the purpose of weakening England's supremacy in the East. Dupuis, Garnier, Admiral Dupré, Rivière, all acted with the same end in view, as their writings plainly show. Of the many books which have appeared in France on the Tonkin question, there is not one which does not openly breathe the spirit of hostility to England; which does not endeavour to point out by that most unreliable of all methods, commercial statistics, that France, without much effort, can not only regain her lost colonial greatness, but can also efface other colonial Powers. The successes attendant on her enterprises of the eighteenth century are dwelt on with much complacency, but the means by which those successes were obliterated are conveniently omitted. French journals, of all shades of political opinion, have been equally blameworthy in their tone, equally untrustworthy in their statements.

The success of France in any colonial undertaking must of necessity benefit England, and no one would welcome such successes more cordially than ourselves. To see a firm Government established in the eastern provinces of Further India, to see

the fertile districts of Annam and Tonkin brought under the sway of European civilisation, and to see the markets of Southern China placed in connection with those of Europe would be a consummation of unqualified advantage to English commerce. What we have to dread is that ere the end is accomplished, if the French Government pursues its present policy of force, falsehood, and fraud, such a tempest will be stirred up in the Far East, such bitter feelings of hostility aroused between the disciples of Eastern and Western civilisation, that the peace of the world will be endangered and we drawn into the struggle.

Blind to the past, the French profess to see in each fresh acquisition of territory fresh markets for their produce. M. Thureau writes : “ Le commerce français traverse une crise terrible, c’est là un fait aussi déplorable qu’incontesté.

“ L’une des causes principales de cette crise connue de tout le monde c’est la diminution de nos débouchés.

“ Les vastes marchés des deux mondes, où nous n’avions pas autrefois d’autres concurrents que les Anglais, sont inondés depuis quelques années par les produits de nos anciens tributaires—les Américains, les Autrichiens, les Espagnols, les Italiens, et les Allemands. Nos acheteurs sont peu à peu devenus eux-mêmes producteurs. Partout où nous avons



naguère des débouchés assurés, nous ne rencontrons plus aujourd'hui qu'une concurrence redoutable, et cette concurrence a même pénétré jusqu'au cœur de notre pays.

“ Le producteur français, placé entre l'ouvrier qui tous les jours élève ses prétensions et le commerçant étranger qui l'écrase par le bon marché de ses produits, est forcé d'abandonner la lutte, s'il veut échapper au sort qui l'attend fatalement—la hideuse banqueroute.

“ Les conséquences inévitables de cette situation sont celles-ci : la ruine de notre commerce, les bouleversements sociaux, la décadence de notre pays.

“ Mais le mal, si grand qu'il soit, n'est pas irréparable, l'un des principaux remèdes est bien connu : il faut sans plus tarder ouvrir à notre commerce de nouveaux débouchés.

\* \* \* \* \*

“ Après les preuves de vitalité qu'a données notre pays nous n'avons pas le droit de désespérer de son avenir. Plus que jamais nous devons être présents sur tous les points du globe habité.

\* \* \* \* \*

“ Eh bien ! c'est dans l'extrême Orient au Tonkin que notre commerce trouvera les plus beaux débouchés qu'il puisse ambitionner. Non seulement cette contrée habitée par douze millions d'individus

recevra nos marchandises, mais elle nous renverra ses riches produits de toutes sortes.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Ce n'est pas tout; cette contrée est traversée par un cours d'eau navigable, Le Fleuve Rouge, qui met en communication directe avec la mer les plus belles provinces de la Chine méridionale, et particulièrement le Yunnan, dont les mines sont les plus riches du globe.

“L'ouverture de cette voie de communication, qui mettra en rapport avec le commerce international cinquante millions d'individus, est attendue avec impatience par toutes les nations civilisées.

“Bientôt la France proclamera la liberté du commerce et de la navigation dans cette belle et riche contrée.”

M. Ferry, as Foreign Minister, has more than once given expression to the same sentiments, even going so far as to suggest emigration to Cochin-China, where the death rate amongst the troops has for the last five years averaged ninety-seven per thousand! M. de Saint Vallier, without venturing on detail, said in the Senate on the 13th of March, 1883: “Il est nécessaire, essentiel que la France se hâte de développer, d'étendre, d'agrandir son système colonial.” But although, as M. Ferry re-

marked, this is the opinion of all economists, of all men of experience who were not blinded by political passions, it does not appear that French colonies do benefit French commerce. Until France takes a new departure as a maritime Power, it is practically impossible for her to become a commercial one. Her steam tonnage is just one-tenth of that of England, and by far the greater number of her finer vessels belong to companies largely subsidised by Government and are employed on services totally unconnected with the development of her colonies. The total steam tonnage possessed by France is 66,747, and over one quarter of this is owned by the Messageries Maritimes and the great Transatlantic lines, whilst a certain amount belongs to the coasting trade. For France to compete on the sea with England, whose steam fleet exceeds 6,000,000 tons, is at present a matter of impossibility; and as a proof that the carrying trade, even of her long-established colonies, is in our hands, I may mention that over sixty per cent. of the tonnage that annually enters Saigon sails under the Union Jack, only four per cent. flying the Tricolour.

Just ten years ago, through the peaceable exertions of M. Philastre, the Red River of Tonkin was nominally opened to international commerce. It would not

have been a matter of surprise if French trade had been turned to this new débouché. But what has been the result? The English, Chinese, American, German, even Dutch, ships have far outnumbered those of the French trading with that country. Of all the foreign vessels that entered Haiphong between 1874 and 1882, only four per cent. were French. France, of course, benefits directly and indirectly by every new port she opens. The heavy duties which cripple her home industries are not absent from her colonial Custom-houses, and a considerable number of her sons are provided for in the Customs and other services of her distant colonies. But the trade to these colonies is in other hands, and it is this fact which gives rise to the jealousy of our neighbours. It is English trade which practically supports her large Customs establishments, and English capitalists who benefit so largely from all her colonial enterprises.

If Tonkin, or even Annam, could be annexed and pacified by other means than those suggested by M. de Grainville and M. Thureau, if France could extend her colonies without interfering with international commerce, we should be the first to welcome the revival of that spirit which gave her a Duplex and a La Bourdonnaye. We are too securely seated

in our colonial possessions to dread France as a rival, nor are the blessings that she showers on her newly acquired provinces of such a nature as to make the advent of the French welcome in the East. The Government of the Republic is not a cheap Government, as the Budget for 1884 showed us; and the extravagance which is permissible in France, under the eyes of the electors, can be indulged in with greater freedom in a distant colony, the rulers of which are as yet uncurbed by a free press.

The Eastern colonies of France give employment to a vast army of officials and to a considerable force of soldiery, but they provide a home for few private individuals. Cochin-China, with a population of one-and-a-half millions, exclusive of its customs, has a taxation exceeding 21,000,000 francs a year, and, in addition to 4500 French soldiers, it has to support 1862 officials of divers sorts. If such an establishment is necessary for the efficient government and protection of a small dependency with a large sea-board, it may be well to inquire what force France will consider advisable to locate in Tonkin. There is as much difference between the inhabitants of Tonkin and of Saigon as between those of the Punjab and of Bengal. The population of the northern provinces of Annam is at any rate five

times as numerous as that of the southern, and certainly more than five times as warlike. It is doubtful if an army of occupation of 20,000 men would be sufficient to extract from them taxation amounting to ten shillings per head of population.

France has failed to realise that colonies founded by force of arms are not always the most profitable, though her past experiences of Algeria and of Cochin-China should have taught her the lesson. Civilisation can be spread by other means than by extermination of the aborigines, and commerce does not always follow in the wake of an ironclad. She went to Cochin-China, according to M. Deschanel of the *Débats*, to support the missionaries ; she has gone to Tonkin, says M. Ferry, to avenge Henri Rivière ; she must annex the whole Kingdom of Annam, says M. de Saint Vallier, in order to extend and develop her colonial system. What this system is no man can say ; hitherto under the present Republic it has consisted in the forcible conquest of lands to which France has no earthly claim, and in which she has by the most unjustifiable means stirred up war and bloodshed. The seizure of Hanoi by Garnier in 1874 and by Rivière in 1882, were acts as indefensible as Admiral Pierre's bombardment of Tamatave, or as Admiral Galibet's subsequent wholesale destruction

of coast towns. The cruel executions which accompanied the march of military events in Tonkin were far more reprehensible than the brutal conduct of the commander in Madagascar.

It is not by such acts as these that colonies are founded or commerce spread, but by the peaceful development of trade. Already Germany, who has vanquished France on what she vainly thought was her great coign of vantage—the battle-field—is defeating her in the arts of peace. Her merchant navy is very little inferior to that of the Republic, her Eastern trade is far greater, and what must be more galling still, Haiphong and Saigon are more frequented by German than by French ships. Colonies do not necessarily produce commerce, nor do successful wars always bring peace and plenty in their train. For thirteen years the Government of the Republic has been pursuing a policy of stern repression at home, and the result has been disastrous to finance and to trade. Liberty of action and freedom of thought are practically forbidden to the people of France, and yet the Ministry think that all discontent will be removed and that trade will be revived by hoisting the Tricolour over a few mud villages in Eastern lands.

It is in France herself that the progress of

development must commence; it is there that civilisation and liberty and freedom are needed. When the Augean stable of official corruption and national impurity is cleansed, when a healthy, pure tone pervades French manhood, when her children are inculcated with principles of candour, of truth, and of virtue, then may French statesmen anticipate a revival of national greatness. Until then she will wallow in the slough of national decadence, a source of danger to the civilised world, so far as her foreign policy is concerned, and the mark of scorn for all who scoff at the freedom of Republican institutions.



## APPENDIX.

---

LE PRINCE KONG AU COMTE DE ROCHECHOUART, CHARGÉ  
D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE EN CHINE.

PÉKIN, le 15 *Juin*, 1875.

J'AI reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire à la date du 25 Mai, et dans laquelle vous me faisiez part de la ratification du traité entre l'Annam et la France. En me donnant communication d'une copie de ce traité, vous exprimez le désir de voir le Gouvernement chinois envoyer des ordres précis aux autorités du Yunnan leur enjoignant d'empêcher les bandes chinoises d'entrer sur le territoire annamite, et de rappeler les bandes qui s'y sont introduites. "De cette façon," dites-vous, "nos bonnes relations seront maintenues et affermies." Vous m'entretenez également de la communication qui existe entre l'Annam et la Chine par le moyen du Song Coi, qui après avoir traversé le Tonkin pénètre dans le province du Yunnan. Ce point,

me dites-vous, ne se trouve pas indiqué dans le traité, parce qu'on ne pouvait prévoir alors la situation actuelle ; mais maintenant que cette question se présente, il importe qu'elle soit réglée dans le plus bref délai. Le Gouvernement français vous a chargé de vous entendre avec nous sur ces deux questions :

1. L'anéantissement des bandes chinoises qui désolent l'Annam.

2. L'ouverture d'un port du Yunnan où vos steamers puissent atterrir et se livrer à des transactions commerciales régulières.

Dans la onzième lune de la douzième année du règne de Tong-tchi, j'ai reçu une lettre de M. de Geoffroy, contenant la copie d'une lettre adressée par ce dernier au Gouverneur de Yunnan, dans laquelle il était question des avantages que recueillerait le commerce de l'ouverture de cette province. J'ai répondu à M. de Geoffroy que le Yunnan n'était pas ouvert au commerce étranger, et j'ai écrit au Gouverneur de cette province de conformer sa conduite aux stipulations du traité. Maintenant que votre Gouvernement réclame l'ouverture d'un port sur le Song Coi, je suis obligé de répondre également que le Yunnan est fermé au commerce étranger, et que dès lors dans votre traité ni dans celui d'aucune nation il ne saurait y avoir de stipula-

tion relative à l'ouverture d'un port de commerce dans le Yunnan.

L'Annam est la contrée appelée également Yuenan ; elle a *été depuis longtemps et est encore* tributaire de la Chine, et les habitants de la frontière chinoise ont eu de tout temps avec les habitants des états tributaires voisins des rapports commerciaux, dont la nature varie suivant les provinces. Il est nécessaire que j'envoie une dépêche pour ordonner une enquête au Yunnan à ce sujet ; dès que la réponse me sera parvenue, nous nous occuperons de délibérer sur cette affaire.

D'un autre côté, l'Annam était jadis infesté de brigands, et son Gouvernement a à plusieurs reprises demandé du secours à la Chine. La Chine ne pouvait refuser aide et protection à *un pays tributaire* ; aussi envoya-t-elle des troupes pour poursuivre ces brigands ; les troupes qui se trouvent dans l'Annam y sont donc sur la demande du Gouvernement annamite, et dans le but de protéger la frontière ; ce but une fois atteint, leur présence sur le territoire annamite n'avait plus de raison d'être et on les a rappelées.

THE END.















